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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter presents the research domain, problems and contributions of this
thesis. First, it introduces the concept of Wireless Sensor Networks, especially
highlighting their most distinguishing features, which differentiate them from
other computing paradigms and makes them attractive for use in countless ap-
plication scenarios. This chapter also shows how these particular features affect,
to a considerable extent, the security and privacy of the network and the envi-
ronment being monitored. Subsequently, the various sorts of privacy problems
arising from the deployment and use of Wireless Sensor Networks are described
and then the chapter concentrates on the privacy issues arising from the analysis
of the traffic generated by these networks. The main problem addressed in this
thesis, i.e., the location privacy problem, is then considered. This problem is
motivated with a critical scenario where safeguarding location information is of
paramount importance for the safety and survivability of both the network and
the entities being monitored. Finally, this chapter ends with a list of the main
contributions underpinning this thesis and a brief description of its research goals
and the outline of the following chapters.
1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks
In the near future the world is expected to be teeming with a huge amount of
smart and interacting objects offering potentially tremendous opportunities both
to industry and final users. In a foreseeable scenario such a this, already known
as the Internet of Things [137], everyday objects will be fitted with computational
1
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
and sensing capabilities. This thesis concentrates on one of its supporting tech-
nologies, Wireless Sensor Networks, and some of the privacy implications arising
from their deployment in different scenarios for monitoring purposes.
A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) [49] is a distributed network consisting of
two types of devices, namely, the sensor nodes and the base stations. The sensor
nodes (or motes) are matchbox-sized computers which have the ability to monitor
the physical phenomena occurring in their vicinity and to wirelessly communicate
with devices nearby. To the contrary, the base station (or sink) is a powerful de-
vice, usually a computer, that collects and processes all the information collected
by the nodes. The base station serves as an interface between the sensor nodes
and the users. In some sense, sensor nodes extend the capabilities of ordinary
computers by allowing them to feel and interact with the world around them. In
this metaphoric view of WSNs [123], the sensor nodes represent the sensory cells,
the wireless channels behave as the nerves, and the base station can be regarded
as the brain of a living organism.
Sensor nodes can be fitted with a large variety of physical sensors (e.g., tem-
perature, presence, vibration, radiation, etc.), which makes of WSNs a highly
customisable technology capable of performing many diverse tasks. The versa-
tility of the devices combined with their small size permit sensor networks to be
unobtrusively embedded into systems for the purpose of monitoring and control-
ling very diverse environments and assets. In fact, WSNs have been successfully
applied to precision agriculture and farming [66, 82], habitat and environmental
monitoring [78, 85, 87], e-health and assisted-living control [33, 147], industrial
control and critical infrastructure protection [19, 45], structural health monitor-
ing [23, 65], homeland security and military applications [47, 51], among many
others.
One of the most distinguishing features of WSNs is the severe hardware lim-
itations of sensor nodes. From an architectural point of view, these tiny devices
consist of four essential components [3]: the sensing unit, the processing unit, the
transceiver, and the power unit (see Figure 1.1a). The sensing unit consists of
a series of physical sensors which provides the node with the ability to measure
different environmental conditions, as previously stated. The processing unit con-
sists of a simple micro-controller whose computational capabilities and memory
space are limited to a few Megahertz (typically between 8 and 16Mhz) and a few
kilobytes (typically between 4 and 10kB for RAM memory, and between 48 and









(b) LilyPad [11] (c) TelosB [91] (d) SunSPOT [96]
Figure 1.1: Wireless Sensor Nodes
128kB for instruction memory), respectively. Although this is the most typical
configuration for sensor nodes, these values may vary depending on the applica-
tion scenario they are intended for. Therefore, we can distinguish three classes
of sensor nodes: extremely constrained sensor nodes, typical sensor nodes, and
high-performance sensor nodes. Figure 1.1 shows one example of a sensor node
for each of these categories.
The transceiver allows the sensor node to send and receive messages wirelessly
at a low data rate (between 70 and 250kB/s) usually in the 2.4 Ghz spectrum.
Furthermore, the maximum communication range outdoors is around 100 meters
for low-power configurations. The power unit is in charge of supplying energy
to all the components. Finally, note that the sensor node might be fitted with
some optional components depending on the application’s requirements. These
components include, but are not limited to, localisation systems (e.g., GPS chips),
power scavengers (e.g., solar panels), mobilizers, and external flash memories.
The power unit is, in fact, the most limiting factor in sensor nodes because all
other components depend on it to operate. Since the power unit usually consists
of two AA batteries (i.e., 3 volts), which cannot be replaced or recharged once the
network has been deployed, all other components must use energy responsibly.
This issue has several important implications, for example in the operating speed
of the nodes. The most common built-in micro-controllers can operate at different
speeds [12, 134] but due to the limited voltage supplied by the batteries, by default
the operating system of the sensor nodes reduces the speed to the minimum. Also,
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it is well known that the energy consumed by the transceiver is far greater than
the energy consumed by the micro-controller [132]1 and thereby it is advisable to
favour computation over transmissions.
The communication model in WSNs is clearly affected by the previous fea-
tures. Although the data reporting methods in WSNs can be either time-driven,
query-driven, or event-driven, the latter is the most usual mainly due to the fact
that it is suitable for time-critical applications as well as being energy efficient.
In the event-driven model, a sensor node starts reporting data to the base station
immediately after an event of interest (i.e., a (sudden) change to the properties of
a particular phenomenon) has been detected in its vicinity and stays silent other-
wise. Consequently, if there are no events to be reported, the energy consumption
of the nodes is moderately low. Moreover, since the transmission power of the
nodes is usually not sufficient (or too energy consuming) to establish a direct com-
munication with the base station, the data source uses multi-hop communications
to deliver the sensed data.
Many routing protocols have been devised to allow remote sensor data to
reach the base station [4]. However, there are two main approaches that stand
out from others, namely flooding-based and single-path routing protocols. A
baseline flooding is a simple routing algorithm in which every incoming message
is transmitted to all its neighbours but the one which sent it2. Recipient nodes
repeat the process thereby making the packet eventually visit all the nodes in the
network. This approach is very reliable because it provides a lot of redundancy
but it is also very energy inefficient because in a typical WSN the only intended
recipient is the base station. On the contrary, a single-path (or shortest-path)
routing protocol is intended to minimise the number of relaying nodes to reach
the destination of the message. In a single-path routing, whenever a node has
event data to transmit, it sends a message to a neighbouring node which is closer3
to the base station than itself. This process is repeated for each of the nodes in
the communication path until the data is eventually delivered to the base station,
as depicted in Figure 1.2. All future messages from the same source node will
1The analysis is based on the Mica2 sensor platform, which uses an Atmel128L micro-
controller and a CC1100 chip transceiver. When active, the micro-controller consumes 8mA
while the radio consumes 7mA in listening mode and up to 21.5mA for maximum transmission
power (+10dB).
2Actually, every neighbour receives the message but the original sender discards the message.
3The distance is usually measured in terms of the number of hops (i.e., intermediaries) that
are necessary to reach a particular node.
1.2. Overview of Security in Wireless Sensor Networks 5
BSInternet
user sensor nodes
Figure 1.2: Communication model in WSNs
follow the same path unless a topology change (e.g., due to the death of a node)
occurs.
Additionally, some sensor networks may take advantage of data aggregation
protocols to further reduce network traffic on its way to the base station. Data
aggregation consists of a set of operations (e.g., counting, average, maximum,
minimum) that are performed at some intermediate points of the network to
combine the data originating from different sources.
1.2 Overview of Security in Wireless Sensor Net-
works
Despite the unprecedented benefits that WSNs bring to our society, there are
many relevant issues that demand meticulous attention. Sensor networks are in-
herently insecure and the severe hardware limitation of sensor nodes requires most
well-founded security solutions, which can effectively protect traditional computer
networks, have to be adapted or they simply do not work on these devices. Ad-
ditionally, the unattended nature of these networks (i.e., once deployed, usually
in remote or hostile environments, no network maintenance is done) provides an
attacker physical access to the devices, which are rarely tamper-resistant due to
the implications in the overall cost of the network. Furthermore, the broadcast
nature of the transmission medium gives access to the packets exchanged by the
sensor nodes to anyone within the communication range.
Consequently, adversaries may take advantage of the distinguishing features
of WSNs in order to launch attacks against the network. Sensor networks are
particularly vulnerable to attackers who may hinder the correct operation of the
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network and thus annul all the potential benefits of this technology. Based on
their capabilities, adversaries can be classified as [142]:
• Internal – external : the distinction between an internal or an external at-
tacker lies in whether the attacker is a member of the network or an out-
sider. External attacks are performed by entities which do not belong to
the network, while internal attacks are performed by legitimate nodes which
behave in an unintended way.
• Passive – active: the distinguishing feature between these attackers resides
in their ability to disrupt the normal network operation. A passive attacker
is an eavesdropper and limits his actions to merely observing the messages
exchanged by the sensor nodes. In contrast, the active attacker does not
only listen but may introduce new packets, modify or block packets in
transit, tamper with the devices, or a combination of these.
• Mote-class – laptop-class : the main difference between these attackers is on
their hardware resources. A mote-class adversary has capabilities similar
to an ordinary sensor node while the laptop-class adversary can use pow-
erful devices with greater transmission range, processing power, memory
storage, and energy budget than typical sensor nodes. A similar distinction
is made between local and global attackers when referring to the ability of
the attacker to control only a part or the whole network.
The most challenging security-related task in WSNs is to maintain the avail-
ability of the network due to the constrained and unattended nature of the nodes,
which cannot do much to protect themselves. A powerful adversary can easily
target the devices themselves, the batteries, or the communication channels, in
order to disrupt the network operation. Nonetheless, there are some other threats
which do not necessarily affect the availability but rather the confidentiality and
integrity of the communications or the system as a whole. Some of these attacks
may affect several security properties at once. Below we provide a non-exhaustive
list of potential threats affecting WSNs [139]:
• Denial of service attacks are any action that reduces or neutralises the abil-
ity of a device or network to perform as expected. A standard DoS attack is
jamming, which consists of the transmission of a signal that interferes with
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and affects the frequency spectrum used by the sensor nodes. Similar at-
tacks may also be launched at the link layer by generating collisions, at the
routing layer by dropping packets, or at the application layer by flooding a
sensor node with so many requests that it eventually runs out of memory
or battery.
• Information flow attacks target the communication channels in order to
compromise the confidentiality and/or the integrity of the transmissions.
An attacker may simply observe the communications but he may also in-
tercept, modify, replay or fabricate messages. The first type of attack is
intended to retrieve valuable information from the packets traversing the
network while the remaining attacks mainly focus on deceiving the base
station to accept a false data value or are part of a more sophisticated
attack.
• Physical attacks are actions targeting the hardware components of the sen-
sor nodes. In this type of attacks the adversary has physical access to the
sensor node and may access any information contained in it, such as the
event data, the program binaries, or the cryptographic material. Addition-
ally, the attacker may modify information within the sensor node in order
to create a compromised version which is under the control of the adversary.
This is usually the first step in performing the identity attacks described be-
low. Furthermore, the attacker may change the topology of the network by
moving some sensor nodes to a different network position, removing them
or destroying the devices.
• Identity attacks concentrate on spoofing or replicating the identities of le-
gitimate nodes of the network. The Sybil attack is a form of identity attack
where a single node uses multiple (new or stolen) identities. In contrast,
a node replication attack consists of having several nodes in the network
using the same identity. The final goal of these attacks depends on the
application but they are usually effective in obstructing routing algorithms,
intrusion detection and any voting-based mechanisms.
• Protocol attacks concentrate on disrupting routing protocols, data aggre-
gation mechanisms and other platform-specific operations. Attacks on the
routing layer include attracting or deviating network traffic from particular
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regions, increasing latency, or dropping messages. In a selective forwarding
attack a malicious node drops some of the packets it receives based on a
given criteria. A sinkhole attack aims to attract network traffic towards a
particular node controlled by the adversary. In a wormhole attack, a com-
promised node receives packets and tunnels them (e.g., using a directional
wireless link) to another point of the network, and then replays them back
into the network. This behaviour may disrupt some neighbours discovery
mechanisms. Additional attacks include the injection of fake control packets
(i.e., hello flood and acknowledgement spoofing attacks).
Consequently, the need for security mechanisms in WSNs is undeniable and
key management schemes are essential. The goal of key management schemes [158]
is to generate, distribute, update, and revoke the key material necessary to es-
tablish secure (i.e., confidential, unforgeable, and authenticated) communication
channels between nodes. Many of the previous attacks can be countered by this
means, however, implementing robust and efficient security primitives in WSNs,
especially public key cryptography, is very challenging given the resource con-
straints of sensor nodes.
Nonetheless, the use of cryptography is not enough to protect the nodes from
physical attacks. To that end, the hardware layer could integrate some protection
mechanisms, like tamper-resistant modules, but these would significantly increase
the cost of each individual node. A more affordable solution is to use code
obfuscation and data scrambling mechanisms [6], which would slow down and
possibly prevent the analysis of the internals of the nodes. Additionally, the
sensor network may incorporate trust management systems [80] and intrusion
detection systems [9] to further protect the network.
1.3 Privacy in Wireless Sensor Networks
Extensive work has been done on the protection of WSNs from the hardware to
the application layer, however privacy preservation has not received that much
attention in these scenarios. Before sensor networks are pushed to the forefront,
it is absolutely necessary to consider and address all potential privacy risks that
may arise from the adoption of this technology. As a matter of fact, advances in
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Figure 1.3: Classification of Privacy Problems in WSN
technology4 have always revolutionised the way in which privacy is violated and
protected.
We distinguish two major categories of privacy problems due to the deploy-
ment of WSNs. This taxonomy is based on the entity that is aiming to breach
privacy and the entity whose privacy is violated. In the first group, the privacy
perpetrator is the network (owner) itself while, in the second group, an external
entity takes advantage of the network to obtain sensitive information. In either
case, the information obtained by the privacy perpetrator may be related to indi-
viduals or other critical assets. As shown in Figure 1.3, the classification can be
broken down into further categories for specialised problems. This dissertation
concentrates on the part of the tree coloured in grey.
1.3.1 User privacy
The most obvious privacy risk is due to the unobtrusiveness and ubiquity of
sensor nodes, which allows them to inadvertently spy on anyone or anything
within the reach of the network. Moreover, the reduced cost and size of sensor
nodes favour the deployment of large-scale surveillance networks, which may go
unnoticed by unaware individuals. Furthermore, their ability of collaboratively
analyse and automatically correlate data at different periods of time can result
in highly accurate tracking and profiling applications.
4A very good paper by Jan Holvast [53] compiles a history of privacy. The author shows
how the birth of new inventions and technologies (e.g., the printing press, automatic photog-
raphy, the Internet, and so forth) have influenced and invaded the privacy of individuals and
organisations.
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As far back as 1991, Mark Weiser [145] warned of the importance of privacy
protection in ubiquitous computing scenarios, where sensing technologies are one
of the cornerstones of these environments:
“hundreds of computers in every room, all capable of sensing people
near them and linked by high-speed networks, have the potential to
make totalitarianism up to now seem like sheerest anarchy”.
This type of threat cannot be easily tackled by technological means alone;
rather, severe laws, regulations, audits, and sanctions are also absolutely nec-
essary to prevent ill-intentioned entities from invading individual privacy, since
the benefits usually outweigh the consequences. In this case, privacy-friendly
engineering approaches [133] are off-topic because the owner or administrator of
the network is a malicious entity (e.g., a governmental agency) and is therefore
unwilling to admit that the network is used for surveillance activities.
However, legitimate networks may opt to apply a privacy-by-policy approach
thereby informing the user of the collection of personally identifiable information5
and the application of fair information practices to these data. However, making
the sensor network responsible for presenting privacy policies to the user in a
meaningful and unobtrusive way is not a trivial task, especially due to a lack of
adequate interfaces. Another option is to let the user define his/her own privacy
preferences in order to illustrate how much privacy he/she is willing to give up
when interacting with the network. Some approaches [67] have concentrated on
these policy-agreement protocols to protect users privacy but in most cases if
the policies do not agree, the user cannot access the service. Another limitation
to these approaches is how to ensure that the policies are correctly defined and
suitable for each user’s privacy expectations.
A more suitable approach is to follow the privacy-by-architecture (or privacy-
by-design) principle, which not only minimises the collection of personally identi-
fiable information but also promotes client-side data storage and processing. As
personal data only leaves the user domain after sufficient care has been taken to
correctly anonymise and reduce the quality (e.g, by adding noise, reducing the
precision, etc.) of the data in such a way that it is still useful for the provision
of the service but it does not leak private information. An extensive body of
5Personally identifiable information [88] is any information that (a) can be used to distinguish
or trace an individual’s identity, and (b) is linkable to an individal.
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research has concentrated on the disassociation of identity and location informa-
tion [16, 20, 34, 50] because of the criticality of these data. Knowing the location
of a person at a particular moment reveals a lot of information, especially if these
data are periodically accessible. Therefore, if one observes that an individual is at
a particular location at 3 am this might indicate that this individual is at home,
but after continuous observations of the same location the initial hypothesis be-
comes much more plausible.
1.3.2 Network privacy
While it is undoubtedly true that the use of a WSN for surveillance purposes is
detrimental to individual privacy, there are a number of issues that may affect
the privacy of the network itself and, consequently, the privacy of the individuals
and assets it monitors. And more importantly, these new privacy problems are
still present despite the application of fair information practices.
Network privacy problems can be classified as content-oriented and context-
oriented threats [100]. This categorisation is based on the type of data the ad-
versary is interested in or is capable of retrieving from the sensor network.
Content-oriented privacy
Content-oriented privacy threats are mainly due to the ability of an adversary to
observe or in some way manipulate the actual contents of the packets traversing
the network. A clear example scenario is the Smart Grid [46], where smart meters
(i.e., household embedded devices used for measuring utility consumption) use
adjacent meters to relay consumption data to a readings collection device, which
in turn transmits the readings to the utility company for the purpose of billing6.
Clearly, the scenario described (see Figure 1.4) has many similarities to a typical
WSN, where the smart meters behave as sensor nodes and the readings collection
device is like a base station.
6The Smart Grid scenario is far more complex [55], as it also includes the generation, trans-
mission, distribution, operation, and market domains.








Figure 1.4: Simplified Smart Metering Scenario
A first line of defence to protect content-oriented privacy in these scenarios
is to apply secure encryption schemes in order to provide confidentiality and in-
tegrity to the data in transit7. However, this straightforward countermeasure can
only provide protection from a subset of potential adversaries, that is, external
observers. An internal attacker (i.e., a legitimate sensor node controlled by a ma-
licious entity) can still intercept, store, and analyse the data being broadcast by
its neighbours since it owns legitimate decryption keys. To prevent intermediaries
from peeking at the data of other nodes (e.g., the electricity consumption from a
neighbour), it is possible to apply end-to-end encryption between the data source
and the sink. This is a simple and effective solution but it presents at least two
problems, namely, the need for additional key material to allow the destination to
decrypt the messages probably without even knowing the original sender, and the
disruption of some common operations performed by the network. In particular,
end-to-end encryption precludes the use of data aggregation protocols because
intermediate aggregator nodes are unable to combine their own data with that
contained in the packets received.
Therefore, the research community has struggled to develop privacy-aware
data aggregation mechanisms capable of preventing insider attacks. The main
idea behind most of these solutions is to perturb the original data in such a way
that an aggregator cannot obtain the contribution of a single source node even
though the aggregated result remains correct. Some solutions are based on the
7Confidentiality and privacy are different yet related properties. Confidentiality does not
necessarily imply privacy, it only prevents unauthorised access to data. Consequently, if the
original data is personally sensitive, confidentiality helps to enforce privacy, while this is not
the case the other way around.
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addition of noise to the contributions of the sensor nodes in the form of random
values that can later be removed by the aggregator [52]. Some other approaches
leverage on the properties of homomorphic encryption schemes in order to allow
intermediate nodes to aggregate their own data to received packets without the
need to decrypt them. To allow decryption of aggregated data, each node shares
a secret key with the base station [22] or uses multiple random keys from a
network-wide key pool shared (or not) with the base station [159]. Additionally,
some authors have provided solutions to some specific aggregation functions such
as additive [52] and histogram [54, 160] operations. The former proposes slicing
the data into chunks and distributing them to some neighbours, which finally add
(i.e., aggregate) the shares received from all its neighbours before submitting the
result to the base station. The latter uses a histogram of a particular granularity
and each of the sensor nodes informs to the base station of not the real value but
rather the histogram interval where its readings lie.
Finally, some research on protecting query privacy in WSNs has also been
conducted. This problem refers to the ability of an attacker to determine the
contents of a query sent to the network based on (the identities of) the nodes that
respond to that particular query. Some schemes propose hiding the actual target
node by also issuing bogus queries to other sensor nodes in the network [21]. A
similar approach [37] is to issue a query following a particular path in the network
such that the target node is potentially any node in the path. A simpler and
more privacy-preserving solution is to query all sensor nodes in the network any
time a user is interested in data from a particular node. However, this approach
is unfeasible for densely populated sensor networks due to the huge amount of
network traffic generated unless an efficient data-aggregation scheme [42] is used
to reduce the amount of traffic and still provide a perfect privacy protection.
Context-oriented privacy
Context-oriented privacy concerns the protection of the data generated from the
operation of the network. These data are not part of the actual packet contents
exchanged by the sensor nodes, they are instead metadata associated with the
measurement and transmission of the sensed data. Therefore, even if the pay-
loads are suitably protected from eavesdropping, an adversary could obtain other
sensitive information that might compromise the privacy of the network itself
and the privacy of the events being monitored. In fact, the mere presence of
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messages traversing the network is usually indicative that some kind of event is
taking place.
Traffic analysis [107] is a very powerful set of mechanisms that helps to de-
termine information about the entities exchanging information by observing the
attributes of the communications. Pai et al. [101] show how apparently innocuous
(meta)data, obtained from the simple observation of network traffic, can be used
to infer sensitive information about the network:
• The frequency spectrum used for the communication might reveal the sensor
platform being used. Recent technologies (e.g. micaz, IRIS, Imote2) can
be easily distinguished from older ones (e.g. cricket, mica2) as the former
perform in the 2.4 GHz spectrum while the latter perform at sub-GHz
frequencies. So, by using a spectrum analyser, an attacker might be able
to determine the owner of the network since different frequency bands are
assigned and licensed for different purposes and to distinct organisations.
In addition, being able to distinguish the types of sensor nodes in use may
allow an attacker to exploit platform-specific vulnerabilities.
• The transmission rate at which messages are generated and delivered to the
base station is a good indicator of the quantity and nature of the events
being monitored. In event-driven sensor networks, the transmission of mes-
sages reveals the presence of events in the network to an observer. Similarly,
the absence of messages might be an indicator of sensitive information. Con-
sider, for example, a sensor network deployed to monitor the heartbeat of
a patient. A high transmission rate might indicate that the patient is in a
stressful situation, while a low or a complete lack of messages may imply
that the patient is sleeping, has fainted, or has suffered a cardiac arrest.
• The message size provides information about the type and precision of the
data being collected. When a sensor network is used to monitor phenomena
of different granularity (e.g., presence (boolean) and radiation (double)),
the attacker can easily distinguish which type of event data is contained in
each message based on its size. Additionally, the adversary can guess the
purpose of the network given the deployment scenario and the message
length because a coarse-grained data collection is used for slow-varying
phenomena while a fine-grained data collection is suitable for fast-varying
phenomena. Moreover, some data aggregation protocols might introduce
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privacy issues because as the nodes incorporate their own data to received
messages, the messages increase in size. This feature can help the adversary
determine the proximity to the base station since the lengthy packet has
traversed many nodes.
• The communication pattern might reveal information about the network
topology. Any solution for WSNs is especially tailored to preserve the
limited battery of sensor nodes in order to extend the lifetime of the network.
In particular, the event-driven data reporting model and the use of shortest-
path routing protocols is intended to reduce the high cost associated with
wireless communications. However, an adversary can exploit these features
to discover the location of important network nodes, generally the data
sources and the base station.
An additional contextual privacy consideration is made by Kamat et al. [61],
who suggest that it is also important to hide the time of occurrence of events
because this information may allow an adversary to predict future behaviours of
the phenomenas being monitored by the network. This privacy problem, known
as temporal privacy, is especially relevant in mobile asset monitoring applications
since the adversary may guess the pattern of movement of these assets.
Admittedly, some of the problems introduced by these features can be cir-
cumvented by implementing simple countermeasures, like a fixed message size
regardless of the length of the contents. However, concealing the information
associated with some other features is less straightforward. Preventing the dis-
closure of location information about relevant network nodes is a particularly
challenging and safety-critical task.
1.4 Location Privacy in Wireless Sensor Net-
works
Based on the original privacy definition by Alan F. Westin [5], location privacy
can be defined as the desire to determine under what circumstances and to what
extent location information is exposed to other entities. Therefore, location pri-
vacy in WSNs aims to preserve the location of relevant nodes in the network.
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More precisely, it focuses on preventing an adversary from determining the loca-
tion of the data sources and the base station. These are called respectively the
source- and the receiver-location privacy problems.
1.4.1 Motivating Scenario
In order to illustrate the importance of location privacy problems in WSNs and
to facilitate future analysis and discussion, we present a motivating scenario that
captures the most distinguishing features of both source-location and receiver-
location privacy. The criticality of the scenario highlights the importance of the
problem and the need to develop solutions to protect from adversaries.
Consider a military environment like the one depicted in Figure 1.5, where
a large number of sensor nodes are deployed in a vast area for the purpose of
monitoring the movements and whereabouts of the troops and assets (e.g., arma-
ments, tanks, drones, etc.) belonging to a military force. The goal of the network
is to better coordinate and control the troops during attack and reconnaissance
missions. Doubtlessly, the deployment of a monitoring sensor network can mean
a significant advantage over the enemy.
BS
Figure 1.5: Sensor Network Deployment for Military Operations
Given the critical nature of the scenario, information must be processed and
analysed in real time. Therefore, immediately after the detection of an event of
interest (e.g., the presence of troops) in the area controlled by a sensor node,
the collected information is transmitted towards the base station on a multi-hop
basis. Typically, single-path or flooding-based routing algorithms are used. As
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long as the event persists, the corresponding sensor node will continue to generate
new traffic, which is expected to reach the sink in the shortest time possible. In
the meantime, an adversary (i.e., the enemy) will try to exploit the deployed
infrastructure for his own benefit.
The importance of source-location privacy is not the protection of the hard-
ware itself but on the need to hide to presence of events in the field. Especially
sensitive scenarios are those involving individuals and valuable assets, like the
military scenario depicted in Figure 1.5. An adversary who knows the location
of a source node can determine with sufficient precision the area where an event
has been detected, meaning that the enemy is capable of uncovering the location
of targets in order to attack them. Moreover, protecting the location of the base
station is extremely important because if it is compromised or even destroyed,
the whole system is rendered useless. Besides the physical protection of the net-
work, the location of the base station is strategically sensitive because this key
device is most likely housed in a highly-relevant facility. In the military scenario
under consideration, the attacker can accomplish a more devastating attack by
targeting the base station, which is located within the headquarters of its enemy.
Despite the criticality of the military scenario, the location privacy problems
are extensible to any conceivable scenario due to the singular communication
pattern of WSNs. The attacker may exploit these properties to find the base
station or data sources. To better understand the threat we must confront, it is
necessary to know the general features of the adversarial model. The adversary is
assumed to be aware of the methods and protocols being used by the network or he
can eventually deduce them after sufficient observation of the network behaviour.
In other words, the adversary is assumed to be informed. Normally, he does
not interfere with the normal operation of the network so as not to be detected
because the network may implement intrusion detection mechanisms that alert
of abnormal situations. This would hinder the plans of the adversary or it could
result in unwanted consequences (e.g., being attacked). Therefore, the attacker
is considered to be passive. Additionally, the adversary has no control over the
sensor network but in certain scenarios he may be able to capture and compromise
some nodes to help him determine the location of particular nodes. So, the
adversary is generally assumed to be external. Finally, depending on the power
of the adversary, he may need to move in the field in order to find the target
or he can remotely determine its location based on the analysis of the traffic
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Figure 1.6: Source-location privacy problem in a military scenario
captured by an adversarial network deployed for the purpose of eavesdropping
the communications of the legitimate network. With respect to the hearing range
of the adversaries, they can be considered either local or global.
1.4.2 Source-Location Privacy
The source-location privacy problem was first introduced and analysed by Ozturk
et al. [100]. The authors show how the operation of various routing protocols
widely used in WSNs (i.e., single-path and flooding algorithms) leak information
about the nodes reporting event data to the base station.
An adversary with a local vision of the network communications, namely a
mote-class adversary, can act in the following way to find the source of event
messages. Starting at any point of the network8 and moving around, the attacker
eventually stumbles upon a communication path originating from a remote sensor
node. The adversary, who is equipped with a device capable of measuring the
angle of arrival of received signals (i.e., a directional antenna), can estimate the
sensor node which transmitted a message. This node is a mere intermediary
in the communication path but by moving towards it and repeating the same
process over and over again, the adversary can finally reach the original data
source. This process is depicted in Figure 1.6, where the enemy (i.e., the tank)
follows the communication path in reverse in order to find the soldiers. Thus,
this strategy is usually referred to as traceback attack.
Note that the situation is not any better when there are multiple source nodes
reporting event data to the base station. The reason is that the adversary is
usually not interested in reaching a particular data source since all events are
8Usually the attacker is assumed to start in the vicinity of the base station from where he
can observe any incomming communication.
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equally important to him9. In the military scenario considered here, any data
source guides the enemy to a target. Similarly, in an endangered animal monitor-
ing scenario, the location of a source node leads to an animal. In a cargo tracking
application, data sources are directly related to the location of the cargo, and so
forth.
Some adversaries can achieve a global vision of the sensor network by deploy-
ing their own adversarial network. Therefore, the adversary does not need to
move in the field, instead he can simply analyse the data collected by his network
remotely. In this case, each adversarial node monitors the transmissions in its
vicinity and, based on the number of packets overhead by each node, the adver-
sary deduces the location of the data sources. In particular, the adversary can
spot the area where a data source is located because sensor nodes only initiate
a transmission in the presence of events. Moreover, the time at which a trans-
mission takes place helps to determine the location of the source node. Clearly,
the attacker can spot data sources by comparing the time at which any pair of
adversarial nodes first observed a sequence of messages.
Additionally, some adversaries might also compromise a small portion of the
sensor nodes in the network in an attempt to obtain information about the data
sources. Since data is transmitted using multi-hop routing mechanisms, an adver-
sary compromising a portion of the network has a certain probability that some
of the nodes he controls is involved in the routing of the data to the base sta-
tion. As compromised nodes are part of the network they have access to the any
secrets shared with neighbouring nodes and thus they could access the contents
of the messages it forwards. Having access to the packet contents may allow en
route nodes to retrieve the original data sender because this information must be
contained somewhere in the packets to allow the base station recognise the data
source.
1.4.3 Receiver-Location Privacy
The base station is the most precious element in a WSN and, as such, its location
must be thoroughly protected from potential attackers. Deng et al. [39] started
to investigate along this line by presenting a set of mechanisms that included the
9Most sensor networks only monitor a particular type of event. In a multi-event sensor
network, if the adversary wants to discern between different types of events, he might turn to
the analysis of other features like those presented in Section 1.3.2.
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use of hashing functions to obfuscate the addressing fields in the packet headers.
However, it was only later that they realised that this type of countermeasure
was insufficient protection from adversaries performing both content analysis as
well as more sophisticated traffic analysis attacks.
Local adversaries are interested in finding the base station and thus traceback
attacks are no longer useful. Instead, the adversary must determine the direction
of the communications flow. To that end, he might first turn to time correla-
tion attacks, where the idea is to determine the next node in the communication
path by observing the time difference between the transmission of a node and its
neighbours. Based on the assumption that a node transmits a message immedi-
ately after it is received, the attacker can determine the next node in the path
by observing the neighbouring node which transmitted in the shortest space of
time. Since event data is always addressed to the base station, by moving to the
forwarding node, the attacker is capable of reducing the distance to the sink. This
process is then repeated at each intermediate node until finally the attacker finds
his target. Additionally, the adversary can opt to use a rate monitoring attack to
reach the base station. This attack is based on the fact that the transmission rate
in the vicinity of the base station is higher than in remote areas because of the
use of multi-hop communications (see Figure 1.7a). A sensor node close to the
sink must serve as an intermediary for remote nodes, thus increasing the number
of packets it transmits. Consequently, before making a decision on his next move,
the adversary observes the number of transmissions of a node and its neighbours.
After a sufficient number of observations the attacker can deduce the neighbour
which is most likely to be closer to the base station and move accordingly.
Similarly, a global adversary uses rate monitoring attacks to infer the location
of the base station. The use of an adversarial network allows him to compare the
number of packets observed in each area without having to move around in the
field. The adversarial nodes recording a higher number of packets reveal to the
attacker which areas are close to the base station. In Figure 1.7b we illustrate the
deployment of an adversarial network {a1, . . . , a4} observing the communications
within its hearing range, which is represented by dashed semi-circles. As the
adversarial nodes a2 and a3 overhear a higher number of transmissions
10, they
are more likely to be close to the base station.
10The use data-aggregation algorithms may reduce the number of transmissions in the vicinity
of the base station but the traffic pattern would still be pronounced in the presence of numerous
data sources.




















(a) Number of transmissions in a WSN im-
plementing single-path routing with 15 data





(b) Adversarial network (ai) deployed to
monitor the transmissions of the legitimate
network
Figure 1.7: Traffic Rate Monitoring in a Typical WSN
Finally, note that we are addressing homogenous sensor networks, where all
the sensor nodes have the same role, i.e., sensing, reporting, and relaying data.
However, in heterogeneous sensor networks the communication pattern may dif-
fer slightly depending on the configuration of the network. For example, in a
hierarchical configuration, sensor nodes are organised into clusters controlled by a
cluster head which makes all organisational decisions, like routing the data sensed
by the cluster members to the base station. Therefore, the adversary might be
interested in finding nodes with a particular functionality, like the cluster head.
This thesis concentrates on the first type of network configuration although some
of the approaches and solutions that have been developed may also be applicable
to the second type of network.
1.5 Goals and Organisation
Wireless sensor networks bring tremendous benefits to our society due to their
ability to link the virtual world and the real world. Unfortunately, the deployment
of such context-aware technologies may also involve a number of risks and threats
that need to be carefully assessed before they are socially accepted. A major
impediment to social acceptance is the potential risk of privacy violations that
wireless sensor networks entail. This is precisely the main focus of this thesis
and our research efforts are aimed at facilitating a privacy-aware integration of
wireless sensor networks in our daily lives.
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In order to ease the acceptance of wireless sensor networks it is important
to build trust in the technology and the underlying mechanisms used to enforce
privacy. Therefore, we deemed it necessary to analyse whether it is strictly neces-
sary to devise new solutions to the location privacy problem in WSNs, especially
when there is an extensive body of research into anonymous communications sys-
tems which are capable of providing a solid privacy protection to their users. The
adaptation of these solutions would imply both strong privacy and users’ trust.
Consequently, one of the goals of this thesis is to study the suitability and appli-
cability of computer-based anonymous communication systems to the source- and
receiver-location privacy problems in wireless sensor networks.
Another goal of this thesis is to analyse and categorise the existing location
privacy solutions in WSNs. This is important to gain insight into the techniques
used to counter the various types of adversaries as well as to identify the advan-
tages, limitations and open problems of the current state-of-the-art. In the case
that adaptation of computer-based anonymity solutions is infeasible or impracti-
cal for some reason, the analysis undertaken will help to devise improved solutions
for protecting both the location of the data sources and the base station.
Finally, we need to develop novel source- and receiver-location privacy solu-
tions and evaluate them. The evaluation of the devised solutions must include
not only the level of protection they are capable of achieving but also how much
their application affects the performance of the network. Since these networks
are highly resource-constrained, it is strictly necessary to provide mechanisms to
balance between the level of protection and the usability and survivability of the
network as it is useless to provide perfect privacy if the network functionality is
severely impaired.
Regarding the applicability of the results arising from this thesis, we concen-
trate on scenarios where the network consists of a large number of static nodes
and there is a single base station. Although this is the most typical configura-
tion at the time of writing, some of the results may also be valid for different
network configurations with several base stations and a few mobile nodes. With
respect to the support of hardware platforms, we consider that our solutions are
suitable for the typical and high-performance configurations available today (see
Section 1.1) but we believe some of the solutions can even fit into the extremely
constrained class of sensor nodes since they are based on lightweight computa-
tions and demand little memory space. Basically, the only requirement is that
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nodes are capable of performing hop re-encryption. Nevertheless, battery con-
sumption is usually a limitation for almost any sensor platform running location
privacy solutions.
1.5.1 Main Contributions
Next we present a list of the major contributions of this thesis to the area of
location privacy in wireless sensor networks:
• Highlight the importance of the contextual privacy problems affecting WSNs
due to their particular mode of operation with a particular focus on the lo-
cation privacy of the data sources and the base station.
• Study of the suitability of existing computer-based anonymous communi-
cation systems to the location privacy problem in WSNs, paying special
attention to the particular requirements, limitations and adversarial mod-
els considered in both scenarios.
• Analysis of the current state-of-the-art in location privacy solutions for
sensor networks specially focusing on the advantages and limitations of the
solutions, and the identification of open problems and research gaps.
• Definition of an exhaustive taxonomy of location privacy solutions in WSNs
based on the property the solution is aiming to protect, the capabilities of
the adversarial model, and the main features of the solution.
• Development and evaluation of a context-aware mechanism which can be in-
tegrated with existing routing protocols to enhance source-location privacy
against local adversaries with minimal impact on network performance.
• Development and evaluation of a receiver-location privacy mechanism based
on traffic normalisation and routing table obfuscation that is capable of
offering protection, for the first time, against both local eavesdroppers and
active attackers capable of retrieving the routing tables of a portion of the
nodes in the network.
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1.5.2 Thesis Outline
In this first chapter, we have introduced the concept of Wireless Sensor Networks
by illustrating their specific features, including hardware limitations, communi-
cation model and routing protocols. We have also provided a quick overview of
security threats and countermeasures in this paradigm. Moreover, we have intro-
duced the two main privacy research areas in wireless sensor networks and next
we have focused on context-oriented privacy and more precisely on the location
privacy problem, which have been sufficiently explained and motivated. Finally,
we have presented the goals and contributions of this thesis.
Before devising new tailored solutions to a given problem it is necessary to
analyse whether these new solutions are strictly necessary. This is especially
important when there is a well-founded area with a number of solutions to prob-
lems which are closely related to the one being tackled. This is precisely the
motivation of Chapter 2. Since location privacy problems in WSNs are caused
by their particular communication pattern, these problems may be countered
by traditional traffic analysis protection mechanisms devised for computer net-
works. This hypothesis has been rejected by several authors by simply claiming
that sensor nodes cannot withstand the heavy computational overhead imposed
by these solutions. However, this reason alone is insufficient to exclude them from
the WSN domain as new sensor nodes with more capacity can be built. There-
fore, this chapter studies which anonymity properties are most suitable to fit the
particular features and requirements of location privacy in WSN and, on top of
that, it analyses some well-known computer-based anonymity solutions in order
to give insight into their overhead and possible limitations to the application of
the network.
Chapter 3 provides a literature review and analysis of the existing solutions for
location privacy in WSNs. The presentation of this chapter is guided by several
criteria that allows us to classify solutions according to the assets that demand
protection, the capabilities of the adversary, and their most distinguishing fea-
tures. First, we analyse a set of solutions that have been devised to protect the
identity of the nodes during data transmission. Next, we concentrate on solutions
aimed at hiding the location of the data sources and the base station by changing
the normal communication pattern of the network. These solutions are further
divided depending on the capabilities of the adversary under consideration: local
or global eavesdropper, and internal adversaries. For each individual solution we
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present some advantages and limitations. This has helped to identify pitfalls,
open problems, and possible lines for pushing forward the state of the art. As
a result we present a complete taxonomy of solutions and discuss some possible
lines of actuation which are exploited in the following chapters.
The Context-Aware Location Privacy (CALP) is presented in Chapter 4. This
mechanism benefits from the intrinsic nature of sensor nodes of being able to feel
their environment to detect the presence of a mobile adversary in the network
deployment area. The idea is to anticipate the movements of the adversary and
modify the routing paths in order to minimise the number of packets he is able
to capture. The scheme has been successfully applied to protect source-location
privacy in the presence of local adversaries with different moving strategies. In
particular, we have developed two versions of the CALP scheme, which differ on
the penalty imposed on paths traversing the area where the adversary is located.
Since the proposed scheme is only triggered in the presence of the adversary, it
considerably reduces the overhead imposed on the network compared to previous
solutions.
Chapter 5 describes a receiver-location privacy solution called the Homoge-
neous Injection for Sink Privacy with Node Compromise protection (HISP-NC)
scheme. The proposed solution consists of two complementary schemes that deal
with adversaries capable of observing the communications in a limited area of the
network as well as inspecting the routing tables of a portion of the nodes. The
first scheme injects controlled amounts of fake traffic to probabilistically hide the
flow of real messages towards the base station. This scheme on its own provides
an adequate protection level against local eavesdroppers but is useless if the ad-
versary is is capable of gaining the information contained in the routing tables of
a few nodes. The second scheme provides, for the first time, some means of pro-
tection against this type of threat by perturbing the routing tables of the nodes
in such a way that inspection attacks are not trivial but real messages reach the
base station within a reasonable time frame.
Finally, Chapter 6 summarises the contributions of this thesis and presents
some potential lines of future work as well as some open research problems that
demand further attention from the research community.
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1.6 Publications and Funding
The main contributions of this dissertation have been published in various jour-
nals and conferences, both national and international. Next, we provide a list of
the main contributions organised by the type of publication:
Journal articles ISI-JCR
• Ruben Rios, Jorge Cuellar, and Javier Lopez. Probabilistic receiver-location
privacy protection in wireless sensor networks. Information Sciences, Ac-
cepted for publication. Impact Factor: 3.89
• Ruben Rios and Javier Lopez. Exploiting Context-Awareness to Enhance
Source-Location Privacy in Wireless Sensor Networks. The Computer Jour-
nal, 54(10):1603–1615, 2011. doi: 10.1093/comjnl/BXR055. Impact Factor:
0.79
• Ruben Rios and Javier Lopez. (Un)Suitability of Anonymous Communica-
tion Systems to WSN. IEEE Systems Journal, 7(2):298 – 310, June 2013.
ISSN 1932-8184. doi: 10.1109/JSYST.2012.2221956. Impact Factor: 1.27
• Ruben Rios and Javier Lopez. Analysis of location privacy solutions in
wireless sensor networks. IET Communications, 5:2518 – 2532, 2011. ISSN
1751-8628. doi: 10.1049/iet-com.2010.0825. Impact Factor: 0.83
International conference papers
• Javier Lopez, Ruben Rios, and Jorge Cuellar. Preserving receiver-location
privacy in wireless sensor networks. In Xinyi Huang and Jianying Zhou, ed-
itors, Information Security Practice and Experience (ISPEC 2014), volume
8434 of LNCS, pages 15–27, Fuzhou (China), May 2014. Springer, Springer.
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-06320-1 3
• Ruben Rios, Jorge Cuellar, and Javier Lopez. Robust Probabilistic Fake
Packet Injection for Receiver-Location Privacy in WSN. In S. Foresti,
M. Yung, and F. Martinelli, editors, 17th European Symposium on Research
in Computer Security (ESORICS 2012), volume 7459 of LNCS, pages 163–
180, Pisa (Italy), Sept. 2012. Springer. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-33167-1 10
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• Ruben Rios and Javier Lopez. Source Location Privacy Considerations
in Wireless Sensor Networks. In Lidia Fuentes, Nadia Ga´mez, and Jose´
Bravo, editors, 4th International Symposium of Ubiquitous Computing and
Ambient Intelligence (UCAmI’10), pages 29 – 38, Valencia (Spain), Sept.
2010. ISBN 978-84-92812-61-5
Book chapters
• Ruben Rios, Javier Lopez, and Jorge Cuellar. Location Privacy in WSNs:
Solutions, Challenges, and Future Trends. In Foundations of Security Anal-
ysis and Design (FOSAD) VII, volume 8604, pages 244–282. Springer, 2014.
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-10082-1 9
National conference papers
• Ruben Rios, Jorge Cuellar, and Javier Lopez. Ocultacio´n de la estacio´n base
en redes inala´mbricas de sensores. In Jesu´s E. Dı´az Verdejo, Jorge Navarro
Ortiz, and Juan J. Ramos Mun˜oz, editors, XI Jornadas de Ingenier´ıa Telema´tica
(JITEL 2013), pages 481–486, Granada, Oct 2013 2013. Asociacio´n Telema´tica.
ISBN 978-84-616-5597-7
• Ruben Rios and Javier. Lopez. Adecuacio´n de soluciones de anonimato al
problema de la privacidad de localizacio´n en WSNs. In R. Uribeetxeberria
U. Zurutuza and I. Arenaza-Nun˜o, editors, XII Reunio´n Espan˜ola sobre
Criptolog´ıa y Seguridad de la Informacio´n (RECSI 2012), pages 309–314,
San Sebastian (Spain), Sept. 2012
Additionally, this thesis has motivated the development of a WSN simulator in
Matlab to support the analysis of the proposed solutions in terms of usability
and privacy protection level. This tool consists of a discrete-event simulation
environment for different network configurations (i.e., topology, connectivity, etc.)
and a variety of attacker strategies (i.e., random, traceback, etc.). The simulator
enables multiple data sources simultaneously together with the presence of various
attackers moving in the field. An important feature of this simulator is that it
obviates the lower levels of the communications stack and concentrates on the
routing layer since our goal is to demonstrate the feasibility of the models and
protocols that have been devised.
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Finally, some other papers have been written in parallel with the main contri-
butions of the dissertation. These papers are not directly related to the topic of
the thesis but are related to privacy and information leakage in various environ-
ments. The contributions are sorted by date and they include both journal and
conference papers:
• Isaac Agudo, Ruben Rios, and Javier Lopez. A Privacy-Aware Continuous
Authentication Scheme for Proximity-Based Access Control. Computers
& Security, 39, Part B:117–126, November 2013. ISSN 0167-4048. doi:
10.1016/j.cose.2013.05.004
• Ruben Rios, Jose A. Onieva, and Javier Lopez. Covert Communications
through Network Configuration Messages. Computers & Security, 39, Part
A:34–46, 2013. ISSN 0167-4048. doi: 10.1016/j.cose.2013.03.004
• Jorge Cue´llar, Mart´ın Ochoa, and Ruben Rios. Indistinguishable Regions
in Geographic Privacy. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Symposium on
Applied Computing (SAC’12), pages 1463–1469, Riva del Garda (Trento),
Italy, March 2012. ACM. ISBN 978-1-4503-0857-1. doi: 10.1145/2245276.
2232010
• Ruben Rios, Jose A Onieva, and Javier Lopez. HIDE DHCP: Covert Com-
munications Through Network Configuration Messages. In Proceedings of
the 27th IFIP TC 11 International Information Security Conference, vol-
ume 376 of IFIP AICT, pages 162–173. Springer, Heraklion, Crete (Greece),
June 2012. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-30436-1 14
• Ruben Rios, Isaac Agudo, and Jose L. Gonzalez. Implementacio´n de un
esquema de localizacio´n privada y segura para interiores. In Yannis Dim-
itriadis and Mar´ıa Jesu´s Verdu´ Pe´rez, editors, IX Jornadas de Ingenier´ıa
Telema´tica (JITEL’10), pages 237 – 244, Valladolid (Spain), Sept. 2010.
ISBN 978-84-693-5398-1
This dissertation has been possible thanks to the support and funding of the
Spanish Ministry of Education through the National Programme for Training
Human Resources under the FPU (Training of University Lecturers) fellowship.
Moreover, some parts of this work have been supported by and applied to different
National and European projects: ARES (CSD2007-00004), SPRINT (TIN2009-




This chapter analyses the suitability of anonymous communication systems for
the protection of location privacy in WSNs. Before devising new solutions we
deem it necessary to understand whether existing solutions are able to provide
an adequate protection level in the sensors’ domain. Several authors [94, 140] have
established that such systems are not applicable to the sensor domain with vague
arguments about the prohibitive hardware requirements of anonymous commu-
nication systems. Notwithstanding, given the extensive literature on anonymous
communication systems and the maturity of research in the field, we believe that
excluding the solid protection mechanisms provided by these systems without
proper analysis would be a serious mistake, especially considering that the capa-
bilities of sensor nodes can improve considerably in the future.
To decide whether or not anonymous communication systems are truly un-
suitable for WSNs it is necessary to strictly analyse the requirements, goals, and
techniques proposed by these systems, as well as the particular features and re-
quirements imposed by the new scenario. First, we study which anonymity prop-
erties better suit the location privacy problem in WSNs given the capabilities and
strategies of the adversary. Next, we examine both centralised and decentralised
anonymous communications systems in order to determine their limitations and
imposed overhead. Finally, we briefly discuss the factors that may limit the
application of the analysed solutions in the realm of sensor networks.
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2.1 Anonymous Communication Systems
Data communication networks allow us to establish online transactions with re-
mote entities. These networks rely on a series of protocols that use addressing
information to identify the parties which are intended to receive or route mes-
sages on their way to the other communication end. Even when application-layer
data are properly secured using end-to-end encryption, the addressing informa-
tion (e.g., IP and MAC addresses) is sent in clear text in order to enable data
routing at intermediate nodes. These addresses seldom change and appear in ev-
ery single packet, which allows anyone observing the communication to correlate
all the transactions belonging to a user. Moreover, some addresses are unique
to a specific device, which can be ultimately linked to a particular individual
thus severely compromising his/her privacy. Additionally, an ambitious adver-
sary can perform more sophisticated traffic analysis attacks, such as monitoring
the volume of packets being sent or received, in order to obtain more detailed
information about the user.
Anonymous communication systems were devised precisely to protect users’
privacy in the presence of highly motivated adversaries performing traffic analysis
attacks. These systems are based on a number of techniques and mechanisms,
usually built on top of cryptographic primitives, which are intended to conceal
the addresses of the users as well as any other information associated with their
identity that can be extracted by observing of the traffic generated from their
interactions with other users or systems.
Usually, anonymous communication systems consider a scenario like the one
depicted in Figure 2.1. In this setting, a set of senders use a data communication
network to send messages to a group of recipients and the goal is to ensure
that an attacker cannot retrieve sensitive information about the communicating
parties from the observation of a portion of the network or the system as a whole.
The attacker may be interested in determining different types of information
from the set of potential senders and recipients and the system struggles to offer
some anonymity-related properties that are intended to prevent that disclosure
of information.
Pfitzmann and Hansen [102] provide a comprehensive and widely-accepted
terminology for describing privacy-related concepts. We adopt and review these
definitions for our analysis, as having a complete understanding of anonymity
properties is essential for a detailed analysis of any anonymity solution.




Figure 2.1: Communications setting
2.1.1 Anonymity Terminology
Defining privacy is usually difficult because of the subjectivity of the term. This
concept has different interpretations and nuances depending on many different
factors such as socio-economical condition, level of educational, religious beliefs,
and so on. A simple yet renowned definition considers privacy as the right to
be left alone [143], however, new definitions have appeared as new ways of in-
vading privacy have emerged. In the area of information technology, privacy can
be defined as the right of individuals (or entities) to control the disclosure, pro-
cessing, and dissemination of information about themselves. Therefore, privacy
is closely related to anonymity because it describes the desire of an individual
to remain unidentified when performing some action. However, anonymity is not
the only useful property to accomplish privacy. Next we review the most rel-
evant privacy-related properties based on the terminology from Pfitzmann and
Hansen [102].
Anonymity can be defined as the state of being not sufficiently identifiable
within a set of subjects (i.e., the anonymity set) with potentially the same at-
tributes as the original subject. In other words, anonymity mechanisms prevent
the disclosure of the identity of the individual who performed a particular ac-
tion (i.e., the attribute) by having a set of potential actors. Clearly, if all the
members in the anonymity set are equally likely to be the author of the action,
the anonymity becomes stronger as the size of the anonymity set grows. Ideally,
the probability that an adversary can successfully determine the actual entity
who performed the action is one over the size of the anonymity set. However, in
practice, not all members in the anonymity set are equally likely to be the actual
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author. In the landscape of anonymous communication systems, the action usu-
ally refers to the transmission or reception of messages. Therefore, a sender may
be anonymous within a set of potential senders and, similarly, a recipient may be
anonymous within a set of potential recipients. These properties are known as
sender and receiver anonymity, respectively.
Another important property for the protection of individual privacy is un-
linkability. Unlinkability of two (or more) items of interest means that an adver-
sary cannot sufficiently distinguish whether these items are related or not. By
definition, the items of interest may be any element of the system, such as en-
tities or messages. Therefore, we may encounter different types of unlinkability.
Commonly, anonymous communication systems strive for the unlinkability of the
sender and the receiver1, which provides the communicating parties with the abil-
ity to hide with whom they communicate. This is usually known as relationship
unlinkability and it is useful in the presence of external observers trying to in-
fer information about the preferences of an individual. When a user accesses an
online service (e.g., websites) regularly this reveals information about his or her
interests. For example, daily visits to a particular online newspaper might reveal
a right- or left-wing ideology. Besides, relationship unlinkability suggests that
even when the sender and the receiver can each be identified as participants in
a communication, they cannot be recognised as communicating with each other.
This implies that the unlinkability property is stronger than anonymity.
Finally, undetectability and unobservability are properties that aim to pro-
tect the items of interest themselves. Undetectability of an item of interest means
that the attacker cannot sufficiently determine whether a particular item exists
or not. Similarly, unobservability means undetectability of the item against all
external entities and, additionally, anonymity even against other subjects in-
volved in the item of interest. In anonymous communication systems, the cited
properties usually refer to messages as the objects of interest. Therefore, unde-
tectability aims to prevent an attacker from determining whether (real) messages
are being transmitted. On the other hand, unobservability not only implies that
an external attacker cannot detect the presence of messages but also that other
senders/receivers cannot sufficiently determine who is sending/receiving the mes-
sages. A sender is unobservable when the attacker is not able to determine
1The attacker model determines the sort of unlinkability required. For example, message
unlinkability is important for preventing a server from linking multiple requests from the same
source in order to avoid user profiling.
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whether any of the senders is transmitting real messages. Likewise, the recipient
is unobservable if the adversary cannot conclude whether it is receiving real data
messages.
2.1.2 Anonymity Properties in WSNs
Prior to the analysis of traditional anonymous communication systems, here we
discuss the need for and suitability of the anonymity properties described in
Section 2.1.1 with reference to the location privacy problem in WSNs. Among
the various pieces of sensitive information that might be gathered by an observer
of the communications, we concentrate on the location of the nodes reporting
or receiving event messages since their location can be determined by means of
traffic analysis.
Since the main focus of anonymous communication systems is hindering traffic
analysis, in principle, these systems might also be ideal for protecting the location
of the data sources and the base station in WSNs. However, there are several
limitations to the application of traditional solutions in the sensors domain. Here
we concentrate on discussing which of the design principles that have guided the
development of traditional anonymity systems are meaningful for the protection
of location privacy in sensor networks.
Firstly, anonymity is only necessary in certain circumstances in WSNs, even
being detrimental to the correct operation of the network in some cases. Source
anonymity with respect to the recipient is not beneficial for the operation of the
network because in most application scenarios the base station (i.e., the recip-
ient) needs to be aware of the original data sender. The base station uses the
source ID for the management and control of the environment being monitored.
Without this information, the base station cannot identify the original source of
the data and thus it is unable to provide the network administrator with rel-
evant information about the sensor field. Notwithstanding, sender anonymity
might be useful to prevent external observers from determining the data source.
Hiding this information helps in the protection of the location of events against
adversaries who have access to a map of the network or who have created one
by patently eavesdropping on every single network node. This problem can be
prevented by occasionally changing the nodes’ IDs for a pseudonym2 in such a
way that even if the attacker obtains such a map, it is rendered useless when the
2A pseudonym is an identifier used instead of the original ID.
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current identifiers change their values. There are already several approaches that
consider the use of dynamically changing pseudonyms for WSNs [92, 99]. In these
solutions, the pseudonyms are known to the base station and it is, therefore, able
to spot the occurrence of events in the field. Finally, it might be useful to prevent
compromised sensor nodes (i.e., nodes controlled by the attacker) to gain access
to the real source ID. Since remote sensor nodes rely on intermediate nodes to
forward their data, if any of these en-route nodes are compromised they might get
access to the source ID. This problem has also been considered by some authors
[103]. Therefore, source anonymity is only necessary in certain circumstances in
WSNs.
Moreover, given the existing communications model in sensor networks, the
sender-receiver unlinkability property does not make much sense. The normal
operation of the network implies many-to-one communications, where any sensor
node is a potential sender and the base station is the only receiver. Therefore,
the property of relationship unlinkability is lost because, in any event data trans-
mission, the base station is one of the participants. In traditional anonymous
communication systems, relationship unlinkability is important in terms of the
identity of the sender and the recipient because it gives away information about
the behaviour and preferences of users. Contrarily, in the case of location privacy
in WSNs, all sensor nodes transmit to a single base station and therefore there is
no such information gain. Here, the important issue is to determine the location
of these nodes and this cannot be done by simply analysing packets in transit
unless this information is given either in the headers or the payload. However, the
attacker is assumed not to have access to the payload because it is cryptograph-
ically protected, but the header might provide some information on the source.
This issue becomes problematic only in the case that the adversary already knows
the network topology but, as aforementioned, this problem is related to source
anonymity, not to unlinkability. Similarly, in the case of the receiver, since we
are focusing on flat and homogeneous sensor networks with a single base station,
which is in charge of collecting all the data, there is actually no need to indicate
in the packets which node is the final recipient of the data. Finally, message
unlinkability is also unnecessary and counterproductive for the same reasons as
source anonymity.
In fact, the most natural property for the protection of location privacy is
unobservability rather than unlinkability. By hiding the presence of the nodes
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reporting event data or receiving it, we can prevent the attacker from determining
the location of events in the field and the location of the base station. More
precisely, the attacker will be unable to obtain the location of the communicating
nodes if he is unable to sufficiently detect the presence of event messages in
the network. Clearly, if the attacker is not able to ascertain the existence of
messages containing event data, he will not be able to determine which node is
the sender or the recipient of that message under the assumption that he has
no information other than the observed traffic. Note that the attacker could
benefit from other sources of information, such as visual recognition of the event
or previous knowledge about the nature of events being monitored, to aid him in
the search. However, this is beyond the scope of this thesis and we assume that
the adversary has no prior knowledge about the deployment of the network or
visual information about the events taking place in the field.
In summary, we can state that some anonymity properties are not suitable or
necessary for the protection of location privacy in WSNs. Notwithstanding, the
following sections will delve into each specific solution regardless of their main
design goal in order to have a clearer understanding of the particular features,
the imposed overhead, and the techniques proposed by renowned anonymous
communication systems originally devised for the Internet. By doing this we will
finally be in a position to assess the real limitations or potential applicability of
these systems to preserve location privacy in the sensors’ domain.
2.1.3 Classification of Solutions
Many outstanding anonymous communication systems have been devised to hin-
der traffic analysis and thus improve the privacy protection in online communi-
cations. These systems have been designed with different goals in mind and, so,
they pursue different anonymity properties. We propose a taxonomy of solutions
which takes into consideration three major features, namely: (1) the main desired
goal in the design of the anonymous communication system, (2) the architectural
design, and (3) the principal techniques used to reach the goals. This taxonomy
is presented in Table 2.1 but, for the sake of simplicity, only the most commonly
used techniques have been represented.
Among the multitude of anonymous communication system designs, we have
selected several outstanding solutions that introduce various distinguishing fea-
tures and countermeasures that are addressed for different adversarial models.
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Main goal Architecture
Techniques
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RN Source identity renaming
PD Temporal packet delay
PR Packet replay
FT Fake traffic injection
MB Multicast or broadcast communications
Table 2.1: Classification of Anonymous Communication Systems
From an architectural point of view, these solutions can be categorised as ei-
ther centralised or decentralised. Centralised solutions are those in which the
communicating parties are not an active part of the anonymity system, namely,
there is a set of devices in between senders and recipients which are responsible
for forwarding and anonymising the communications. Contrarily, in decentralised
solutions each user collaborates in the forwarding process to conceal his own com-
munications and the communications of other participants. Some of the analysed
solutions are partially decentralised because they rely on a central server which
is in charge of providing all the information necessary to communicate with other
members of the system or external entities, while other solutions are fully decen-
tralised and not dependent on a central authority. Also, in these solutions, data
recipients might be part of the anonymous communication network or external
entities.
The proposed categorisation also takes into consideration the main goals pur-
sued by these solutions. It is worth mentioning that some of these solutions
might have been designed with several goals in mind but only the most relevant
ones are included in the table for the sake of simplicity. For example, mix-net
approaches aim to provide sender-receiver unlinkability although they might also
ensure sender anonymity. Note that when we refer to sender anonymity, we usu-
ally refer to anonymity with respect to the data recipient. In many situations a
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client is willing to gain access to a particular service but is reluctant to provide
his/her real identity to a potentially untrustworthy service provider because of
the concern of being tracked or profiled for illegitimate purposes, such as price
discrimination.
Finally, note that the various techniques employed by these solutions could be
used to further break down into new categories. For example, the presented solu-
tions could be organised into high-latency or low-latency solutions depending on
whether the systems introduce large delays before relaying the packets received.
Instead, to guide the exposition and analysis of the solutions in the following
sections, we concentrate on the architectural (i.e., centralised or decentralised)
perspective, which is more natural and consistent with the evolution of research
in the field of anonymous communication systems. Nonetheless, the notation
presented for the various techniques will be used during the overhead analysis of
the systems.
2.2 Centralised Schemes
Centralised anonymous communication systems rely on a set of partially-trusted3
devices which are responsible for conveying data from senders to receivers in a
privacy-preserving manner. Whenever a user wants to send data anonymously
to another party, it does so by contacting anyone of the devices comprising the
anonymity network. The anonymity relay(s) will eventually deliver the received
data to the final destination on behalf of the user, thereby obscuring the actual
data source. In short, the communication ends (i.e., sender and recipient) are not
members but clients of centralised anonymity systems.
As a result, an attacker capable of observing all the nodes involved in the
system can easily spot the communication ends. This is the case of global ad-
versaries, who can observe all the transmissions in the network. Consequently,
centralised anonymous communication systems are unable to protect themselves
from such a powerful adversarial model. Thus, only local observers and internal
attackers will be considered in this section.
3Honest relays may be forced to reveal information under legal compulsion.
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2.2.1 Single-proxy
Several single-proxy solutions (e.g., Anonymizer [10]) have been proposed to allow
Internet users to access online services, like surfing the web, without disclosing
their identity to service providers4. In other words, single-proxy solutions aim to
provide source anonymity against potentially dishonest service providers mostly
interested in tracking and profiling.
These solutions are based on a trusted third party which acts as an interme-
diary between the user and the real destination. The operation is very simple as
depicted in Figure 2.2a. Whenever a user (i.e., the sender) wants to communi-
cate with a server (i.e., the recipient) it issues a message to the third party (i.e.,
the proxy) informing them about the intended recipient and the original request.
Then, the proxy forwards the user request to the server but first, removes the
true source of the request. In this way, as far as the recipient is concerned the
proxy appears to be the original data sender, thus hiding the true identity of the
true sender to the destination. Finally, the recipient responds to the message
as if it came from the proxy, which needs to keep track of connections to send
the reply back to the user. Additionally, some single-proxy solutions create an
encrypted tunnel from the user to the proxy5 in order to prevent eavesdropping
on that link.
From a computational point of view single-proxy solutions introduce relatively
low overhead, which is an interesting feature for hardware-constrained sensor
nodes. Source sensor nodes are only required to transmit their data to a proxy
node and, in the worst case, encrypt it. A proxy node, on the other hand, must
decrypt the data from different sources (if encrypted) and change the source
ID of incoming packets with their own identifier. This process is referred to as
renaming and must be done for every single message. Note that, given that the
communication is assumed be unidirectional from sensor nodes to the base station
only, a proxy node does not need to keep track of messages in order to send a
reply back to the data source. Additionally, the data source could opt to apply
end-to-end encryption in order to protect the data on its way from the proxy to
the base station. This would imply a extra encryption operation on both ends
of the communication but could also relief the proxy from decrypting in the first
4In most cases, when we talk about identity we are actually referring to any information
that is linked to or can be used to identify an individual, usually an IP address.
5The communication from the proxy to the server can also be encrypted if the server provides
that functionality (e.g., using HTTPS).
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Figure 2.2: Single-proxy Solutions
place. The table in Figure 2.2b summarises the total number of operations that
different network nodes will need to perform depending on the (best or worst case)
scenario. Note that the values in the table refer to a single message transmission.
The terminology used in this and subsequent tables is consistent to that described
in Table 2.1.
Despite the low overhead introduced, given the threat model under consider-
ation, a single-proxy approach alone cannot prevent the location privacy problem
in WSNs. In the case of a local observer, this solution is unsuitable because the
adversary uses strategies that lead him to the target regardless of the packet con-
tents or headers. When looking for a source node, the attacker uses a traceback
strategy based on the angle of arrival of signals. Whereas an adversary willing
to find the sink, can simply turn to rate-monitoring or time-correlation attacks.
To prevent these attacks, it is necessary to prevent the use of persistent paths by
randomising the routes to the proxy, using different proxies for each new message,
etc. In fact, Phantom Routing [60] and other solutions use random intermediate
nodes (similar to proxies) from where the source data is finally routed to the
base station. However, the protection mechanism does not reside in renaming or
data encryption but on the selection of random intermediate nodes which lead to
ephemeral routes that confuse the adversary.
On the other hand, the use of renaming and end-to-end encryption provides
some protection against internal adversaries. However, the level of protection is
insufficient considering that only the nodes located after the proxy node would
not have access to the true source identifier. Also, note that the attacker may
be able to identify a proxy node and compromise it, thus easily gathering the
identifiers of all the source nodes using the proxy. A potential countermeasure
for this is to have proxies at various distances from the base station forming a
multi-tier proxy architecture but this is something that will be discussed in the
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next section.
2.2.2 Mixes
A mix is a store-and-forward device that receives public-key encrypted messages
and after a sufficiently long period of time has passed, it outputs a re-ordered
batch of all messages. In this way, mixes hide the correspondence between input
and output messages because of temporal storage and decryption. This type of
high-latency anonymity solutions were originally devised by D. Chaum [26] for
non-interactive online communications, such as anonymous e-mail transmissions.
Usually, mixes are arranged and selected in series (i.e., mix cascade) or deployed
as a fully connected network and picked in a random order (i.e., mix network). In
such arrangements a single honest mix preserves the unlinkability between inputs
and outputs along the whole path.
A mix cascade is depicted in Figure 2.3a, where messages A, B, and C are en-
crypted with the public keys of the mixes they will traverse in reverse order. Each
mix removes its corresponding encryption layer and outputs a lexicographically
ordered batch of messages after a sufficiently large amount of time to prevent the
correlation of inputs and outputs. After decryption, each mix adds a block of
random bits at the end of each message to maintain their size constant. Addi-
tionally, both users and the mixes themselves can introduce dummy messages to
hide the number of messages sent and received at each point.
The implementation of a mix-based solution over WSNs presents several lim-
itations in terms of the computational overhead introduced. Source nodes are
required to perform N public-key operations per transmitted packet6. Addition-
ally, source nodes must have a global knowledge of the network topology in order
to be able to determine the transmission paths and perform the public-key en-
cryptions in the right order. Moreover, this implies that source nodes must store
the public keys (PK) of all potential mix nodes. Clearly, the size of the mix
network has a tremendous impact on the number of operations and the amount
of memory needed to store all the information required to satisfy the mix-based
model. However, the recipient of messages, which is the most powerful device of
the network, is freed from performing any operation.
6An extra operation, being it symmetric or asymmetric, satisfies the end-to-end encryption
principle.
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Figure 2.3: Mix networks
Moreover, each intermediate node has to perform 1 public-key decryption
per received packet as well as temporarily store a number of messages (T ) that
depends on the number of events in the field. Also, the closer the nodes are to
the base station the higher the traffic rate is. But, the amount of memory fitted
inside a typical sensor node is insufficient to accommodate a large number of
messages. Besides, to preserve message indistinguishability and prevent leaking
the direction of message flows, packets are padded (PAD) after decryption. This
not only requires more computation but also more wirelessly transmitted bits.
Finally, many WSN applications require real-time monitoring capabilities but
mixes introduce significant delays at each node thus precluding their use in these
scenarios.
A summary of results is provided in Table 2.3b, where, for the sake of simplic-
ity, only the best case scenario is represented. Note that the worst case (i.e., source
nodes performing end-to-end encryption) implies that, for every message trans-
mitted, a source node performs an extra cryptographic operation and, moreover,
the base station must share keys with all potential source nodes. Furthermore,
we do not consider scenarios where the destination responds to the source. In
such cases, the base station would perform the same number of operations as a
source node and mix nodes would have to perform roughly the same number of
operations as in the forward path. Additional terminology appears in this table:
SK is the node’s own private key, N is the number of nodes in a path, and M is
the number of mixes. Additionally, topo refers to the topology of the network and
T ·mess indicates the temporal storage of messages. We acknowledge that some
of these values may vary over time depending on the workload of the network.
However, our goal is not to make an exhaustive and accurate to the milliwatt
overhead study as this would require having real implementations running on the
motes. Rather we are more interested in gaining an overall idea on the potential
cost of deploying these solutions.
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In addition to the high computational and memory overhead imposed by mix-
based schemes, there are other limitations that hinder the successful deployment
of the mixes, taking into account the types of adversaries considered in WSNs.
The main aspect is that the adversary wins if he is able to obtain the location of
either the source node or the base station, contrarily to the goal of the adversary in
the traditional scenario, where he wants to determine whether a particular sender
is communicating with a particular recipient. In such scenarios the temporal
mix of messages provides the desired property but, in sensor networks, it makes
no difference whether the adversary reaches one source node or another. The
adversary is interested in no particular source node, any of them lead him to an
event in the field. Therefore, if the adversary is able to reach the entry point
of the mix network (i.e., the mix closest to the source) he will start to receive
packets from the source node, thus revealing its location. The same applies to
the exit point of the mix network and the protection of the base station. Finally,
it is worth mentioning that the mix model provides attractive countermeasures
against internal adversaries. They are successfully prevented from determining
the source node and the base station unless they are precisely the entry or exit
nodes of the mix network, respectively. The use of layered encryption prevents
any compromised mix node or intermediate observer from obtaining information
about the true data source since all these data are contained in the innermost
layer. Also, the use of padding helps to hide the number of layers that were peeled
by intermediated mixes. After traversing several mixes the messages are closer
to the base station, thus padding prevents adversaries from learning the distance
to the base station.
2.2.3 Onion Routing and Tor
Onion routing [108] is a low-latency anonymous communication system based on
a network core composed of onion routers (OR), whose functionality is similar to
Chaum’s mixes. Indeed, onion routing is like mix networks except that the secu-
rity of onion routing does not come from introducing significant delays to messages
but from obscuring the route they traverse. Onion routers are connection-oriented
devices, which means that once an anonymous connection (i.e., circuit) has been
established through the network, the route remains unchanged for a given period
of time. Circuits provide near real-time communications by multiplexing several
connections in a single data stream using fixed-size cells. Moreover, circuits are
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established by means of a public-key layered data structure, called the onion.
Each layer of the onion contains the cryptographic material needed to derive the
symmetric keys used later during the data transmission phase by each of the onion
routers of the circuit. The onion also tells each element of the circuit which is the
next member. Once the circuit has bee established and onion routers have their
session keys, application data are optionally sanitised to remove any sensitive
information and then they are passed to the onion proxy which adds one layer of
symmetric-key encryption for each of the onion routers in the path. Then, the
entry onion router peels the outermost layer of encryption and sends the resulting
message onto the next router. The process is repeated until the exit node removes
the last layer and sends the data to the intended recipient. A simplified illustra-
tion of the onion routing architecture and its transmission process is provided in
Figure 2.4a. Tor [43], the second-generation onion routing, added several changes
to the original design, its new circuit setup process being the most relevant one.
Instead of using an onion, the circuits are established incrementally, i.e., node by
node, based on authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Moreover, the num-
ber of onion routers in a circuit is reduced from 5, in the original design, to only
3 as it was shown to provide reduced latency and similar security.
Onion routing reduces the overhead compared with mixes, principally for two
reasons: data encryption and decryption is not based on public-key cryptography,
and the core nodes are not required to temporarily store messages. Nonetheless,
the computational and memory requirements are still costly for sensor nodes.
Specifically, source nodes are required to be aware of the network topology as well
as the public keys of each onion router to enable them to establish the anonymous
path. Moreover, if the path is set by means of an onion, the source must perform
several layers of public-key encryption containing the key seed material for each
of the onion routers in the path. In the case of incremental path establishment,
it implies that the source must contact the onion nodes one by one to make
authenticated handshakes. This implies even more energy consumption because
it requires the exchange of many messages, which is known to be much more
power consuming than computations. Once the circuit has been established,
the source node must apply as many layers of symmetric key encryption to the
data messages as onion routers in the path. Later, each of the path members
must decrypt the messages and multiplex several messages within a single link-
encrypted transmission. In an attempt to further complicate traffic analysis,
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Figure 2.4: Onion Routing
packet padding and reordering is introduced by onion routing but Tor dismisses
the idea because they introduce a significant cost and are still unable to yield
effective resistance against various attacks. The base station might receive the
data in clear text or encrypted with a shared key.
In Table 2.4b we summarise the computational and memory demands of onion
routing schemes. The table considers both the path setup process, which only
occurs occasionally, and the data transmission period. We place some operations
in parenthesis those which are only performed by the original onion routing design
and not by Tor. Extra terminology is defined: SK is session key, LE and LK are
link encryption and link key, R is the number of neighbours an onion node shares
links with, and S is the number of sessions an onion router handles at each
given moment. During path setup, the source needs to perform a N public key
operation and during data transmission these become symmetric key operations.
Note that these values are per each single transmitted message. Moreover, the
source nodes need to know the public keys of all M nodes in the onion network
and somehow, the topology in order to be able to apply encryptions in the right
order. Additionally, they need to store N session keys for each circuit, one for each
of its nodes. We can assume that there is only one circuit per data transmission
to the base station. The onion nodes only perform one decryption operation for
each transmitted message. These decryptions are either based on public-key or
symmetric-key cryptography depending on whether it is during the path setup or
the data transmission. Moreover, onion nodes keep long-standing link encrypted
connections with every other onion node. This is represented in the table as
LE during data transmission. These together with padding and reordering are
present during the whole communication, thus they could have also been included
in the path setup, but it was done in this way for the sake of clarity. In terms
of memory, onion nodes must keep their own public-key pair and as many link
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keys and session keys as there are neighbouring onion nodes and active circuits.
Note that we used R instead of M to represent the number of link-key encrypted
connection an onion node has but as an onion router should be able to connect
to any other onion router in the network, this value may be equal to M . As a
result, source nodes could be released from having to know the network topology.
Again, we have considered the simplest case, where the source node does not use
end-to-end encryption and the sink does not send responses back to the sources.
These schemes can be regarded as an evolution of the mix-nets approach
in the sense that they reduce some of the tight requirements imposed by the
original mix design. Despite the overhead reduction, onion routing solutions still
present the same limitations with respect to the capabilities of the adversarial
model considered in WSNs. The main drawback is that a local adversary will
eventually identify the edges of the onion network. This issue allows him to
identify the source nodes and the base station if messages follow similar or fixed
routes to reach and leave the onion network. Therefore, the best strategy for an
adversary is to reach entry or exit nodes and wait for messages to arrive. Overall,
it can be stated that the edges of the onion network are the most critical points.
This is also true if the adversary is capable of compromising nodes.
2.3 Decentralised Schemes
Contrary to centralised solutions, where the communicating parties are not in-
volved in the anonymity network, in the solutions considered in this section all
members collaborate to conceal the identities of other participants. In this way,
there is more cohesion in the network, which positively affects the level of protec-
tion of the members since it is not trivial to identify the communicating parties
from mere intermediaries. However, the elimination of a semi-trusted network
core introduces new challenges. Note that some of these solutions are only par-
tially decentralised because they rely on a central server, which is in charge of
providing all the information necessary to communicate with other participants.
2.3.1 Crowds and Hordes
Crowds [109] is a partially decentralised solution where a set of geographically di-
verse users are grouped, and cooperate to issue requests on behalf of its members.
Whenever a crowd member (i.e., a jondo) wants to send a message, it chooses
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a random jondo, possibly itself, to act as an intermediary. The receiving jondo
decides, based on some biased probability, whether to forward the data to an-
other jondo or to finally submit it to the destination. Subsequent requests from
the same jondo and same destination follow the same path. Finally, the reply is
sent back using the same path in the reverse order. Both requests and replies
are encrypted using pairwise keys provided by a trusted authority, namely the
blender, at the time jondos join the Crowd. This process is exemplified in Fig-
ure 2.5a, where jondo1 communicates with Server2 using three intermediaries
while jondo5 issues requests to Server1 using only two relays. The first path,
initiated by jondo1, is represented with ordinary arrows, while the other path is
represented with dashed arrows. Interestingly, jondo5 is both the data source of
one path and the last node in the other path. Hordes [70] is based on the Crowds
model but its main contribution is the incorporation of multicast messages to
reduce the latency and overhead on the return paths, i.e., from recipients to ini-
tiators. Additionally, it uses public-key cryptography to obtain the session keys
from a trusted authority to be later used for message forwarding.
The Crowds model presents a low overhead when compared to other solutions.
Instead of requiring computationally heavy mechanisms such as public-key oper-
ations, dummy traffic or padding, the Crowds is based on symmetric-key packet
re-encryption, sender ID renaming, and random node selections7. Consequently,
any intermediate jondo is only aware of the previous and next hop in the path
and, from the receiver’s perspective, the message is equally likely to have origi-
nated from any crowd member. Each member must perform one decryption and
one encryption for every packet it forwards within the Crowd but, if it decides
to submit the packet to the destination, it only needs to decrypt and forward it.
In order to perform these operations, Crowd members must share keys with any
other member. Therefore, the number of keys each node must store is dependent
on the size of the network. Also, for every received message, the node changes
the sender ID for its own and assigns an identifier to keep track of all messages
belonging to that path. They must keep a translation table with as many records
as the number of paths the node handles, because any subsequent packets from
this connection will follow the same path.
Table 2.5b represents the number of operations and the amount of memory
7Additionally, the user might establish end-to-end encrypted channels to prevent en route
eavesdropping by other Crowd members.
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Figure 2.5: Crowds
consumption introduced by the Crowds model to nodes with different roles in
the network. Note that even when these roles are separated in the table, a node
might have several roles at the same time. A similar table could have been
constructed for Hordes but since we are not considering the communications on
the return path in WSNs, this is not really useful. Additionally, in Hordes all
participants hold the public key of the server, which is used to obtain a signed
list of all other members and their public keys. Later each participant chooses
a subset of jondos to use as message forwarders. The selected nodes receive a
symmetric key encrypted with the node’s private key. In this way, Hordes not
only requires the storage of all participants’ public keys but also the exchange and
storage of session keys, which implies more computational operations and more
memory consumption. For simplicity, we provide a single table corresponding to
the Crowds solution. In this table, R represents the number of records in the
translation table of an intermediate node. The remaining notation has already
been introduced.
In general, the Crowds scheme imposes relatively low computational and mem-
ory requirements precisely due to the adversarial model under consideration. This
solution provides a sufficient protection level against local adversaries which are
able to observe the inputs and outputs of a single node but the attackers are
considered to be static because of the geographic dispersion of the crowd mem-
bers. This feature makes a big difference with respect to the WSN domain. The
Crowds model considers a random but fixed path for all communications with a
given server, however this involves a serious risk when the adversary can move to-
wards the immediate sender of a packet. Likewise, by performing time-correlation
attacks the adversary could determine the next hop in the path and after several
hops he finally reaches the sink. Internal adversaries are partially countered by
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means of source renaming at every hop but the main drawback is that renaming
also prevents the base station from learning the actual data source unless speci-
fied in the packet payload. Finally, this model provides no protection mechanisms
against global adversaries, who can easily spot the data sources because crowd
members start a transmission as soon as they have a request to issue. In other
words, the transmission of real messages are not hidden by any means. Similarly,
the base station can be easily detected by a global adversary because it is not
part of the anonymity network.
2.3.2 GNUnet Anonymity Protocol
The GNUnet Anonymity Protocol (GAP) [14] was originally devised to provide
anonymous file-sharing in peer-to-peer networks. GAP is based on the idea of
making initiators look like mere intermediaries in order to hide their own actions.
To achieve this, each node takes advantage of the traffic generated by other nodes
but they also inject some baseline fake traffic in order to cover their own messages.
Basically, GAP nodes perform the following actions: forwarding, renaming the
identity of packets (i.e., indirection), injecting fake traffic, replaying messages
several times, introducing short packet delays, and using message padding. Most
of these actions are represented by different sorts of arrows in Figure 2.6a. An
ordinary arrow means message forwarding, but these arrows may have forks which
is represent the replay of packets to arbitrary nodes. Indirection is depicted by
means of dotted arrows, while the short arrow starting from inside the node
symbolises the injection fake packet injection.
The security of the GAP model is based on the idea that the more traffic
a node transmits the more unlikely it is, to the eyes of an adversary, that a
particular message was created by that node. In other words, a source node must
route a sufficient number of packets from other participants so as to maintain an
adequate protection level. Received messages can be either forwarded, indirected
or dropped. Message forwarding implies no modifications to the message while
indirection involves the modification of the sender address and thus the handling
of subsequent packets belonging to that connection. However, in this analysis
as we are considering traditional sensor networks where messages only flow from
sensors to the base station, there is no need to handle replies, thus alleviating
the problem of storing large translation tables. Only the forward path will be
considered for the rest of this section.








(a) A GAP Node
Node Requirements
CPU F · FT +R · PR (+1RN)
+2SK [+1SK]
RAM N · PK +N · SK + T ·mess
(b) GAP Overhead
Figure 2.6: GAP Scheme
Additionally, each node holds a public key that is used to establish encrypted
links between nodes. Public keys are periodically propagated throughout the
network. Also, both queries and data traversing the network are encoded using
a particular scheme [15], which is similar to a symmetric-key encryption but it
allows intermediaries to verify whether the encoded data matches a specific query
or content. In this way, packets change their appearance at each hop but this also
provides intermediaries with plausible deniability as they cannot decrypt what
they are transmitting. This can also be considered a means of protection against
internal adversaries. Finally, to further prevent the correlation between incoming
and outgoing messages, short random delays are introduced and packets can be
either forwarded or indirected to a random number of nodes.
The GAP model imposes extremely expensive requirements for hardware-
constrained nodes, especially in terms of energy consumption since the network
must maintain a baseline noise in the form of fake traffic and sensor nodes are
battery-powered devices. The overhead introduced by this solution is summarised
in Table 2.6b. Each node must contribute a given amount F of fake traffic to
the network8. Moreover, for each received message a GAP node can decide to
simply replay this message to a random number R >= 0 of nodes9 or alterna-
tively perform an indirection, which is represented within parenthesis. Also, after
receiving a packet the node must decrypt it and then encrypt it with the key from
the output link. Furthermore, source nodes perform an additional encryption op-
eration, which is represented within brackets. From the point of view of memory,
the node stores a number N of public keys, which are used to establish pairwise
secrets for enabling link encryption with neighbouring nodes. Moreover, each
node introduces a short random delay to messages which is translated into the
8This value F may vary on time depending on the network load.
9The range includes zero because the node may drop the message.
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need of a buffer of a particular size T for allocating the messages. Recall that the
variables represented on the table are node-dependent and may vary over time.
Both local and global observers can be countered by the GAP model since they
cannot easily determine the source of messages due to the use of a baseline fake
traffic that hides the occurrence of events. On the one hand, a local adversary
does not gain any information by following all the messages since these might
be fake traffic leading him nowhere. On the other hand, the global adversary is
more difficult to deceive because in the presence of continuos events, there is an
increase in the amount of traffic in that particular area compared to other more
distant areas. Besides, internal adversaries are somehow, but not completely,
countered due to the use of the encoding mechanism used for providing plausible
deniability and the indirection mechanism. Finally, the base station can mimic
the behaviour of ordinary nodes, replaying and sending traffic in order to remain
hidden but it is likely that the area surrounding the base station still concentrates
a larger amount of remote regions. In short, the presented mechanism might be
useful for the protection of location privacy in WSNs but the overhead introduced
will exhaust the battery of the nodes in a short period of time.
2.3.3 DC-nets and Herbivore
The Dining Cryptographers (DC) scheme [27] allows a group of users to share
information while hiding the actual sender of messages even to other protocol
participants. To this end, each member needs to share a secret bit with any other
participant. For example, in Figure 2.7a, node B shares a 0-bit with node A and
a 1-bit with node C. Also, the participants perform the sum modulo 2 (i.e., logic
XOR) of their shared secrets. Subsequently, the obtained result is broadcasted
to the rest of participants unless the participant is willing to communicate data
to the rest of members, in which case it shares the inverse of the result (see node
A in Figure 2.7). The final result is obtained by performing the XOR of all
contributions. Each protocol execution is called a round.
The idea behind this scheme is that the final result must be zero if nobody
(actually, any even number of simultaneous senders) has transmitted because
each secret is used twice, and one if someone inverts de result10. Provided that
the initial shared bits are secret, there is no way to determine the actual sender.
Although the original protocol considers the transmission of a single data bit, the
10The inverse of any bit value is that same bit value xor-ed with 1.
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Figure 2.7: DC-Nets Scheme
DC scheme can be easily extended to transmit string messages by sharing random
numbers instead of random bits. This modification enables the transmission
of encrypted messages so that the actual recipient is the only entity capable
of determining whether that protocol round conveyed a real message. Thus it
provides unobservability of both senders and recipients. The following analysis
focuses on the bit-based version but it could be directly extrapolated to the
extended version.
The application of the DC-nets model in WSNs has several impediments. One
of these limitations is that sensor networks communicate wirelessly, which is a
highly unreliable medium. The DC protocol is extremely vulnerable to noise and
a single erroneous bit leads to undesirable results. Additionally, provided that
participants’ contributions must be broadcast11 simultaneously in order to allow
the XOR of their signals, the sensor nodes running the protocol are required to
be tightly synchronised and within the transmission range of the other members.
This suggests that the data recipient must be either one of the DC participants
or an external observer within the communication range. Consequently, only
neighbouring sensor nodes can run the protocol or they must carefully adjust
their transmission power, however, this would deplete their limited batteries in
a short period of time. As proposed by Herbivore [48], the participants could
be hierarchically arranged in order to reduce the complexity of the system. This
arrangement would allow sensor nodes to reduce their transmission power but it
also introduces more synchronisation problems and increased delivery delays to
data packets.
Additionally, there are high memory requirements in the DC model associated
with the key sharing process because of the continuous protocol rounds. Two
11There are other potential communication techniques besides broadcasting but they imply
an increase in the number exchanged messages.
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potential solutions exist for the provision of keys: either sensor nodes are pre-
loaded with sufficiently large one-time keys, or they share short keys which are
periodically updated by means of a pseudorandom function. In the former case,
given the memory limitation in sensor nodes, the shared keys will rapidly expire.
In the latter case, the memory cost is traded by computational operations. In
any case, the overhead introduced is directly dependent on the topology of the
network. A ring topology, such as the one presented in Figure 2.7a, requires each
node to share 2 random bits, with the right and left participants. On the other
hand, in a fully-connected graph each participant shares one bit with every other
participant, which adds up N−1 random bits, where N is the total number nodes.
Note that these values are for a single protocol round (i.e., for the transmission of
a single bit). Moreover, a protocol round occurs even if no participant is willing
to transmit otherwise an adversary would identify which nodes are interested in
transmitting. Clearly, this implies a high waste of bandwidth and energy because
of the continuous flow of messages.
Another substantial problem has to do with simultaneous communications.
The DC model does not allow various data senders at a time because their mes-
sages would collide. This issue highly constrains the usability and nature of sensor
networks, which were conceived to provide a highly distributed sensory system.
This problem might be reduced by using a slot reservation protocol as proposed
by Herbivore, however, this introduces more messages and thereby more energy
waste. Moreover, this countermeasure cannot solve the increased delivery time in
the communications, especially when the sensor networks under consideration are
extremely large with a substantial amount of potential data senders. A summary
of these and other features constraining the application of this model to WSNs
are presented in Table 2.7b, where INV refers to the inversion of the contribu-
tion. For every protocol round, each node is required to perform only two simple
XOR operations and, optionally, an additional one if they want to transmit data.
In terms of memory requirements, depending on the connectivity of the network,
a single protocol round requires from 2 to N − 1 secret bits.
Although the computational overhead introduced by the DC-net scheme is
rather inexpensive even for sensor nodes, the memory requirements, topological
restrictions and the disruption of simultaneous event notifications preclude their
application to WSNs. Nonetheless, the model is effective in the protection of
location privacy because it hides the original data source to all participants and
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also external (local or global) observers. This could result in a problem for the
base station which is unable to identify the data source unless the extended
protocol is used. To this end, the source node would send both the event data
and its identifier in an encrypted form so that only the base station knows the
original sender. Therefore, the location of the data source is protected from
disclosure to any other participant including internal passive adversaries, which
are unable to determine the original data sender unless they collude. As a matter
of fact, a collusion is successful only if all nodes sharing keys with the potential
source node collude which is highly unlikely.
2.4 Evaluation
Previous sections have delved into several features from centralised and decen-
tralised anonymous communication systems that need to be further analysed.
This section is intended to provide this final discussion while outlining the most
important aspects of this chapter.
As for the case of centralised solutions, these can be regarded as black box
devices where the data sources stand on one side and the data recipients on the
other. The communications originating from various sources change their appear-
ance, are delayed or mixed within the network, but still the presence of incoming
and outgoing messages is evident. In these settings, both source nodes and the
base station are clearly exposed to a global observer, simply because they are
not part of the network core and thus their actions can be easily detected, which
implies the disclosure of their location. Contrarily, local and internal adversaries
are placed somewhere within the network core and, in consequence, they cannot
identify the communicating nodes so easily. These adversaries rely on a par-
tial view of the communications but depending on their location they might be
more likely to uncover the senders and recipients. The entry and exit points of
centralised systems are especially sensitive since at these areas the adversary is
capable of distinguishing the source nodes and the base station unless packets
use different routes to reach that point.
In particular, single-proxy schemes are very lightweight because they are pri-
marily based on source renaming at a single intermediate point. However, this to-
gether with the potential use of payload encryption for eavesdropping prevention,
can protect neither from the trace-back attack performed by local adversaries nor
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from compromised proxy nodes because they can retrieve the data source from
the packet.
Mix-based designs depict a rather different situation. The overhead imposed
by mix nodes is significant, not only because it demands the use of public-key
cryptography but also because the source node must perform as many of these
operations as nodes in the communication path each packet traverses. Addition-
ally, the layered encryption implies the knowledge of the public keys of every mix
node and the topology of the network to perform the encryptions in the right
order. Moreover, mixes introduce large message delays, which are not suitable
for time-critical applications, like critical infrastructures monitoring. Regarding
the privacy protection, mix cascades present the same problem concerning local
adversaries, which are able to follow the paths of messages since they are fixed and
they follow any received packets regardless of the appearance or timing. Yet, the
free-route selection proposed by mix-nets provides some protection means against
local adversaries but it might still be insufficient since they can eventually reach
either edge of the mix network. From these positions, local attackers are much
more likely to succeed. Similarly, internal adversaries who are at the edge of the
network are capable of uncovering the communication endpoints. However, the
use of layered encryption prevents intermediate nodes in the path from uncov-
ering the data source. More precisely, intermediate nodes are only aware of the
previous and next hop in the path.
Finally, onion routing solutions reduce some of the computational restrictions
imposed by mixes by introducing the path setup process, which allows the estab-
lishment of session keys that are later used during the data transmission process.
Also, these schemes reduce the delay introduced at every hop by multiplexing
the communications of various data sources on a single stream. Although the
overhead is reduced, it still demands layered cryptography and great memory
requirements. Anyway, onion routing schemes present the same problems when
countering the typical adversaries considered in sensor networks.
As for the case of decentralised approaches, their aim is to prevent the afore-
mentioned problems at the edges by making all participants part of the system.
In other words, any member of the system is potentially a data source as well
as a data forwarder. This implies that it is not trivial for global observers to
determine the communication endpoints and it also introduces the opportunity
to more sophisticated internal attacks.
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The Crowds schemes do not sufficiently protect against global adversaries
because the data recipients are not part of the network and the data senders, start
new paths for new data connections, thus altering their behaviour and becoming
an easy target. Moreover, in order to keep a low overhead, these solutions do not
introduce protection mechanisms such as dummy packet injection, which might
be helpful against both global and local adversaries. Local adversaries can also
trace back sources and the base station because the paths are static once created
to reduce the chances of internal adversaries. Internal adversaries are countered
only slightly because, even if some protection means are placed (i.e., renaming),
data sources can be easily detected by its neighbours for the same reason global
adversaries can identify them.
To the contrary, GAP and DC-nets offer attractive safeguards, which improve
the level of protection against the various types of adversaries considered in the
WSN domain. However, these safeguards imply a significant increase in the
number of messages being transmitted, replayed or forwarded, which results in
an unaffordable energy waste for battery-powered devices. Additionally, the DC-
nets model presents extra limitations in terms of memory requirements, network
topology restrictions, and also the inability to handle simultaneous data sources,
which further precludes its application to the location privacy problem in WSNs.
A visual summary of this discussion is presented in Table 2.2, where the up
and down arrows roughly indicate the overhead introduced and the impediments
presented by these systems with respect to their applicability to WSNs. The
tick, cross and approx symbols (
√
,× and ≈) represent whether these solutions
can provide, are not able to provide or could provide some protection against the
three adversarial models considered in WSNs.
In general, we can state that centralised approaches are less suitable for the
protection of location privacy in WSNs than decentralised approaches given the
highly distributed nature of these networks and their particular communication
pattern. The typical many-to-one communication model makes it difficult to
hide the location of the base station and the source nodes when they are located
outside the limits of the centralised network core. A local adversary can even-
tually determine the entry points of the network core while a global adversary
can directly identify the source and destination of messages. Therefore, decen-
tralised approaches are more appropriate as they integrate all the nodes within




Single-proxy [10] ↓↓ × × ×
Mix-nets [26] ↑↑↑ × × X
Onion routing [108] ↑↑ × × X
Tor [43] ↑↑ × × X
Crowds [109] ↓ × × ≈
Hordes [70] ↓ × × ≈
GAP [14] ↑↑↑ X X X
DC-nets [27] ↑↑↑ X X X
Herbivore [48] ↑↑↑ X X X
Table 2.2: Suitability of Traditional Systems
the anonymising solution, thereby hindering the identification of the current par-
ticipants to adversaries with either local or global eavesdropping capabilities.
However, not all decentralised solutions are capable of providing suitable protec-
tion.
Although some solutions are sufficiently lightweight to run in a sensor node,
we have shown that the real weak point is that they do not fit the requirements
and the adversarial models considered in the sensors domain. Similarly, another
group of solutions are suitable for the protection of location privacy in WSNs but
they are rather expensive in terms of computational, memory, and battery re-
quirements or they present additional limitations. However, the analysis of these
solutions has provided us insight into a variety of mechanisms and techniques
which can be applied to the sensors’ domain to preserve location privacy.
Chapter 3
Analysis of Location Privacy
Solutions in WSNs
Anonymity systems for traditional communication networks have been studied
and it has been concluded that these solutions are not practical for the features,
restrictions and attacker models considered in WSNs. As a result, this chapter
delves into the various solutions devised to protect both source- and receiver-
location privacy. The idea is to gain insight into the techniques used by different
solutions and learn from studying their advantages and disadvantages in order to
come up with new and improved solutions capable of solving some open issues in
the area.
The contents of this chapter are organised following three criteria, which are
(a) the asset or information the solution aiming to protect, (b) the capabilities
of the adversary to be countered, and (c) the techniques used by the solution.
In Section 3.1, we describe and analyse solutions dealing the protection of the
identities of the nodes, which are carried within the packet headers to enable the
routing of data through the network. This is the first step to location privacy
protection. Next, Section 3.2 and 3.3 concentrate on the obfuscation of traffic
patterns in order to protect the location of the data sources and the base station
in the presence of different adversarial models. Finally, we present a complete
taxonomy of location privacy solutions and some research gaps that we tackle in
the following chapters.
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Figure 3.1: General IEEE 802.15.4 MAC Frame Format [135]
3.1 Node Identity Protection
Despite the use of cryptographic mechanisms to protect the payload of data
packets, there is much relevant information contained in the packet headers that
is available to anyone eavesdropping on the wireless channel. Packet headers
consist of various data fields containing, among other things, the identifiers of
the data sender and the destination (see Figure 3.3 for the structure of a typical
WSN frame). These data are sent in clear text because any intermediate sensor
node must be capable of using packet header information to perform routing tasks.
Therefore, an attacker can, after a sufficient amount of time capturing network
traffic, elaborate a map of the network relating node identifiers to locations in the
field. Being in possession of such a network map, a local attacker may simply wait
next to the base station for incoming messages because all packets are addressed
to this single location. Upon the reception of a packet, the adversary can retrieve
the identifier of the data source and, by using the map, he can translate the
identifier into a physical location, where the event occurred.
Several techniques have been proposed in the literature to provide node ano-
nymity. Most of these solutions are based on the creation, distribution, update,
and use of pseudonyms, which are intended to hide the true identifiers of the
nodes. Persistent pseudonyms provide no means of protection in the long term as
they become the new identifiers of the nodes and thereby the attacker is able to
easily correlate a node to a pseudonym. Therefore, pseudonyms are only effective
if they are periodically updated, that is, pseudonyms must be dynamic if they
are to provide node anonymity. Some authors have approached the management
of pseudonyms by means of pools of pseudonyms while others have turn to cryp-
tographic mechanisms for the same purpose. Note that most of the solutions fall
into the second category since the use of cryptographic techniques for the cre-
ation of pseudonyms have several benefits over the use of network pools. Next,
we review these solutions in detail.
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Figure 3.2: Pool-Based Approaches
3.1.1 Pool of pseudonyms
Misra and Xue [92] were the first authors to provide a set of solutions for node
identity protection based on the use dynamic pseudonyms. The first of their
solutions, called the Simple Anonymity Scheme (SAS), is based on a network-
wide pool of pseudonyms which are distributed among the sensor nodes. The
base station divides the pool into subranges of l bits and provides each node with
a random set of these subranges (see Figure 3.2a). Moreover, the base station
stores correspondence between the identity of each sensor node and its subranges
in order to figure out the correct decryption key for received messages. After
deployment, each node builds a pseudonyms table where it stores the pseudonym
ranges and secret keys used for communicating with its near neighbours. In each
row of the table, the node keeps two ranges of pseudonyms for traffic coming from
and directed to a particular neighbour. When the node wants to send data to
a neighbour, it selects a random value from the range of pseudonyms belonging
to that node and concatenates the index of the row from where it picked the
pseudonym. The recipient node checks whether the received pseudonym belongs
to the incoming range corresponding to the given index and, that being the case, it
uses the shared key to decrypt the message. The principal limitation to SAS is the
large memory space necessary to store a sufficiently large pseudonym space. Note
that each sensor node is assigned several ranges of l bits from a pre-established
pool of pseudonyms, and uses two ranges for each of its neighbours. This imposes
a high memory overhead for hardware-constrained devices, especially in densely
populated networks.
Nezhad et al. [93, 94] proposed a label switching protocol for providing node
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anonymity as part of their Destination Controlled Anonymous Routing Protocol
for Sensornets (DCARPS). After each topology discovery phase, the base station
is aware of the location of the sensor nodes and is able to build an updated map
of the network. This information is used to assign labels (i.e., identifiers) to
each and every network link, as depicted in Figure 3.2b. These labels serve as
pseudonyms and whenever a node has to send a packet to the base station, it uses
the label assigned to the link connecting it to a neighbour that is closer to the base
station1. Upon the reception of the packet, the neighbour node, checks whether
the label corresponds to one of its input labels. If the label is known to the node,
it replaces the input label with its own output label. For example, the grey node
in Figure 3.2b checks whether an incoming message has either label L9 or L10
and, in the case it does, it forwards the packet after changing the original label
with L3. The main drawback to this labelling solution is that it is not sufficiently
dynamic. Labels are only modified sporadically, after a topology change has been
discovered in the network, which gives the attacker the opportunity to observe
the same labels for large periods of time. This allows the attacker to correlate
labels with specific nodes, thus completely compromising anonymity.
3.1.2 Cryptographic pseudonyms
The second solution by Misra and Xue [92] was the first one to use a cryptographic
scheme to preserve the identity of the nodes. This solution is intended to reduce
the amount of memory needed to handle the ranges of pseudonyms in SAS at the
expense of increased computational overhead. The Cryptographic Anonymity
Scheme (CAS) uses a keyed hash function to generate the pseudonyms. Before
the deployment of the network, each node x is assigned a pseudo-random function
fx and a secret key Ksx as well as a random seed asx for communicating with the
base station. After that, each pair of neighbours agree upon a random seed and
a hash key generated using the pseudo-random function fx. This information
together with a sequence number seq are stored in a table which is used to
generate the pseudonyms during the data transmission period. Whenever a node
x wants to communicate with the base station, using node y as intermediary, it
creates a message M = {sID, rID,EncryptedPayload, seq}, where sID consists
1Each node is considered to use only one path to send data to the base station for simplicity
reasons. There is probabilistic version of DCARPS where nodes select, for each packet, a
random node from all possible communication paths.
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of the concatenation of the index of node y in the table and the hash function
of the bitwise XOR operation of the random seed shared with the base station
and the sequence number keyed with the secret shared with the base station (i.e.,
sID = Iy||HKsx(asx ⊕ seqxy)). The contents of rID are very similar except that
instead of using the key and seed shared with the base station it uses the ones
shared with the neighbour y. Clearly, the first field is used for identification with
the base station and the second is used for identification with the next hop in the
communication. This scheme is more memory efficient but it introduces a relevant
computational cost, not only to intended recipients but also to the remaining
neighbours which need to compute a keyed hash value before discovering that the
packet is not addressed to them.
The CAS scheme ensures that an external observer cannot learn the real
sender (or recipient) of a message by simply observing the identifiers contained
in the packet headers. The authors assume that an attacker cannot compromise
the secrets shared between the nodes. For example, if an attacker captures a
node, he learns all past, present and future pseudonyms. To reduce the impact
of secrets being compromised, Ouyang et al. [99] propose two methods based on
keyed hash chains. The Hashing-based ID Randomisation (HIR) scheme, uses
the result of applying a keyed hash function to the true identifier of the node as
pseudonym. More precisely, after the topology discovery process, sensor nodes
determine which neighbours are closer to (uplink) and which are farther from
(downlink) the base station, and share pairwise keys with them. Then, sensor
nodes create a table that includes, for each link, the keyed hash identifier of the
uplink node of that neighbour2. After the transmission or reception of a message
on a particular link, the node rehashes the value contained in the table to generate
a fresh pseudonym. Additionally, packets convey another identifier used for the
base station to be able to identify the original data source. This value is also an
element of a hash chain keyed with a secret shared with the base station. Since
hash values are assumed to be non-invertible, this solution provides backwards
secrecy, that is, an attacker compromising the node or the secrets cannot retrieve
previous identifiers.
However, if the adversary compromises the key used for the hash functions
he can easily generate future pseudonyms since he only needs to rehash the last
2If the node itself is the uplink of its neighbours, it stores the hash value of its own identifier
keyed with the secret shared with the corresponding neighbour.
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Figure 3.3: Keyed Hash Chain Generation
values used by the node. The second solution by Ouyang et al. [99] attempts
to further reduce the risk of secrets being compromised. Instead of creating the
identifiers on the fly as they are needed, in Reverse HIR (RHIR), the nodes first
create the hash chain, store it locally, and then use the elements of the chain in
reverse order. Once a pseudonym has been used, it is no longer needed and it
can be deleted from the memory. Also, even if the attacker obtains the secret key
used to create the hash chain, he cannot generate any fresh pseudonyms since
he cannot invert a hash. The main drawback to this solution with respect to
the previous one lies in the need for increased memory space to accommodate a
lengthy hash chain.
Later, Jiang et al. [59, 131] introduced the Anonymous Path Routing (APR)
protocol. One of the elements of this scheme, namely the anonymous one-hop
communication, introduces an enhancement that improves the resilience against
secret compromise attacks compared to previous solutions. Similar to the solu-
tions by Ouyang et al., in this scheme each node creates a table to keep the uplink
and downlink identities of each neighbour. These hidden identities are calculated
by hashing the values of the secret keys, identities, a sequence number and a
nonce shared by the nodes. The novelty of this approach is that both the shared
keys and the hidden identities are updated (i.e., rehashed) after each successful
transmission between neighbouring nodes.
The same idea has been developed by Chen et al. [30, 31] in the Efficient
Anonymous Communication (EAC) protocol. Before the deployment of the net-
work each sensor node is preloaded with two hash functions, a secret key and a
random nonce shared with the base station. These data are used to generate a
pseudonym that is included in packets addressed to the base station in order to
allow the identification of the data source. The pseudonym is updated for every
new packet by applying one of the preloaded hash functions to the current iden-
tifier xor-ed with the random nonce. The problem with this scheme is that, after
deployment, each node exchanges their preloaded information with its neighbours
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in order to generate and update pseudonyms for one-hop communications. This
information includes the keys and nonces shared with the base station, which
allows any node to determine whether the true source of the packet is a neigh-
bouring node. Indeed, a node could even impersonate any of its neighbours.
None of these schemes can successfully protect the system from attackers
who are able to capture a node and access its internal memory. When a node
is compromised, its secrets are exposed and the adversary retrieves all current
pseudonyms and is able to generate all future pseudonyms. Notwithstanding, we
acknowledge that coming up with a solution capable of dealing with this type of
threat is rather challenging. Some kind of node revocation mechanism would be
necessary to diminish this sort of problem.
Finally, it is important to highlight that node anonymity is only a first line
of defence to preserve location privacy. This problem is a huge challenge due to
the resource limitations of the scenario and the peculiar communication model of
these networks, which together allow a skilled adversary to perform more sophis-
ticated traffic analysis attacks to determine the location of the nodes of interest
to him. In the following sections we present and analyse the most important
solutions that have been developed to diminish the threat of different types of
adversaries. The exposition will be based on the capabilities of the adversaries,
more precisely on their eavesdropping power and their ability to capture nodes.
3.2 Source Protection
Source-location privacy refers to the ability to protect the location of the sensor
nodes reporting event data to the base station. More precisely, source-location
privacy is intended to prevent an attacker from finding the physical location of the
events being monitored by the network since they may be related to individuals
or valuable resources.
This problem has drawn the attention of the research community due to the
challenging nature of the scenario. Many solutions have been devised for coun-
tering passive adversaries with a local or a global view of the communications
but only a few authors have concentrated on the threat of internal attackers.
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3.2.1 Local Adversaries
A local adversary can only monitor a small portion of the network, typically the
equivalent of the hearing range of an ordinary sensor node, that is why they are
usually referred to as mote-class attackers. Therefore, they must turn to moving
in the field following packets until they find the data source. This strategy is
called a traceback attack since the adversary attempts to reach the target by
moving along the path of messages from the source to the base station in reverse
order.
A traceback attack is successful in typical WSNs because the packets trans-
mitted by a particular node tend to follow the same path over and over again.
Consequently, most of the solutions to this problem are based on the randomisa-
tion of routes (i.e., using different paths for different packets) to hinder traceback
attacks. The goal is to mislead the adversary in order to increase the safety pe-
riod, that is, the number of packets sent by the source node before the attacker
reaches it. The application of route randomisation protocols come at the cost of
increased latency, higher packet loss probability, and most importantly, increased
energy waste. The research community has struggled to find the right balance
between network performance and privacy protection.
Below we analyse a number of solutions falling into some of the following
categories, namely undirected random paths, directed random paths, network
loops, and bogus traffic. In the first category, we include solutions where the
communication paths are not clearly guided by a mechanism to improve the
safety period while the solutions in the second category introduce a technique to
direct the random walks. The solutions in the third category use a strategy based
on the creation of loops of fake messages in order to deceive the adversary into
believing he is following a real path. Bogus traffic has also been used in different
ways to protect the data sources. Note that some solutions may belong to more
than one category.
Undirected Random Paths
The first solution to provide source-location privacy was devised by Ozturk et al.
and is called Phantom Routing [100]. This scheme results from the analysis of
two widely used families of routing protocols in WSNs, flooding-based and single-
path routing protocols. Surprisingly, both provide the same privacy protection
level although it may seem that an attacker could be confused in a flooding by
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the number of messages coming from all directions. However, the attacker only
needs to pay attention to the first message it observes since this is following the
shortest path. Besides that, a baseline flooding wastes a significantly greater
amount of energy compared to single-path routing but the latter is less robust to
packet loss. Probabilistic flooding tries to find a balance between reliability and
energy efficiency by making sensor nodes flood messages with a given probability.
As a side effect, this approach reduces the likelihood of the attacker reaching the
data source.
Based on the previous analysis, Phantom Routing proposes making each
packet undergo two phases, a walking phase and a flooding phase. In the walking
phase, the packet is sent on a random walk for h hops until it reaches a node,
which is called the phantom source. Then, in the next phase, the phantom source
initiates a baseline or probabilistic flooding, which eventually delivers the packet
to the base station. This two-phase process is repeated for each new message
thereby selecting random phantom sources. Having different phantom sources
implies that messages traverse different paths, which reduces the location privacy
risk for the actual data source. Later, a new version of protocol, called Phantom
Single-Path Routing, was proposed in [60]. This variant replaces the flooding in
the second phase by a single-path routing, which results in even longer safety
periods due to the fact that the adversary misses some of the single-paths com-
ing from different phantom sources. Figure 3.4 depicts the transmission of two
messages using the Phantom Single-Path Routing protocol, where dashed arrows
represent the walking phase and the ordinary arrows represent the single-path
phase. The grey node in both subfigures represents the phantom source for each
transmission.
The main limitation to Phantom Routing protocols is in the walking phase.
Pure random walks tend to stay close to the source node and the definition of a
large value for h does not solve the problem. Indeed, a larger value of h does not
provide a direct improvement in the safety period, it only increases the energy
waste. This problem is represented in Figure 3.4, where phantom sources are
within a distance of two or three hops regardless of the definition of a 5-step
random walk.
To reduce the concerns about pure random walks staying close to the source
node, Xi et al. [148] propose GROW, a two-way greedy random walk. The idea





Figure 3.4: Phantom Single-Path Routing with h = 5
behind GROW is that using random walks is desirable for protecting source-
location privacy because routing decisions are made locally and independently
from the source location. However, using pure random walks as the only routing
mechanism is impractical because the average delivery time of messages goes to
infinity. GROW exploits the fact that the probability that two random walks will
not intersect decreases exponentially in time [125]. First, it creates a permanent
path of receptors by transmitting a special packet on a random walk from the
base station. Then, the source node sends all subsequent data packets on a greedy
random walk that will eventually hit a node from the path of receptors. From
there, the packet is forwarded to the base station following the established path
in reverse order. This process is illustrated in Figure 3.5. The protocol is said to
be greedy because it uses a Bloom filter3 to store previously visited nodes in order
to extend as far and as quickly as possible. Despite being designed as a greedy
algorithm, one of the main limitations of GROW is the substantial delivery time
of the packets.
Cross-layer routing [128] was designed to further mitigate the problem of
random walks staying close to the data source. This approach is basically a
Phantom Routing that hides the walking phase by routing data using the data
link layer. Beacon frames are periodically broadcast to inform about the node
presence and other network related parameters. Additionally, frame payload can
be cryptographically obscured which allows sensor nodes to convey event data in
securely. Since beacons are transmitted regardless of the occurrence of events, the
3A Bloom filter [18] is a simple data structure used for representing in a memory-efficient
way (as a bit string) a set of elements and for supporting queries about whether an element
belongs to the set, or not.
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Figure 3.5: Operation of the GROW Scheme
attacker is unable to distinguish legitimate beacons from those containing event
data. At the end of the walking phase, event data reaches a pivot node where
the information is extracted and sent to the base station using the implemented
routing protocol. The pivot node is chosen by the data source at random from all
its neighbours at h hops of distance. The operation of the protocol is depicted in
Figure 3.6a, where the dotted arrows represent the routing phase at the data link
layer, solid arrows represent the transmission of messages at the routing layer,
and the black and grey circles represent the data source and the pivot node,
respectively. This solution provides perfect privacy for all attackers within the
beaconing area as long as they are not close to the pivot node. Also, since the
routing layer mechanism considered by the authors is a single-path protocol the
attacker only gains some information if he is on the path from the pivot node
to the base station. The main limitation to this approach lies in the tradeoff
between the level of protection it can provide and the delay introduced by large
beaconing areas. Beacon frames are periodically sent out at intervals ranging from
milliseconds to several hundreds of seconds. Therefore, the larger the beaconing
area is the better the protection but also the longer the delay.
As the data travels from pivot nodes to the sink using a single-path strategy,
choosing nearby pivot nodes very often allows an attacker to determine and reach
the edge of the beaconing area. Also, due to the important tradeoff involving the
size of the beaconing area, the network administrator may turn to small values
for h in order to boost the delivery time. This implies that pivot nodes will be
close to the original data source (i.e., same problem as with the original Phantom
Routing) and even if there is no evidence of messages leading to the target, the
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uncertainty region is considerably reduced. Therefore, an attacker can turn to a
systematic field inspection to find the source node with no great effort. A double
cross-layer solution is proposed by Shao et al. to further enhance location privacy
in these circumstances. In this version of the protocol, instead of sending the data
directly to the base station, the pivot node sends the data to another randomly
chosen node using the routing layer. Then, this random node chooses a new pivot
node and starts a second beaconing phase. Thus, the attacker cannot easily reach
the edge of the beacon area to which the original data source belongs. The dual
cross-layer approach is represented in Figure 3.6b.
Based on the same idea of hiding the walking phase, Mahmoud and Shen
propose creating a cloud of fake traffic around the data source to hinder traceback
attacks [83, 84]. During the network setup, the base station floods the network
with a discovery message in order to allow sensor nodes to learn the shortest
path to the base station as well as the nodes in that route. Then, sensor nodes
choose a group of nodes at different distances to become fake source nodes, similar
to phantom sources or pivot nodes. Finally, each node groups its immediate
neighbours in such a way that the members of each group are not contiguous
so as to allow each group to send packet in different directions. During the
data transmission phase, for each message the source node chooses one node Fs
from its list of fake sources and sends the message to the group where there is a
member which knows how to reach Fs. As the packet travels to the fake source,
it generates fake traffic to cover the route. A node from the addressed group
generates fake traffic if it is not in the direction of the fake source. In that case,
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the node chooses one of its groups at random and sends a fake message that
lasts for h hops. Consequently, if groups are carefully chosen, traffic flows in any
possible direction, generating clouds with dynamic shapes.
Compared to the cross-layer scheme, the main limitation to the cloud-based
approach is that the clouds of fake messages consume substantially more energy
than beacon frames, which are present even if there is no event data to transmit.
On the other hand, routing data in the link layer is very slow and introduces
significant delays but it is an interesting countermeasure when there are high
privacy demands.
Directed Random Paths
Instead of simply sending packets at random, some authors have proposed using
mechanisms to guide the walking phase. By having a walking phase governed
by certain parameters, either the packet delivery time is reduced or the privacy
protection level is increased, or both.
The first solution to have included a mechanism to guide the walking phase
is Phantom Routing itself [100]. The authors suggest changing the pure random
walk in favour of a directed random walk. To that end, each node separates its
neighbours into two groups depending on whether they are in the same direction
or in the opposite direction to the base station. Thus, during the walking phase,
the next hop in the path is still selected uniformly at random but only from
the set of nodes in the direction of the base station. By introducing this simple
mechanism they prevent packets from looping in the vicinity of the source node
and thereby achieve a similar safety period while reducing the energy waste.
Yao and Wen devised the Directed Random Walk (DROW) in [152]. The
idea behind this solution is quite simple, any sensor node having a data packet to
transmit must send it to any of its parent nodes (i.e., a node closer to the sink)
with equal probability. This applies to both data sources and intermediaries.
The level of protection provided by DROW is therefore highly dependent on the
connectivity of the network. A path with a limited number of neighbours implies
a short safety period since most of the packets follow very similar routes to the
base station. In 2010, Yao alone published another paper describing the Directed
Greedy Random Walk (DGRW) [151]. This solution is a mere copy of DROW
with a different name. Also, the Forward Random Walk (FRW) scheme by Chen
and Lou [29] does exactly the same thing. However, the authors argue that this
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solution cannot obtain a high level of protection and it would be necessary to
inject dummy messages in the network to reduce the chances of the adversary.
Later, Wei-Ping et al. [144] observed that one of the most critical factors dur-
ing the walking phase period is not the length of the walk but its inclination. Long
random walks do not necessarily increase the safety period unless the phantom
sources are placed in a safe location to initiate the routing phase. A location is
considered to be safe if it is not close to the straight line between the data source
and the sink. The reason is that if phantom sources are close to this line too often,
the single paths originated by them will be very similar to each other and thus
the attacker has more opportunity to overhear packets. This problem is depicted
in Figure 3.7a, where the curly lines represent directed random walks from the
source node to the phantom sources and the dashed lines represent the single-
path routing phase. To prevent this situation, Phantom Routing with Locational
Angle (PRLA) prioritises the selection of phantom sources leading to larger in-
clination angles. More precisely, a sensor node assigns its neighbours forwarding
probabilities based on their inclination angles in such a way that neighbours with
larger angles will be more likely to receive messages. After h hops, the node re-
ceiving the message becomes a phantom source and finally sends the packet to the
base station using the shortest path. By using this strategy, the authors manage
to reduce the number of hops necessary in the walking phase while keeping an
adequate safety period. A major downside to this work is that it is not fully clear
how the nodes obtain the inclination angles4 of their neighbours without built-in
geolocation devices or directional antennas.
Wang et al. [140] propose Random Parallel routing, which assigns each sensor
node n parallel routing paths to the base station. Messages are evenly distributed
to different paths in such a way that the adversary traceback time is the same
at any path. Also, the paths must be sufficiently geographically separated in
order to prevent the attacker from overhearing packets from various paths. The
underlying idea is that if the adversary chooses one of the paths he is forced to
stay on that single path. This improves the safety period, which is now equivalent
to the sum of all the parallel paths. More formally, let Li be the length of each of
the paths and let pi be the probability of choosing the path i as the transmission
path. Then, the traceback time for an attacker (i.e., the safety period) is equal to
4The authors claim that the inclination angle of neighbours is calculated in terms of the
number of hops. Nonetheless, two nodes at the same distance have different inclination angles.
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pi ≈ nL, where L is the mean length of all paths. However, this approach
is only theoretically feasible. In practice, the generation of n truly parallel paths
is a complex task, especially in large-scale sensor network deployments. It is
also impractical for sensor nodes to store a large number of routing paths locally.
Moreover, some of these paths may become useless over time due to the death of
nodes or due to simple disruptions performed by an attacker in order to force the
source node to use some particular paths. Finally, since the paths are parallel
to each other, retrieving several packets from any of the paths provides a good
idea of the direction to the source. This would significantly reduce the expected
traceback time for the adversary.
Besides developing the Random Parallel routing (see Section 3.2.1), Wang
et al. [140] proposed the Weighted Random Stride (WRS). This algorithm is
similar to PRLA in the sense that both of them make routing decisions proba-
bilistically based on the inclination angle of its neighbours. Whenever a sensor
node transmits a message to the base station it uses two parameters to guide
the path, a forwarding angle and a stride. First, the data source randomly picks
a forwarding angle and chooses a neighbour that matches that angle. After re-
ceiving the message, the node uses the same forwarding angle to select a new
neighbour. This process continues until the stride, which defines the number of
hops for a particular forwarding angle, reaches zero. Once the stride expires, the
recipient node selects a new forwarding angle and starts a new stride5. In prac-
tice, instead of sensor nodes having to store the forwarding probabilities of all
5The stride is set to a value of 5 for a large scale sensor network with an average of 20
neighbours per node during the simulations
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their neighbours, they are divided into closer and further nodes. Closer nodes are
additionally divided into sectors and only nodes from these sectors are selected to
forward the packet. In order to produce larger routing paths and thus deter the
traceback attacks, sectors with larger inclination angles are prioritised. Within a
particular sector, the node selects the neighbour which has the largest forwarding
step. For example, in Figure 3.7b, sectors 1 and 6 are more likely to be chosen
than sectors 2 and 5, and sectors 3 and 4 are the least likely. The main difference
between this approach and PRLA is that in WRS there are no phantom sources
from where the packets are finally routed to the base station using a single-path
approach.
Li et al. [73, 110] proposed Routing through a Random selected Intermediate
Node (RRIN) as another solution to the problem of selecting phantom sources
close to the data source6. The authors assume that the network is divided into a
grid and that each node knows its relative location (i.e., cell position) in the grid
as well as the grid dimensions. In this way, instead of making each node in the
walking phase take routing decisions independently, the source node can pick a
random point in the field and send the packet to that location. The source node
does not know whether there is a node in that particular location but in that
case, the node closest to that location becomes the point from where the packet
is finally transmitted to the base station using the shortest communication path.
Li et al. propose two versions of RRIN. In the first version, the intermediate point
is chosen uniformly at random but it is forced to be placed at least at a distance
dmin from the source as shown in Figure 3.8a. The main drawback to this scheme
is that the probability of being selected as an intermediate node is proportional to
the distance to the data source. As a result, the intermediate nodes concentrate
around the location of the source node and no mechanism prevents them from
being picked from the proximities of the source-destination shortest path, which
was one of the problems addressed by PRLA and WRS. In the second version
of RRIN, any location in the network has the same probability of being selected
as the random intermediate point. The consequence is that some intermediate
nodes will be very close to the data source thus exposing its location while some
others will be extremely far, not only resulting in energy-intensive paths but also
6They also argue that directed random walks leak information about the data source since
the forwarding direction must be contained in the packet headers in order to allow nodes to
route packets correctly. However, this information may be encrypted or encoded in the payload
thereby alleviating the problem.










Figure 3.8: Routing through Random selected Intermediate Node(s)
in more chances for the adversary to trace packets.
The RRIN scheme has been extended and used in several other research pa-
pers. In [72], Li and Ren propose two schemes that use multiple random interme-
diate nodes instead of a single one. In the angle-based multi-intermediate node
selection, the source node selects a maximum angle β to limit the location of
the last intermediate node within the range (−β, β). Once the maximum angle
has been determined, the source node uniformly chooses a random angle θ be-
tween itself and the node with respect to the base station, such that θ ∈ (−β, β).
Then, the data source selects the rest of the n intermediate nodes to be evenly
separated between itself and the final intermediate node. In the quadrant-based
multi-intermediate node selection, each sensor node divides the network into four
quadrants in such a way that it is placed in the first quadrant and the base sta-
tion is in the middle. The source node location is determined within the first
quadrant based on a random angle α. The last intermediate node is selected to
be somewhere within its adjacent quadrants, namely quadrant 2 and 4 as shown
in Figure 3.8b. Both extensions ensure that nodes are neither selected from be-
hind the base station nor close to the shortest-path between the data source and
the destination. However, it is not fully clear why it is necessary to use multiple
intermediate nodes instead of a single intermediary.
The Sink Toroidal Routing (STaR) routing protocol [75, 76] is also designed
to improve upon the initial RRIN designs. More precisely, it has been designed to
reduce the energy cost associated with the selection of pure random intermediate
nodes in the field. To that end, the source node picks random points within
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a toroidal region around the base station, which guarantees that intermediate
nodes are, at most, a given distance from the destination but also not too close
in order to prevent traceback attacks. The toroid is defined by three parameters:
the centre of the toroid (x0, y0), where the base station is placed; r, the inner edge
of the toroid; and R the outer edge of the toroid. Therefore, for each message
a source node picks a distance value d uniformly from the interval [r, R] and an
angle θ from [0, 2pi]. The intermediate node will be the one closest to the point
(x, y) = (x0 + d cos θ, y0 + d sin θ). The main drawback to this solution again has
to do with the selection of problematic intermediate nodes not only between the
source and the base station but also behind it.
Network Loop Methods
A completely different approach to deceive local adversaries consists of the cre-
ation of network loops. A network loop is basically a sequence of nodes that
transmit messages in a cycle in order to keep the adversary away from the real
direction towards the data source or to cover the presence of real traffic.
The Cyclic Entrapment Method (CEM) [98] is intended to set traps in the form
of decoy messages to attract the adversary and distract him from the true path
to the data source for as long as possible. After the deployment of the network,
each sensor node decides whether it will generate a network loop with a given
probability. Then, the node selects two neighbouring nodes and sends a loop-
creation message that travels h hops from the first to the other neighbour. All the
nodes receiving this message become loop members. During the normal operation
of the network, a loop is activated whenever a loop member (i.e., activation
node) receives a real packet being routed from a source node to the base station.
Interestingly, CEM is not a routing protocol itself but rather an add-on that
can be used with different routing protocols to enhance source-location privacy.
This implies that, when used in conjunction with single-path routing, real traffic
reaches the base station in the shortest time possible without incurring extra
delays. Figure 3.9a depicts such a scenario where two loop members (in grey)
become activation nodes after receiving real traffic. During a traceback attack,
when the adversary reaches an activation node he must decide which packet to
follow. If he chooses the fake message he is trapped in the loop for h hops until he
realises. However, an skilled adversary might avoid loops by observing the angle
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Figure 3.9: Network Loops Methods
of arrival of packets since those with a larger inclination angle are more likely to
lead to a loop.
The information Hiding in Distributed Environments (iHIDE) scheme by
Kazatzopoulos et al. [63, 64] is another solution that uses network loops. In
this scheme, the sensor network consists of a set of ring nodes which are inter-
connected with each other and with the base station by means of a network bus.
This arrangement is similar to the one depicted in Figure 3.9a but in iHIDE all
sensor nodes are either bus or ring nodes. During the data transmission period,
a source node that wishes to communicate data to the sink first sends the data
to the next ring member in a (counter-)clockwise direction7. When the bus node
receives the packet, it forwards it to the next bus node closer to the sink but the
packet continues to loop in the ring for a random number of hops. As the packet
travels through the bus, each bus node decides, based on a given probability, to
forward the packet into its own ring or to directly submit it to the next bus node.
The main limitation to iHIDE is that because it has such a well defined architec-
ture and roles for the nodes it is easy to learn the topology of the network and
thereby identify the bus and the rings. Once a bus node has been reached, the
adversary can wait until he observes that the bus node receives a message from
another bus node that it forwards to the next one. This implies that somewhere
in a previous ring there is a data source. In this way, the adversary can slowly
7In the case that the sensor node belongs to multiple rings simultaneously it randomly selects
one of them to forward the message.
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reduce his uncertainty.
The Network Mixing Ring (NMR) scheme [71, 74] creates a virtual ring of
nodes surrounding the base station whose aim is not to trap the adversary but to
mix up real messages with fake traffic in order to make them indistinguishable to
the adversary. This scheme consists of two phases. In the first phase, the source
nodes picks a random intermediate node which is in charge of initiating the next
phase. The selection process is based on the distance-based RRIN approach
described in Section 3.2.1. In the second phase, the intermediate node sends
the packet to the closest node in the network mixing ring. Once there, the
packet is relayed clockwise for a random number of hops before being finally
submitted to the base station. Within the mixing ring there are a few nodes that
generate network traffic, namely vehicle messages. These messages carry several
data units, which are all initially filled with garbage but as real messages enter
the ring the fake data units are replaced. To further complicate traffic analysis,
vehicle messages are re-encrypted at every hop. In this way, even if the adversary
reaches the ring node that forwarded the data to the base station he is unable to
figure out the entry point of that packet to the ring. Moreover, entry points are
changed over time. The whole process is depicted in Figure 3.9b, where the grey
cells represent the area defining the network mixing ring. A major limitation to
this approach is the increased energy consumption at the ring nodes, which are
more likely to deplete their batteries than other nodes. This event not only ruins
the source protection mechanism but also isolates the sink from the rest of the
network, rendering the whole system useless.
To diminish the energy imbalance between ordinary sensor nodes and ring
nodes, the authors propose predefining several rings and activating only one at a
time according to the residual energy of their members [71]. Additionally, they
briefly discuss the possibility of having several active rings simultaneously to im-
prove the level of protection of the data sources. More recently, Yao et al. [154]
have continued with the idea of organising the network using a multi-ring ap-
proach to protect source-location privacy. This scheme consists of three phases:
initialisation, path diversification, and fake packet injection. During initialisa-
tion, the base station floods the network with a discovery message which includes
a hop count. This process allows sensor nodes to obtain their distance to the base
station as well as to determine which of their neighbours are at the same distance,
which means that they belong to the same ring. In the following phase, the data
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source picks, uniformly at random, two rings (one closer and one farther) and an
angle α between zero and pi. Then, the data packet is sent out to the farther ring
and once there it is relayed counterclockwise until the angle is reached. From this
point, the packet is sent to the closer ring and once more travels counterclock-
wise for an angle β = pi − α. Finally, the packet is routed directly to the base
station. During transmission of real traffic on the rings, fake packets are injected
by the nodes on contiguous rings to further complicate traffic analysis. Clearly,
these ring-based solutions require the network to be densely populated in order
to enable the creation of full rings.
Fake Data Sources
The idea of using fake data sources was first suggested by Ozturk et al. [100].
They proposed two strategies, namely Short-lived and Persistent Fake Source, to
simulate the presence of real events in the field by making some sensor nodes to
behave as true data sources. In the first strategy, whenever a sensor node receives
a real message it decides, based on a particular probability distribution, whether
to generate a fake message and flood the network with it. This scheme provides
a poor privacy protection since fake data sources are ephemeral. The second
strategy aims to prevent this by creating persistent sources of fake messages.
Each sensor node decides with a probability to become a fake data source. The
efficiency of this strategy is very much dependent on the positioning of the fake
data source. If fake data sources are far from a real data source it helps to
improve the safety period significantly, otherwise it may lead the adversary to
the real data source.
Chen and Lou [29] designed several solutions to protect location privacy based
on the use of fake messages, namely the Bidirectional Tree (BT) scheme, the
Dynamic Bidirectional Tree (DBT) scheme, and the Zigzag Bidirectional Tree
(ZBT) scheme. These solutions are intended to protect both source- and receiver-
location privacy simultaneously but we cover them here in full detail to avoid the
duplication of contents across different sections. In the BT scheme, real messages
travel along the shortest path from the source to the sink and several branches of
fake messages flow into and out of the path. To that end, before the transmission
of data messages, the source node sends a packet containing its own hop count
Hs along the shortest path. Those nodes in the path whose distance to the sink is
greater than (1−p)Hs, being p a network-wide parameter, will generate an input
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branch with a given probability8. Similarly, the nodes satisfying pHs will choose
whether to generate an output branch. This solution is depicted in Figure 3.10a,
where dashed arrows represent (input or output) fake branches. The idea behind
the creation of fake branches is to misdirect the adversary from the real path
while event data reaches the base station in the shortest time possible. However,
it is not difficult for a skilled adversary to realise that nodes deviating from the
already travelled path are fake branches.
To prevent the adversary from easily obtaining directional information, the
DBT scheme suggests that real messages should travel with a forward random
walk (see FRW in Section 3.2.1) instead of using a single-path routing approach.
When a node receives a real message it decides the next hop uniformly at random
from its list of those neighbours closest to the base station. Similar to the BT
scheme, fake branches are created in order to complicate packet tracing attacks
further. In this case, input branches are generated with a probability when the
hop count is smaller than Hs/2, and output branches otherwise. The ZBT is an-
other scheme that has also been devised to prevent leaking direction information.
To that end, real packets zigzag along three segments: from the source node to
a source proxy, from there to a sink proxy, and finally to the real sink. First,
two candidate sink proxies are selected, one on each side of the sink and at a
distance of h hops. Then the sink and the two proxies initiate a flooding so that
each node learns its distance from each of them. In this way, the source node
8Input messages cannot originate from a node belonging to the shortest path but from a
remote node. The authors do not specify how remote sources of fake data are selected. A
possible solution is to send a message on a directed random walk from the node in the shortest
path.
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can select the sink proxy which is furtherest away from itself. Having a single
sink proxy may imply that a source node is very close to that proxy, which would
negatively impact source-location privacy. Before the transmission of data to the
sink, the source node picks a source proxy h hops away from itself. The source
proxy should be selected in such a way that it is not close to the sink. However,
this is not a trivial task unless the nodes are aware of the physical location of
all other nodes. Finally, during the data transmission phase, each node in the
path generates fake branches with a given probability. In the segment from the
source node to the source proxy, the fake packets flow into the path, and in the
segment from the sink proxy to the sink, the packets flow out. No branches are
generated in the segment connecting the source and sink proxies. The operation
of the ZBT scheme is depicted in Figure 3.10b, where grey nodes represent the
source and sink proxy nodes. This scheme presents the same limitation as the
original BT scheme, that is, fake branches can be eventually discarded. Either
the attacker discards a fake branch after tracing it or due to a unusual inclina-
tion angle. Moreover, the segment between the source and sink proxies does not
generate any branches, which implies that an attacker can easily determine their
locations and from there reach its target.
Jhumka et al. [56] developed two solutions, namely fake source (FS) 1 and 2, to
investigate the effectiveness of using fake data sources to protect source-location
privacy. Both solutions are built on top of a baseline flooding protocol. In FS1,
the data source floods the network with a data message containing the event data
and a hop count. When this packet reaches the base station, it generates an away
message containing the distance between itself and the data source, and floods
the network with it. The away message is intended to reach all nodes at the same
distance as the source to the sink and make them transmit a choose message. This
new message is forwarded to nodes further away, which decide to forward it based
on a given probability. When the hop count of the choose message reaches 0, it
generates a random number and, if above a given threshold, the node becomes
a fake data source. The FS2 protocol is very similar to FS1, the difference is
that in FS2 all the nodes that receive a message forward it, while in FS1 the
forwarding of messages is determined by a given probability. Consequently, more
nodes are likely to become fake data sources in FS2 and thereby the level of
protection achieved by this scheme is better at the expense of increased energy
consumption.
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3.2.2 Global Adversaries
The aforementioned techniques are only effective against adversaries perform-
ing traceback attacks with a limited hearing range. A more powerful adversary
is capable of monitoring the behaviour of a larger number of nodes simultane-
ously, which allows him to better correlate messages and guess routing paths. In
particular, global adversaries are capable of monitoring all the traffic generated
and forwarded in the network. Such adversaries can easily detect the data sources
among mere intermediaries because sensor nodes are programmed to report event
data to the base station as soon as it is detected.
Dealing with global adversaries is very challenging especially in scenarios
where there exist topological, functional or hardware constraints, as we learnt in
Chapter 2. There are two main approaches to hide the location of data sources,
either using fake traffic to cover the presence of event messages or introducing
significant delays in the transmission of messages. Both solutions present some
disadvantages in the sensor domain. The former implies a massive energy waste
while the latter has a negative impact on the ability of the network to provide the
base station with timely reports about events, which is essential for time critical
applications.
Most solutions in this area have concentrated on the injection of fake traffic to
provide event source unobservability and a huge research effort has been devoted
to making these solutions as energy-efficient as possible.
Dummy Traffic Injection
The threat of global adversaries was first considered by Mehta et al. in [89],
where they proposed the Periodic Collection scheme. This scheme makes every
node transmit fake messages at regular intervals to hide the presence of events in
the field. However, it is not as simple as sending fake messages at a constant rate
because the occurrence of an event message would change the message transmis-
sion pattern as shown in Figure 3.11a. This figure depicts a timeline where the
transmissions of real and fake packets are represented by arrows with white or
black heads, respectively. In the Periodic Collection scheme, sensor nodes trans-
mit messages at a given rate R regardless of the presence of events. Instead of
transmitting a message immediately after the detection of an event, the message
is temporarily stored until the next scheduled transmission time, as shown in Fig-
ure 3.11b. Since real and bogus traffic are indistinguishable from each other, this
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Figure 3.11: Periodic Fake Packet Injection
method provides perfect event source unobservability because the transmission
rate is not altered by the presence of events.
As event messages need to be delayed until the next scheduled transmission
time, this poses a serious limitation in time-critical applications. Intuitively, the
delivery delay can be reduced by changing scheduling in order to have shorter
inter-transmission times. However, this impacts negatively on the energy waste
of the network. Therefore, the transmission rate must be carefully adjusted in
order to ensure the durability of the network without incurring an excessive delay
in the delivery of messages to the base station.
Energy-Aware Approaches
There has been an extensive body of research which focuses on reducing the
overhead imposed by the injection of fake messages at regular intervals by all
sensor nodes. These proposed solutions have approached the problem in different
ways: simulating the presence of events in the field, filtering out fake traffic, using
already existing traffic to convey event data, and sending messages according to
a given probability distribution.
A first attempt to reduce the overhead produced by the Periodic Collection
scheme was devised by Mehta et al. [89]. This scheme, called Source Simulation is
based on the idea of saving energy by reducing the number of nodes transmitting
fake messages. Instead of making all nodes send out messages at regular intervals,
the network simulates the presence of real events in the field. The main problem
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with this approach lies in the difficulty of accurately modelling the movement of an
object so it appears as real to the adversary. In such a case, having a static subset
of sensor nodes transmitting fake messages is not enough to deceive an attacker.
Therefore, sensor nodes must be carefully programmed to transmit fake messages
following a coherent pattern that resembles a real object. Moreover, this process
should be carefully tailored to any type of asset being monitored, which turns
it into a challenging and laborious protection mechanism. Mehta et al. propose
a source simulation protocol as follows. During network deployment, a set of
L nodes are preloaded, each with a different token. These nodes generate fake
traffic during the data transmission phase and after a predefined period of time,
the token is passed to one of its neighbours (possibly itself) depending on the
behaviour of real objects. The size of L determines the level of protection as well
as the energy consumed by the network.
The Unobservable Handoff Trajectory (UHT) presented by Ortolani et al. [97]
is another solution that simulates the movements of objets in the field to preserve
source-location privacy against global adversaries. This solution focuses on the
protection of events originating at the perimeter of the network and eventu-
ally expiring at some point inside it (see Figure 3.12a). A clear example is the
transportation of goods to an industrial area. The UHT is a decentralised and
self-adaptive scheme that generates fake mobile events with the same probability
distribution as real events. Real events follow a Poisson distribution of rate l
while fake events are generated with rate k− l. In consequence, the overall distri-
bution of messages in the network follows a Poisson distribution of ratio k thus
covering real events. The generation of dummy events starts at the perimeter of
the network and propagates for a number of hops according to the length of real
events. Each perimeter node decides to generate a new dummy event indepen-
dently based on a Poisson with parameter k − l/P , where P is the number of
perimeter nodes and l, although unknown, can be estimated by choosing a sta-
tistical estimator. To do this, perimeter nodes record the number of real events
they observe over a time window. The propagation of fake event messages works
as follows. All nodes within the radius of a fake node receive the fake packets sent
towards the base station. This packet contains who will be the next fake source
in the path and also the length of the current event. This process is represented
in Figure 3.12b, where fake sources are shaded in grey and real sources in black
while fake and real messages are represented with dashed and ordinary arrows,
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respectively.
Besides the cross-layer scheme described in Section 3.2.1, Shao et al. [128]
proposed another version of the same solution that can be useful in the protection
of source-location privacy against global adversaries. This alternative protocol is
very similar to the Periodic Collection proposed by Mehta et al. but the main
difference is that instead of using ordinary network traffic it takes advantage of the
beaconing phase. This scheme also provides perfect event source unobservability
at no additional cost since event data is hidden within beacon frames, which
are periodically broadcast regardless of the occurrence or not, of events in the
field. However, since the time between consecutive beacons is relatively large, the
solution is only practical for some applications where no tight time restrictions
exist. Also, this solution is inadequate for large-scale sensor networks since the
delivery time is highly dependent on the distance from the data source to the
base station.
In order to reduce network traffic while maintaining source unobservability,
Yang et al. [149] proposed a bogus traffic filtering scheme. In this approach, the
network is divided into cells and some sensor nodes operate as filtering prox-
ies. Cells send real or fake messages at a given rate and on their way to the
base station they reach some of these proxy nodes. Upon the reception of traf-
fic, a proxy node discards bogus traffic and real traffic is temporarily buffered
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and re-encrypted before being forwarded9. In the case there are no event mes-
sages available, a proxy node sends encrypted dummy messages to prevent the
attacker from learning which proxies are receiving real traffic from some of its
associated cells. Two filtering schemes are proposed, the Proxy-based Filtering
Scheme (PFS) and the Tree-based Filtering Scheme (TFS). The PFS is the base-
line approach where a number of nodes are selected as proxies but the traffic
generated by each cell is only filtered once by its default proxy node. In TFS, a
multi-layered proxy architecture is proposed to further reduce dummy traffic. As
packets move towards the base station they can be processed by several proxy
nodes, which reduces fake traffic at the expense of increased network delay due
to the buffering at each proxy node. Thus, the number and location of proxy
nodes is very important to the performance of the solution. It should be noted
that a drawback to this solution is that an attacker can still use rate monitoring
techniques to identify the proxy nodes, which are important for the operation of
the network.
Another branch of research has concentrated on the concept of statistically
strong source unobservability to reduce message delivery time and increase the
lifetime of the network. This concept was introduced by Shao et al. [129] to relax
the tight requirements of perfect event source unobservability while maintaining
a statistical assurance on the protection of data source. Before deployment, sen-
sor nodes are configured to transmit according to a message distribution Fi as
depicted in Figure 3.13. During the data transmission phase, when an event E oc-
curs, the real message can be transmitted before the next scheduled transmission,
F4, without altering the parameters (e.g., the mean and variance) of the distri-
bution. This process is depicted in Figure 3.13b. Sensor nodes keep a sliding
window of previous inter-message delays {δ1, δ2, ..., δn−1} and, upon the occur-
rence of an event, δn is set to a value very close to 0 and gradually incremented
by a small random number until the whole sliding window passes an Anderson-
Darling goodness of fit test. Thus, the real event transmission can be sent ahead
of the scheduled time without alerting the adversary even if he performs statisti-
cal tests on inter-message delays. The solution proposed by Shao et al. includes
a mean recovery mechanism which delays subsequent transmissions because the
presence of bursts of real messages might skew the mean of the distribution.
9Cells are assumed to share pairwise keys with proxy nodes to allow them distinguish real
from fake messages.
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Figure 3.13: Statistically strong source unobservability
Recently, Alomair et al. [7, 8] showed that a global adversary has more efficient
ways of breaking statistically strong unobservability. Instead of focusing on the
inter-message delays of a single sliding window, the attacker might try to spot
differences between any two sliding windows in order to detect the presence of
real events. Therefore, the strategy of the adversary to distinguish between an
interval (i.e., a sliding window) containing real events from another one with
no real events, is to identify short inter-message delays followed by long inter-
message delays. These patterns are common in intervals containing real events
because the delay of real messages is usually shorter than the mean in order
to reduce the latency, and subsequent messages are delayed in order to adjust
the mean of the distribution as proposed by Shao et al. [129]. To the contrary,
inter-message delays are independent identically distributed random variables
in fake intervals. Consequently, by counting the number of short-long inter-
message delays an attacker might be able to distinguish intervals containing real
events. The solution proposed by Alomair et al. to reduce the success probability
of the attacker is to make fake intervals resemble intervals with real events by
introducing some statistical interdependence between fake inter-message delays.
Proano and Lazos [105] pointed out that the adversary cannot exactly deter-
mine the transmission rate of each and every sensor node. This is due to the fact
that a global vision of the network is usually achieved by means of an adversarial
sensor network. Each adversarial node only knows the number of packets sent
within its hearing range but it is unaware of which node is sending each of the
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(b) A potential MCDS
Figure 3.14: Minimum Connected Dominating Set
packets unless these data are present in the packet headers. As a result, not all
sensor nodes need to be active sources of fake traffic to deceive the adversary. The
problem of reducing the number of fake data sources is solved by partitioning the
network into a minimum connected dominating set (MCDS) rooted at the base
station. The MCDS covers the whole network by using the minimum number of
nodes in such a way that each node in the network either belongs to the MCDS
or is one hop away from it, as depicted in Figure 3.14. In this way, the nodes in
the MCDS transmit (real or fake) traffic at a given rate Z and the rest of the
nodes regulate their transmissions in order to conform to the statistical traffic
properties observed by an eavesdropper. Since the location of the eavesdropper
is unknown, each sensor node divides its hearing range into several regions so as
to consider all potential locations and computes a rate that satisfies the original
rate Z for all of them. Later, in [106], the same authors added a deterministic
assignment scheme for coordinating sensor transmissions and thus reduce end-to-
end delay for real packets. Time is divided into intervals of duration T and each
interval is in turn divided into subintervals of duration T
l
, where l is the height
of the MCDS. Nodes deeper in the MCDS are scheduled to transmit sooner, so
that any real packet reaches the sink at the end of each interval. For example,
in Figure 3.14b, each time interval Ik is divided into four subintervals since the
maximum depth of the MCDS is four. Sensor node s0 transmits at subinterval
I1k , node s1 at subinterval I
2
k , and so on.
Previous solutions have considered a passive global attacker in the sense that
he does not check in the field whether his observations lead to an actual data
source. Yang et al. [150] consider a global attacker who, upon detecting suspicious
cells devises an optimal route to efficiently visit these spots. As usual, the attacker
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performs traffic analysis on the network by deploying an adversarial network and
based on his observations he obtains a suspicion level for each cell. Then, he
defines a suspicion threshold to determine which cells to visit and in what order.
Since this problem has a factorial time complexity on the number of suspicion
cells (i.e., O(s ·s!)), Yang et al. propose two potential strategies to find a (pseudo-
)optimal route to visit all suspicious cells. The first strategy is based on a greedy
algorithm, which ends in polynomial time but is not globally optimal, and the
second one is a dynamic programming algorithm, which finds the optimal solution
but requires an exponential time to finish. Subsequently, the authors evaluate
the impact of the proposed attacker model to two existing solutions: statistically
strong source unobservability and source simulation. They conclude that the
former behaves well when the rate of real messages to be delivered is low while the
latter approach is suitable when the rate is high. As a result, Yang et al. propose
a dynamic approach that combines the merits of both solutions by switching from
the one to the other based on the load of the network.
3.2.3 Internal Adversaries
Some adversaries might be able to compromise and control a subset of nodes from
the legitimate network. These nodes become internal adversaries since they can
participate in the same tasks performed by any other network node. Thus, inter-
nal adversaries can provide the attacker with any information contained in the
packets they forward since they share cryptographic material with their neigh-
bours.
The solutions devised to deal with these types of attackers are very limited
and their approaches rather diverse. To the best of our knowledge, so far there
are only three solutions and they have concentrated on the implementation of
a trust-based routing solution, the modification of packets in transit, and the
decoupling of the location where the data is sensed, from the location where it
is temporarily stored before it is collected by the base station. Next we review
them in more detail.
The Identity, Route and Location privacy (IRL) algorithm is presented by
Shaikh et al. [124] as a network-level privacy solution. The primary goal of
this solution is to provide source anonymity and location privacy as well as pro-
vide assurance that packets reach their destination. Although the authors do
not consider the threat of internal adversaries, one of its features is suitable for










Figure 3.15: Neighbours partition in IRL
just this purpose. The authors introduce the notion of trust and reputation
to prevent routing through misbehaving adversaries. First, each node classifies
its neighbours into four groups depending on their position with respect to the
base station: forward (F ), right backward (Br), left backward (Bl), and mid-
dle backward (Bm), as shown in Figure 3.15. Furthermore, each node classifies
its neighbours as either trustworthy or untrustworthy based on the number of
successfully forwarded packets. Nonetheless, the calculation of the trust values
could be extended to incorporate new parameters, such as the presence of com-
munications with external entities or with other non-neighbouring nodes in order
to identify internal adversaries. When a node needs to send a message to the
base station, it checks whether there are any trustworthy nodes it can select in
the direction of the base station. From among all the trustworthy nodes it picks
one uniformly at random. If there are no trustworthy nodes, the same process
is repeated for Br and Bl. As a last resort, the node tries to send the packet
in the opposite direction to the base station. In the case no trustworthy nodes
are found, the node simply drops the packet. Therefore, each message follows a
different (random) path composed of trustworthy nodes only.
Additionally, IRL includes a renaming mechanism to protect the identity of
the data source. Whenever a node receives a packet it replaces the identifier
contained in its header with its own before forwarding it. In this way, dishonest
en-route nodes are unable to determine whether the sender is the real data source
or a mere intermediary. This implies that the identity of the real data source is
conveyed in the packet payload, encrypted with a pairwise secret shared with
the base station. The use of end-to-end encryption is efficient against internal
adversaries but it impedes the use of data-aggregation mechanisms, which is a
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useful feature for reducing network traffic and thus preserving energy.
Pongaliur and Xiao [103, 104] propose a more sophisticated packet transfor-
mation scheme called Source Privacy under Eavesdropping and Node compromise
Attacks (SPENA) based on the application of some cryptographic operations on
the packets at dynamically selected nodes in the route to the base station. Packets
have the following structure: {DstID, SrcID Hash, Obfuscating Partial Hash,
Rehash Seed, Payload Length, Payload | SrcID, Filler}, and nodes are pre-
loaded with two unique hash functions, a mapping function fp that returns 1
with probability p and 0 with probability 1 − p, a rehash function, and a sym-
metric key shared with the base station. One of the hash functions Hi is used to
generate a hash chain (h1i , h
2
i , . . . , h
n
i ) used in reverse order as the identities of the
nodes and the other hash function Fi is used in conjunction with the mapping
function to determine whether a node should modify the packet or not. In partic-
ular, a node j transforms a received packet if fp(Fj(Rehash Seed)) = 1. Nodes
that transform packets in transit are called rehashing nodes. At the data source,
the SrcID Hash field is loaded with an element of its hash chain (i.e., hmi ) and
later replaced by a rehashing node j by a value of its own hash chain (i.e., hkj ).
The Obfuscating Partial Hash (OPH) is initially set to the next element of the
hash chain concatenated with the payload and encrypted with its symmetric key
(i.e., EKi(h
m+1
i |Payload)). A rehashing node j generates a new OPHj by first
applying the rehashing function to the received OPH and then encrypts it with
its own key. Additionally, the rehashing node concatenates the SrcIDHash ob-
tained from the received packet to the payload, which is then encrypted with its
own symmetric key. It also uploads the new payload length and subtracts that
amount of bits from the filler to keep the packet size unchanged. At the base
station, the payload is recursively decrypted until the SrcID Hash of the true
data source is found. Finally, the base station checks the validity of the OPH.
The verification process requires the base station to keep track of the hash chains
of all the nodes in order to find the key corresponding to each of concatenated the
hash values. Another limitation to this approach is that the attacker can trivially
learn the real size of the payload by inspecting its corresponding header field and
thereby guess the number of modifications the packet has suffered based on the
probability p of the mapping function. By having access to this information the
attacker can estimate its distance to the data source.
The last solution is called pDCS [130] and its aim is to provide security and
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privacy in Data-Centric Sensor (DCS) networks with an itinerant base station.
In DCS networks, there are two types of nodes: sensing nodes, which collect and
forward information about events of interest, and storage nodes, which temporar-
ily store the data from a subset of sensing nodes and respond to the queries of
the itinerant base station. The relationship between sensing and storage nodes is
defined by a publicly known mapping function that determines where the data is
stored. In this way, the data can be accessed more efficiently but it also allows
an attacker to easily determine which nodes to compromise if he is interested in
a particular type of data. After compromising such nodes, he can also identify
the location where the data was originally collected. pDCS is intended to protect
against this type of threat. In particular, it concentrates on preventing node com-
promise and mapping attacks, that is, impeding the retrieval of any event data
stored in storage nodes as well as preventing the attacker from identifying the
relationship between sensing and storage nodes. The proposed scheme is based
on the use of a secure mapping function10 and the storage of encrypted data in a
remote location. In the case the adversary compromises a storage node he is not
able to decrypt the data contained in it because these data are encrypted with the
key of the sensing nodes which collected them. If a sensing node is compromised,
the attacker cannot determine where previous data was stored because the secure
mapping function prevents this from happening. Moreover, when a node is found
to be compromised there is a node revocation mechanism in order to prevent the
attacker from obtaining the location of future event data. Finally, the authors
suggest protecting the flow of data from the sensing to the storage node by means
of any existing source-location privacy solution.
3.3 Receiver Protection
Receiver-location privacy refers to the protection of the destination of messages
but it primarily concentrates on hiding the location of the base station. This
device demands exceptional protection measures given its importance for both
the physical protection of the network and strategic reasons. An attacker aware
of the location of the base station may compromise it for his own benefit. For
example, the attacker may be interested in gaining access to the data collected by
10A secure mapping function is basically a keyed hash function that uses as input the type
of event and other secret information shared by a group of nodes.
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the network, change configuration and operation parameters, or even destroy the
base station and thereby render the whole system useless. Additionally, the base
station provides strategic information because it is usually housed in a relevant
facility (recall the scenario depicted in Section 1.4.1).
The location of the base station is exposed due to the peculiar communication
pattern of WSNs. Each sensor node transmits data messages to a single base
station using a multi-hop routing protocol, which results in a high volume of
traffic in the proximities of the sink. Intuitively, the solution is to normalise the
traffic load by making each sensor node transmit, on average, the same number of
messages. Thus, a baseline flooding protocol provides the maximum protection
but it also incurs a prohibitive network overhead. Solutions in this area have
concentrated on providing a sufficient protection level at a reasonable cost.
In the following we review the existing solutions according to the capabilities
of the adversary. We analyse proposals dealing with local adversaries followed by
solutions considering the threat of global adversaries. There are no solutions in
the literature that study the threat of internal adversaries or node compromise
attacks. To the best of our knowledge, the first receiver-location privacy solution
to consider this type of threat has been developed as part of this dissertation and
is presented in Chapter 5.
3.3.1 Local Adversaries
In a local adversarial model, the attacker usually starts at a random position in
the network11 and moves around until he overhears some transmissions in the
area surrounding him. The typical types of attacks performed by an adversary
who wishes to find the sink are: content analysis, rate monitoring, and time
correlation. In content analysis, the adversary looks for any valuable information
that might lead him to the base station in either the packet’s headers or the
payload. This attack may be taken a step further by adding undetectable marks to
data packets as proposed by Shakshuki et al. [126] in order to allow the adversary
to track them on their way to the sink. Nonetheless, content analysis is usually
a poor source of information.
Additionally, an attacker can observe the packet sending times of neighbouring
nodes in order to determine the direction of the communication flow. Assuming
that the network is using a single-path routing protocol, the attacker can learn
11Placing the adversary at the edge of the network is, in our opinion, more realistic.
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that a sensor node is closer to the base station than one of its neighbours if it is
used as a relay. In other words, if a node transmits immediately after one of its
neighbours, the former node is closer to the sink. Finally, in a rate monitoring
attack, the strategy of the adversary is to move in the direction of those nodes
with higher transmission rates since nodes in the vicinity of the base station
receive more packets than remote nodes.
Next we analyse some basic countermeasures against the aforementioned at-
tacks followed by a set of more advanced solutions which provide enhanced se-
curity to the base station. Most of these solutions aim to balance the amount
of traffic between all network nodes by selecting the next hop based on some
probability while other solutions attempt to disguise or emulate the presence of
the base station at different locations. Again, some solutions may fall into several
categories depending on the features analysed.
Basic Countermeasures
In order to prevent the aforementioned traffic analysis attacks, some basic coun-
termeasures have been proposed. First, content analysis can be hindered by
applying secure data encryption on a hop-by-hop basis. Deng et al. [39] suggest
this process should be applied throughout the whole lifetime of the network but
it is not easy to satisfy this requirement until each node shares pairwise keys with
all its neighbours. Thus, they propose an ID confusion technique to conceal the
source and destination during the route discovery phase. This technique is based
on reversible hash functions so that when a node x sends a message to node y, it
randomly selects an element from Cx = {hx : x = H(x)} as the source address,
and an element from Cy = {hy : y = H(y)} as the destination address. Finally,
it encrypts the whole packet with a network-wide shared key pre-loaded on all
sensor nodes. A receiving node decrypts the message and, by reverting the hash
function, it obtains the true sender and intended recipient.
During data transmission, sensor nodes must ensure that packets change their
appearance as they move towards the base station. Each node in the path must
decrypt any received packet and then re-encrypt it with the key shared with
the next node in the route. However, even if the attacker cannot observe the
contents of the packets, he can learn some information from packet sending times
and eventually infer the relationship between parent and child (i.e., closer and
further) nodes. To prevent this, Deng et al. [38, 40] propose applying random
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delays to the transmission of packets. Additionally, the authors suggest creating
a uniform sending rate to prevent rate monitoring attacks. This can be achieved
by making a parent node accept packets from a child node only if its own packet
has been forwarded. In the case the parent node has nothing new to send, it can
simply continue to send the same packet or inject dummy traffic.
There are some limitations to these basic countermeasures that require the
development of further solutions. These limitations are related to the delay in-
troduced at each forwarding node and the energy wasted due to the application
of uniform data transmission rates. The following solutions aim to reduce these
limitations.
Biased Random Walks
This category brings together solutions where the routing process is random but
somehow biased towards the base station. The first solution we analyse here is
also presented by Deng et al. [38, 40] and is called Multi-Parent Routing (MPR).
The MPR consists of making each sensor node pick the next element in the
path uniformly at random from its set of parent nodes. See in Figure 3.16 a
comparison between a single-path routing and a MPR scheme. In Figure 3.16a all
transmissions use the same transmission path, which is represented by a straight
arrow, while in Figure 3.16b the paths followed by two different packets are
represented. The MPR scheme obtains a better load balance as data packets
spread within a band of nodes next to the shortest path from the data source to
the base station. However, the traffic flow still points to the base station as the
next communication hop is selected from the list of parent nodes.
To further diversify routing paths and introduce packets in different direc-
tions, the authors suggest combining MPR with a random walk (RW) routing
scheme. In this version of the protocol, nodes forward packets to a parent node
with probability pr and to a randomly chosen neighbour with probability 1− pr.
Consequently, packets may not only travel towards the base station but in any
other direction. In Figure 3.16c we depict two routing paths which at some points
even move in the opposite direction to the base station. This scheme provides
better security at the cost of a higher message delivery delay.
Similarly, Jian et al. [57, 58] propose in Location Privacy Routing (LPR) to
make every sensor node divide its neighbours into two groups. The first group
contains nodes which are closer to the base station and the second group contains









Figure 3.16: Schematic of Several Multi-Parent Routing Techniques
the rest of their neighbours. So, nodes forward packets to further nodes with
probability Pf and to closer nodes with probability 1−Pf . To ensure that packets
reach the base station the value of Pf must be below 1/2. This implies that after
a sufficient number of observations, the attacker is able to determine which of the
neighbours of a node belong to each group. By following this strategy at different
nodes, the attacker is able to infer the direction toward the data sink. To prevent
this, the authors propose injecting fake packets in the opposite direction to the
base station. When a node forwards a real packet, it generates with probability
Pfake a fake packet to a random node in the group of further nodes. This packet
travels for Mf ≥ 2 hops away from the base station12. In general, the adversary
cannot distinguish real from fake traffic which makes this solution secure since
packets flow in any direction with an even probability. However, if the adversary
observes a node that does not forward a packet he knows that it is a fake packet.
As fake packets are sent to further neighbours exclusively, the adversary learns
that the base station is in the opposite direction.
Fake Traffic Injection
The aforementioned MPR solutions are still vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks
since pr is typically set to values over 0.5 for reasons of efficiency. Therefore,
after a sufficient number of observations, an attacker can learn which of the
neighbours of a node are its parents. To mitigate this problem, Deng et al. [38, 40]
propose an additional technique called Fractal Propagation (FP) to be used in
conjunction with MPR and RW. The main idea behind this mechanism is to
generate and propagate fake packets in random directions in order to introduce
12A value Mf = 1 implies that the node receiving the fake packet does not retransmit the
packet, which can be detected by the attacker.
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more randomness into the communication pattern. When a sensor node observes
that a neighbouring node is forwarding a data packet to the base station, it
generates a fake packet with probability pc and forwards it to one of its neighbours.
The durability of fake packets is controlled by means of a global time-to-live
parameter K. Also, if a node observes a fake packet with parameter k (0 <
k < K) it propagates another fake packet with time-to-live parameter k − 1.
Figure 3.16d shows the trace resulting from the transmission of a single packet
using the three mechanisms together.
The main problem of the FP scheme is that since nodes in the vicinity of
the base station observe a greater amount of traffic, they generate much more
fake traffic than remote nodes. This implies that the traffic rate in the area
surrounding the base station is significantly higher than in other areas, which is
not only detrimental to the operation of the network as it increases the number
of collisions but also helps the adversary to track down the base station. To
address this problem, the authors propose a new solution called the Differential
Fractal Propagation (DFP). In this scheme, sensor nodes adjust their probability
of generating fake traffic pc according to the number of packets they forward.
Below a given threshold sensor nodes behave as in FP but if their forwarding rates
are higher (i.e., they are close to the base station) they reduce the probability pc
by a specific factor. Besides reducing the energy waste and packet loss rate, this
scheme provides better privacy protection to the base station because it balances
the network traffic load more evenly.
Yao et al. [153] devised another fake packet injection scheme to protect sink
location privacy. In this scheme, real packets are sent along the shortest path from
the data source to the base station. When two paths of real messages intersect at
some point, the node receiving these packets sends two fake packets to two fake
data sinks after a timer expires or a packet counter reaches a certain threshold. In
this way, real and fake data sinks receive a similar number of packets. Moreover,
when a packet reaches subsequent intersection points, the intersection node sends
Nf packets to some random destinations. This process is depicted in Figure 3.17,
where dark grey nodes represent intersection nodes, light grey nodes are fake
sinks or some random data destinations. Ordinary arrows symbolise real data
packets while dashed arrows represent fake packets. In Figure 3.17a the first
intersection node transmits fake traffic to both fake data sinks. Meanwhile, the
second intersection node introduces fake traffic to other random destinations as












(b) Injection at second intersection node
Figure 3.17: Yao et al.’s Fake Packet Injection Scheme
well.
The main problem of Yao et al.’s approach is its privacy protection level.
An attacker starting from a data source and tracing packets can trivially reach
the first intermediate node. From that point, the attacker has to decide on his
next move. Since fake traffic is sent after certain conditions have been satisfied,
the attacker can distinguish real from fake traffic. Additionally, since real data
packets are sent using the shortest path, the transmission of fake traffic may
imply an abrupt change in the angle of transmission and thus reveal the flow
of real messages. This problem is also present in the Bidirectional Tree Scheme
(see Section 3.2.1), which was devised by Chen and Lou [29] as a solution for
protecting source- and receiver-location privacy simultaneously.
Sink Simulation
Some approaches try to emulate the presence of the base station at different points
in the field in order to provide some form of k-anonymity13. Simulation techniques
are based on the generation of fake traffic but, instead of being transmitted in
random directions, it is addressed to particular network locations. This results in
a concentration of high volumes of fake traffic, called hotspots, the objective of
which is to draw the adversary to remote locations, away from the true data sink.
The main challenge is to create hotspots that are evenly distributed throughout
the network with a minimum overhead.
13Refers to the ability to remain anonymous (i.e., unidentified) within a set of at least k
entities with similar attributes.
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Chang et al. [25] present a solution called Maelstrom that generates a num-
ber of points in the network with a high traffic density which are intended to
drag the attacker to them. After deployment, the base station sends N special
configuration packets, each of which is configured to travel Hs hops away from
the base station. After that, each of these packets travel Hr random hops to
any node on the same level or further away. The final recipients of these packets
become the centre of a maelstrom area and announce this by sending a discovery
packet to nearby nodes. During data transmission, when a node receives a real
packet it generates with probability pf a fake message and forwards it to its clos-
est maelstrom. Additionally, any packet addressed to the sink or a maelstrom is
sent to a node closer to its destination with probability p and to a node at the
same distance as itself (if any) with probability 1− p. By carefully adjusting the
values of pf , N , and p the authors claim that it is possible to evenly distribute the
number of packets being received at the base station and the various maelstroms.
However, once an intelligent attacker reaches a maelstrom area he can discard it
as the true data sink.
A similar approach based on the simulation of several data sinks is proposed
by Biswas et al. [17]. The idea is to evenly distribute multiple fake data sinks in
such a way that each of them receive the fake traffic within its neighbourhood.
The selection criteria is that fake data sinks should not be close to the base
station, be neighbours with each other, or have neighbours in common. The
goal is to maximise the number of neighbours that each of the fake base stations
have, since this implies more incoming traffic. During data transmission, each
node is configured to transmit a fixed number of messages either real or fake so
that after a given time period all nodes have sent the same amount of traffic.
Fake traffic is directed to fake base stations by its neighbours except for nodes
which are not neighbours the selection of a fake destination is done in a round-
robin fashion. The result should be that fake base stations receive at least the
same amount of traffic as the actual base station. This approach may deal with
naive rate monitoring adversaries but it can be easily defeated by informed global
observers.
Finally, Deng et al. [38, 40] refined their fractal propagation solutions and cre-
ated a new scheme called Differential Enforced Fractal Propagation (DEFP) that
is capable of creating hotspots in a decentralised and dynamic way. To generate













Figure 3.18: Decentralised Hotspot Generation in DEFP
hotspots, sensor nodes are pushed to send fake traffic to an already used neigh-
bour with higher probability as opposed to FP and DFP where dummy packets
are sent in any direction. This is achieved by keeping track of the number of
fake packets forwarded to each neighbour. New fake traffic is more likely to be
sent to neighbours who have previously received more fake traffic, as shown in
Figure 3.18. In this way there is no need for a central authority or a complex
coordination system to establish where the hotspots should be placed. Another
interesting feature of this solution is that the hotspots can be deactivated by sim-
ply resetting the forwarding probabilities of each node. After that, new hotspot
locations are likely to appear, which prevents smart attackers from discarding
fake data sinks (i.e., hotspots) until they find the real base station.
3.3.2 Global Adversaries
The aforementioned techniques are considered to be effective only in a local ad-
versarial model but some of them may also provide some means of protection
against global adversaries. As a matter of fact, they can be useful if the global
adversary has no real-time analysing capabilities, that is, he is only able to re-
trieve a snapshot of the amount of traffic transmitted over a period of time. Also,
this is made possible by the fact that the adversary is usually unaware of the
forwarding rate of each particular node rather he only knows the overall rate in
its vicinity, as noted by Proano and Lazos [105]. However, there is still a chance
that there can appear global adversaries with real-time monitoring capabilities,
which needs to be tackled.
Again, the injection of fake traffic is one of the main approaches for protecting
from global adversaries. Making the base station mimic the behaviour of sensor
nodes, simulating the presence of several data sinks, and moving the base station
to a different location might also be useful solutions. These schemes are usually
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(a) Data packet reaches the backbone
BS
(b) Packet flooding within the backbone
Figure 3.19: Backbone Flooding
more energy efficient but imply more management and configuration issues as we
see next.
Bogus Traffic
At the beginning of Section 3.3 we mentioned that flooding the network with
messages is a simple yet efficient mechanism to homogenise network traffic and
thus protect the location of the base station. The main drawback to flooding is
the cost associated with the retransmission of the same message to every corner of
the network. Backbone flooding [90] reduces the communication cost associated
with flooding-based protocols by controlling the scope of the transmissions within
a limited area, that is, among backbone members. Any data packet generated
in the network is addressed to the backbone, from where it is delivered to all its
members. Thereby, the backbone must satisfy two conditions. First, any data
sinks must be located at least within the range of a backbone member in order
to overhear all messages. Second, the backbone is created in such a way that it
contains a sufficient number of nodes to achieve the desired level of privacy. A
major limitation to this approach is that the backbone is static and thus back-
bone members will deplete their batteries sooner than the rest of the nodes. The
authors suggest that this problem can be alleviated by (a) periodically rebuilding
the backbone based on the energy remaining on the nodes or (b) defining several
backbones from the beginning so that each packet is addressed to different back-
bones. Figure 3.19 illustrates the transmission of a data packet to the backbone
as well as its eventual propagation and delivery to the base station.
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Ying et al. also try to homogenise the traffic in the network by making each
sensor node transmit at the same rate regardless of its distance to the base station.
After network topology discovery, each sensor node knows its distance from the
base station and can adjust its transmission rate accordingly. The Concealing
Sink Location (CSL) [155] calculates the traffic that has to be transmitted by
each single node located at distance i from the sink. This value is calculated
as the number of nodes with distance d ≥ i divided by the number of nodes at
distance i. This ratio represents the number of messages to be transmitted by
each individual node at distance i, considering that each node must send its own
traffic and forward the traffic from nodes further away from the sink. The number
of nodes at a given distance i is estimated via geometric analysis considering the
size of the deployment area and a uniform distribution of the nodes in the field.
However, these estimations may differ significantly from the reality. Also, it
is important to note that the authors assume that sensor nodes have a similar
transmission rate for real messages but this might not be the case in the presence
of bursts of messages.
A similar approach is followed in [156] to determine the transmission rate of
sensor nodes, which is calculated based on the number of child nodes an immediate
neighbour of the sink has. The reason is that this provides an estimation of
the total amount of traffic that each node should generate to transmit a similar
number of messages. The idea is to make all sensor nodes in the network transmit
as many messages as a sink neighbour has to since they are the most loaded nodes.
This fixed number of messages is split into real and fake messages. When a sensor
node receives a message it first checks whether it is fake or real. In the former
case, the packet is simply dropped, while in the latter, the packet is temporarily
buffered before being transmitted. In the meantime the sensor node generates fake
traffic to satisfy the overall transmission rate. Ying et al. claim that by instructing
sensor nodes to forward the same number of messages as the neighbours of the
base station, the lifetime of the network is not reduced. The argument is that
the neighbours of the sink are always the first nodes to deplete their batteries.
However, the authors have not considered several important issues that may call
into question their claims. First, they should have considered that a transceiver
in listening mode consumes almost as much battery as the micro-controller in a
typical sensor node [132]. Second, sensor nodes must decrypt received packets
in order to be able to discern which of them are real. Finally, it is necessary












(b) Network partition and tree forma-
tion
Figure 3.20: Examples of Sink Simulation Approaches
to consider that increasing the traffic rate of every single sensor node also has a
negative impact on the reliability of the communications, which results in packet
collisions and retransmissions.
Sink Simulation
Sink simulation has also been proposed as a mechanism to protect from global
adversaries. Mehta et al. [90] propose simulating the presence of several data
sinks in the field. During the deployment of the network some restrictions must
be met. A number k of sensor nodes are picked as fake data sinks and the
true data sinks are manually placed within the communication range of some
of these. The number of fake sinks must outnumber the number of true sinks.
When a source node collects event data, it sends them to all the fake data sinks,
which on reception broadcast the message locally. This process is illustrated in
Figure 3.20a, where the data source S sends four messages to F1, . . . , F2 and
each of them broadcast the message locally. Since all fake sinks receive the same
amount of traffic, they are all equally likely to be next to a true data sink. The
number of fake sinks has a clear impact on both the level of protection of the
network and the communication overhead. The larger the value of k the better
the protection but the higher the volume of traffic in the network.
Chai et al. [24] present a solution also based on the concept of k-anonymity.
The idea is to have at least k nodes with a communication pattern similar to
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the nodes around the base station. To that end, the network is partitioned into
k non-overlapping regions, each of which contains a node that collects all the
information sensed in that region. These nodes pi are organised as an Euclidean
minimum-spanning tree (EMST) and the data they received from their own region
is forwarded to all other tree members. The base station is manually placed after
the formation of the EMST in order to ensure that it is within the communication
range of the tree. The authors show in the paper that the Voronoi tessellation14 of
the network is the optimal partition that minimises the total routing energy and
provides a reasonable protection level. Figure 3.20a shows a Voronoi partition of
the network for the designated nodes pi, in grey. Note that all nodes connecting
the designated nodes see all the network traffic and thus the base station simply
needs to be placed close to one of them. As a result, the uncertainty of the
attacker is much greater than in the previous scheme for the same value of k.
However, the nodes forming the tree are highly likely to deplete their batteries
much sooner than the rest of the nodes, thereby ending up with no alternative
routes to the base station.
Wang and Hsiang [141] propose another solution based on the creation of
artificial hotspots that is intended to counter a global adversary. The hotspots
are generated by means of a decentralised protocol that starts by generating a
shortest-path tree rooted at the base station. After that, neighbouring leaf nodes
from the tree can establish communication links in order to generate network
cycles. During data transmission, the shortest-path tree is used to transmit data
to the base station and, simultaneously, fake packets are injected into the cycles.
Fake traffic continues moving along the cycle until it is completed. The centre of a
hotspot is, indeed, a node where several cycles intersect as it is the recipient of all
the bogus traffic generated along the cycles. Moreover, during cycle generation,
they include a mechanism that establishes that two leaf nodes only create a cycle
if their least common ancestor is at least h hops away from both nodes. This
mechanism is interesting because it reduces the number of hotspots and, in this
way, each of the hotspots receives a greater amount of traffic. However, if h is
too large, it may result in very few hotspots, which turn out to be placed very
close to the base station. Another drawback is that leaf nodes may be physically
distant from each other and if this is the case they are unable to communicate
14A Voronoi diagram for a given set of locations is a partition of the plane into disjoint regions
such that any given region contains all the points closest to each of the locations
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with each other in order to establish a link for the cycle. Finally, it is worth
mentioning that even though the authors assume a global adversarial model, this
solution does not seem suitable for that purpose. As a matter of fact, their
simulations concentrate on the communication cost and efficiency compared to
DEFP but no security analysis nor simulation results are provided with respect
to the level of privacy achieved by their solution. The main problem is that the
true sink behaves differently from the rest of the artificial hotspots. While the
transmission rate of the base station is negligible, fake hotspots must forward the
real data packets coming from its child nodes. Consequently, the base station
can be uncovered by calculating the node with the largest reception-transmission
ratio.
Relocation and Disguise
As far back as 2003, Deng et al. [39] suggested the reallocation of the base station
for enhanced security. They assume that the base station has complete knowledge
of the topology of the network and thus it may calculate an optimal future location
that maximises its security. Actually, they do not address a global eavesdropper
but a compromised node dropping packets. Therefore, we refer the reader to their
paper for further details.
Possibly motivated by the approach just mentioned, Acharya and Younis
present the Relocation for Increased Anonymity (RIA) scheme [1]. The base
station finds a new location by considering both the impact over network per-
formance and its own level of protection. The network is divided into cells and
the base station knows the transmission rate of each cell as well as the number
of nodes in them. With this information, the base station calculates a score for
each cell (i.e., scorei = densitiyi/threati) and moves to the cell with the highest
score. The rationale behind this scoring mechanism is that by moving the base
station to a cell with a low threat (i.e., low transmission rate), the cells with high
activity need to send packets to remote areas, which increases the delivery time
and consumes more energy. Likewise, if there is a low transmission rate due to a
reduced node density, moving the base station to that cell would cause the few
nodes in the cell to become overwhelmed with traffic and their batteries would
soon be depleted. Once the base station knows which is the most suitable cell to
reside in, instead of moving there using the shortest path, the base station follows
the safest route to reach the final destination. In Figure 3.21a we depict the path
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BS
(a) Safest route in the RIA scheme
BS
(b) Selective packet retransmission
Figure 3.21: Relocation and Disguise Examples
selected by the base station for relocation based on the scores of each of its cells,
the cells with higher scores are depicted in a lighter colour.
Mimicking the behaviour of ordinary sensor nodes is another way of hiding
the base station from global adversaries. The communication pattern of the
network can be modified by making the base station forward the packets it receives
for several hops, as suggested by the Base-station Anonymity increase through
selective packet Re-transmission (BAR) [1]. After receiving a packet the base
station decides whether to send the packet to a random neighbour. Packets will
be retransmitted away from the base station for a given number of hops. The
length of the walk is dynamically adjusted based on the level of threat perceived
by the base station. If the base station needs to increase its level of protection
it defines longer walks. The general idea is that by doing this, the number of
transmissions in remote cells increase and thus the attacker cannot clearly identify
the actual location of the base station based on the transmission rate of a cell.
An example of this approach is illustrated in Figure 3.21b, where source nodes
and destination nodes are represented as grey and white circles, respectively. The
main problem with this approach is that by forwarding packets to random remote
locations, the base station is also increasing the transmission rate of the cells in
its vicinity. Consequently, the attacker may still spot the base station as the cell
with the highest transmission rate.
Finally, the Decoy Sink Protocol [35] combines indirection and data aggre-
gation to reduce the amount of traffic received by the base station. Instead of
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sending the event data to the base station directly, sensor nodes are programmed
to transmit their packets to an intermediate node (i.e., the decoy sink) and on
their way the data are aggregated. Finally the decoy sink sends the result of the
aggregation to the base station. Although this may prevent the attacker from
determining the location of the true data sink, this scheme exposes the location
of the decoy sink. If the goal of the attacker is to compromise the base station,
he obtains a similar result by compromising the decoy sink. Also, if he destroys
it, the protocol stops working. This problem is contemplated by the authors and
they suggest picking several random nodes during the initialisation of the network
to operate as decoy sinks. During the transmission period, sensor nodes send all
their readings to a particular decoy sink for a pre-established period of time. This
version of the protocol adds robustness to the network and balances the traffic
load but the attacker is still able to ultimately achieve his original goal.
3.4 Conclusion
As a result of the aforementioned analysis we propose a complete taxonomy of
location privacy solutions in WSNs (see Figure 3.22). This categorisation has
been created following the same criteria as those used to guide the exposition of
this chapter. It considers both the protection of node identity and traffic patterns
as a first tier of the taxonomy. On the one hand, we observe that there are two
main approaches for node identity protection, which are either based on the use
of an already established pool of pseudonyms or rely on cryptographic schemes
to generate them. On the other hand, the traffic pattern branch considers both
the protection of data sources and the base station. In either case, we first
classify solutions based on the capabilities of the adversary and then look into
their common features. In general, we observe that the most common approach
for protection against local adversaries is to introduce random routing paths.
However, this type of protection mechanism is unable to preserve location privacy
in the presence of an adversary with a global hearing range. Finally, little work
has been done on the protection of location privacy against internal adversaries.
In fact, there are no papers dealing with the threat of internal adversaries when
the goal is to preserve the location of the base station.
Besides the information which can be easily derived from the proposed taxon-
omy, during the analysis of solutions we have discovered some other interesting








































Figure 3.22: Taxonomy of Location Privacy Solutions in WSNs
issues that we will exploit in the following chapters to enhance location privacy
in WSNs. First, we have observed that the existing protection mechanisms are
blind, in the sense that they are executed without knowing whether an adversary
is present in the field. With this sort of information, the network can intelli-
gently decide when to activate the protection mechanism instead of assuming a
constant threat. Moreover, if the network knows the exact or approximate loca-
tion of the adversary it can carefully adjust the protection mechanism to impose
a minimal impact on the network both in terms of energy consumption and data
delivery delay. This is precisely the idea that we exploit in Chapter 4 to protect
source-location privacy in the presence of a mobile adversary.
Another interesting observation is that most of the solutions devised to pro-
tect the location of the base station are either too costly because they require
large amounts of fake traffic or they leak location information in some specific
circumstances. Additionally, none of the existing solutions deal with node com-
promise attacks and more precisely with the threat of routing table inspection.
An adversary being able to retrieve the routing tables of a node trivially learns
which of its neighbours are closer to the base station. After very few repetitions
of this process he gains a very good idea of the direction towards the base sta-
tion. In Chapter 5 we elaborate on these research gaps and develop a solution
that provides receiver-location privacy against adversaries capable of performing




This chapter presents a novel source-location privacy solution, called Context-
Aware Location Privacy (CALP). The general trend towards source-location pri-
vacy protection has been to randomise routing paths in order to reduce the num-
ber of packets the adversary is capable of capturing, thus minimising his chances
of tracing back to the source of messages. However, it is well known that sending
packets on randomly chosen paths does not necessarily reduce the likelihood of
the attacker reaching the source of events. The primary reason is that the data
routing process is blind, that is, there is no knowledge of where the attacker could
be located.
The CALP mechanism offers an original solution to the location privacy prob-
lem that takes advantage of the ability of sensor nodes to feel their environment.
CALP exploits sensor nodes’ context-awareness to detect the presence of a mo-
bile adversary in their surroundings so that packets are routed in a more efficient
and privacy-preserving manner. The solution aims to anticipate the movements
of the attacker in order to minimise the number of packets he is able to capture
and analyse, hence reducing the likelihood of the attacker finding the source.
Unlike state-of-the-art solutions, the devised protection mechanism is operative
only when the adversary is present in the field. Since the network is expected to
be free from threats most of the time, the use of the CALP mechanism trans-
lates into significant energy savings and increased efficiency compared to previous
source-location privacy solutions.
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. We describe the net-
work and threat model under consideration in Section 4.1. The main building
blocks of the CALP approach are detailed in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents
the implementation of the shortest-path CALP routing algorithm, which com-
bines the CALP approach with an energy-efficient routing algorithm. Finally,
the shortest-path CALP routing is evaluated through simulations in Section 4.4.
4.1 Problem Statement
This section describes the network and attacker models considered in this chapter.
It also presents the main assumptions that are relevant for the development in
the CALP mechanism.
4.1.1 Network Model
We consider WSNs used for monitoring purposes that follow an event-driven data
reporting method, meaning that individual sensor nodes transmit data packets to
the base station as soon as they observe a relevant phenomenon in their vicinity.
Therefore, all data is received at the base station after several forwarding hops.
The network is assumed to be composed of n sensor nodes which are uniformly
and randomly distributed in a field. Sensor nodes cover a large area so that the
attacker can only control and monitor a small portion of the communications
at any given moment. Also, we assume that each node is aware of its adjacent
neighbours and the connectivity of the network is high. This allows sensor nodes
to choose the next communication hop from various neighbouring nodes.
The most important assumption for the correct operation of CALP is that
each node in the network has the ability to detect the presence of moving objects
in the field. This can be done by means of one or various types of sensors such
as infrared, acoustic, thermal, pressure and magnetic sensors. Additionally, as
shown in [157] and [146], the location of transceiver-free moving objects can be
estimated due to the interferences they cause in the radio signal strength of several
network nodes.
In addition, we require sensor nodes to share keys with its immediate neigh-
bours in order to be able to encrypt and decrypt messages at each hop. We
assume these cryptographic algorithms are semantically secure, thus enabling
message confidentiality and indistinguishability to an external observer, who is
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unable to retrieve packet contents nor link messages. Moreover, the headers of
the packets contain no information about the identity of the data sources. This
can be achieved by means of pseudonyms schemes, as described in Section 3.1.
4.1.2 Threat Model
The adversarial model under consideration is an external, passive attacker with
local eavesdropping capabilities. An external adversary does not control sensor
nodes and thus cannot intercept packets and retrieve their contents. An adversary
is said to be passive when he does not interfere with the communications or the
normal operation of the network by injecting, modifying or blocking packets.
In general, passive adversaries limit their actions to performing traffic analysis
attacks. These attacks depend on the hearing range of the adversary, which is
typically equivalent to that of an ordinary sensor node. This must not be regarded
as a strong assumption since the network model under consideration is intended
to cover large areas.
Also, contrarily to traditional attackers considered in [108, 109], the adver-
sary is able to move in the direction of received packets. An attacker is able to
determine the angle of arrival of a signal, for example by measuring the difference
in received phase at each element of an antenna array [86], which finally allows
him to find the source of a packet. Besides, we assume that the attacker is able
to move at a reasonable speed but never exceeds the time it takes for a packet to
reach a neighbouring node. Thus the speed of the attacker is not a critical factor,
although it affects the response time of our scheme.
The attacker might start to monitor the communications from either an in-
ternal position or the edge of the network. We follow the same approach as
most authors, that is, letting the adversary start next to the base station. In
this way, the adversary will eventually overhear data packets since all the traf-
fic is addressed to this single node. We consider two different strategies for the
adversary: a patient or inquisitive adversary. Formally,
Definition 1 (ADVPAT ). Let X = {x1, x2, · · · , xn} be the set of sensor nodes
comprising the network and let x0 be the base station. ADVPAT is an attacker
that starts at x0 and waits until he observes a packet from another node xi. The
adversary moves to node xi and waits for a new transmission from a node xj,
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where i 6= j. If no packets are received after a time t, the attacker returns to node
xi. This process is repeated until xi = x0.
The patient adversary waits until he overhears a data packet or a predefined
time period passes without any observations, in which case he returns to his
previous position. Eventually, the attacker may return to the original position,
the base station. The inquisitive adversary behaves similarly but he does not
wait for packets.
Definition 2 (ADVINQ). Let X = {x1, x2, · · · , xn} be the set of sensor nodes
comprising the network and let x0 be the base station. ADVINQ is an attacker
that starts at x0 and initiates a random walk until he observes a packet coming
from node xi. The adversary waits next to node xi for new packets but if no
packets are received after a time t, he initiates a new random walk.
A combination of both strategies is also possible but the proposed solution
will be only evaluated against the ADVPAT and ADVINQ adversaries.
4.2 Context-Aware Location Privacy
This section provides the details of the Context-Aware Location Privacy scheme.
The basic idea behind the CALP mechanism is to anticipate the movements of
the attacker in order to decrease the number of packets he is able to capture and
thus reduce the probability of the attacker finding the data source. To that end,
it is necessary to take advantage of the ability of sensor nodes to perceive the
presence of moving objects in their vicinity. Upon the detection of such an event,
nodes react by broadcasting a route update message to its neighbouring nodes.
This message is forwarded several hops away from the position of the attacker
and is used to modify the routing tables of the nodes in such a way that packets
are routed around the region under the control of the adversary.
4.2.1 Software Components
The Context-Aware Location Privacy scheme can be regarded as a software plug-
in that integrates neatly with the rest of components of the sensor nodes to enable
privacy-aware routing protocols. The interaction between components is depicted
in Figure 4.1, where an outgoing arrow means that the component uses some of




Figure 4.1: Components Interdependence
the functionality provided by the component receiving the arrow. Therefore,
a monitoring Application might use the Sensors component to measure some
phenomena and a Routing component to send the information to the base station.
Additionally, the Routing component uses the Radio component to send the
data through the wireless interface and might use the CALP component to make
decisions on the next hop of the communication, thus allowing the sensor nodes to
adapt their routing strategy depending on their privacy needs. Finally, the CALP
component may use either the Sensors component or the Radio Component, or
both, to detect the presence of adversaries.
The main advantage of this approach is that by integrating the CALP com-
ponent, any existing application can transparently benefit from privacy-enhanced
routing. Moreover, the underlying routing protocol does not need to be modi-
fied or replaced by a specially tailored solution since the interaction between the
Routing and the CALP component is done seamlessly through an intermediate
shared element, i.e., the routing table of the node. More details will be given in
the subsequent sections.
4.2.2 Adversary Recognition
Prior to the route updating process, the network must identify whether there is
an adversary in the field. This implies that the CALP mechanism is suitable for
application scenarios where the tracking of moving objects is among the typical
duties performed by the sensor nodes. The monitoring of endangered species,
the surveillance of country borders, mineral deposits or oil and gas fields are
among the scenarios where sensor nodes already incorporate the object tracking
functionality. Most of these scenarios are highly sensitive to the presence of
intruders and the authorised-personnel-only policy must be enforced.
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The use of traditional radio-based localisation methods [86], where the tar-
get object carries a transmitter or transceiver whose radio signals are analysed
to determine its location, are not suitable for critical object tracking scenarios
because an intruder might not have such a device or can simply drop it. Also,
the use of physical barriers have been a means of protection but in some cases,
such as a country’s perimeter surveillance, this might be highly expensive or even
infeasible. Given such circumstances, the use of WSNs capable of detecting and
tracking objects crossing the area under observation is of great interest [69, 77].
To that end, the nodes comprising the network can be equipped with motion sen-
sors or they might measure the interferences in the signal strength of the radio
signals [146] caused by the moving objects.
The aforementioned techniques allow sensor nodes to determine the existence
of mobile targets in their vicinity. However, these techniques on their own pro-
vide no means of discriminating between adversaries and authorised users or
other moving objects. As a matter of fact, being able to distinguish adversaries
from other mobile entities is not a trivial task. The only difference is between
entities authorised to move around the field (e.g. those being monitored or net-
work administrators) and other moving objects, which may be adversaries or
not. Therefore, the best strategy for the sensor network is to consider that any
non-authorised moving object is an adversary although, ideally, the protection
mechanism should be launched only in the presence of adversaries in order to
reduce the extra overhead due to the performance of the privacy-aware routing
mechanism. Anyway, this strategy is much more energy-preserving than already
existing solutions, which are in continuous operation.
Consider a sensor network which monitors the behaviour of an endangered
animal species. This network needs to be able to distinguish between differ-
ent species so that it collects only relevant information concerning the protected
species. This can be done in several different ways, for example, by tagging the
animals with some sort of wireless device (e.g. an under-skin transmitter) being
able to broadcast authenticated information regarding each specific animal. Also,
biologists might carry their own personal devices in order to be recognised as au-
thorised users. On the other hand, other animal species or adversaries willing to
capture the protected animals would trigger the protection mechanism as they
are not in possession of a legitimate device.
A simple challenge-response protocol might allow the interaction of external
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authorised entities with the sensor network. After authentication, a temporal
session key might be established between the sensor network and the external
entity in such a way that this entity is able to securely transmit messages to
the sensor network. Clearly, the session key must be occasionally updated. This
process may require the use of public key operations. Several solutions have been
devised for the user-authentication problem [28, 136]. Also, similar solutions
exist for unattended WSNs, where the sink sporadically visits the field to collect
data from every single node [41]. Doubtlessly, the advances in Elliptic Curve
Cryptography will not only simplify the process but also reduce the overhead
introduced by the use of authentication mechanisms.
Also, in order to reduce the probability of erroneously identifying moving
objects as adversaries, the sensor network might observe the behaviour of moving
objects in the field in the presence of messages. Therefore, if a non-authorised
moving object is detected by the network, the sensor nodes in the vicinity of the
mobile object might mimic source nodes and send out fake messages. In the case
the moving object traces back fake messages it is highly likely to be an adversary
and thus the sensor nodes might alert their neighbours to this, by broadcasting
route update messages.
4.2.3 Route Updating Process
Upon the detection of an adversary in the proximities of the network, the de-
vised privacy-preserving mechanism is triggered. The sensor nodes feeling the
presence of an adversary, inform their neighbours of the situation in order to
prevent packets from traversing the area where the adversary is located. As the
adversary is capable of moving in any direction, it is also necessary to anticipate
his movements in order to minimise the number of packets he might be able to
capture. Thus, alert messages need to expand over several hops so that it is not
only neighbours in a close range to the attacker that are aware of the distance to
the adversary.
After the detection of an adversary in the field, the detecting node (at dis-
tance 0) informs their immediate neighbours about the presence of the adversary
by broadcasting an alert message with distance value 1. Upon reception, the re-
ceiving nodes store the distance value and broadcast a new message with distance
value 2. This process is repeated for a given number of hops to spread the alert.
Clearly, the number of hops the alert spans depends on the ability of the attacker




























Figure 4.2: Distance of sensor nodes with respect to two adversaries
to monitor the communications. The more powerful the attacker, the larger the
radius of the area covered by the routing update message. Figure 4.2 depicts the
distance values obtained by each sensor node in a network of size 50× 50, where
two adversaries have been detected at positions (20, 20) and (0, 0).
The power of the attacker can be measured by two non-mutually exclusive
means, namely, the communications area the attacker is able to monitor and
the displacement speed. In the work presented here, we focus on mote-class
attackers, which are capable of eavesdropping and analysing the traffic in a region
r equivalent to that of any regular sensor node. This feature is also dependent
on the size of the network since a large network is less vulnerable to an attacker
with a hearing range of r than a network covering a small region. With regards to
the speed of the attacker, it is important to note that an adversary moving at an
infinite speed has the ability to capture every packet in the network. Obviously,
this type of attacker is unrealistic and thus is beyond the scope of our solution.
We assume that the network is agile enough to reconfigure the routing tables
before the attacker reaches the next neighbouring node. In fact, this is not such
a strong assumption since the time of flight of packets between contiguous nodes
and the processing time of packets can be considered negligible.
Whenever a detector node sends a route update message to its neighbours,
this message contains information regarding the distance at which the attacker is
placed. In general, the number of hops is a good indicator of the distance if the
sensor network is uniformly deployed, though sophisticated devices might provide
more precise information about the location of the attacker. Nevertheless, using
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a hop-based distance estimation simplifies the route updating process because
upon the reception of an update message, the receiving node merely increments
the hop count before forwarding the packet and the routing table is modified in
consequence without having to perform any further calculations to determine the
distance between the node and the adversary.
Finally, it is worth noting that route update messages do not provide the ad-
versary with information regarding the location of the data sources because their
transmission is independent of the presence of events in the network. There-
fore, these messages may be either sent periodically or just in the presence of
adversaries but the latter choice is recommended to extend the lifetime of the
sensor nodes. An alternative is to benefit from beacon frames, which are con-
figuration messages that are periodically broadcast regardless of the existence of
events. Beacon frames have the ability to carry a few bytes of information in
the payload, which is enough for alerting about the distance to the adversary.
Beacon frames do not imply any extra energy consumption in the network and
thus allow resources to be saved. However, this approach has some limitations
in terms of the delay between two consecutive frames, which ranges from tens of
milliseconds to hundreds of seconds, as described in [128]. Therefore, there is a
trade-off between the energy consumption and the routing update speed, which
impacts on the privacy preservation of the source nodes in the case of having to
counter rapidly moving adversaries.
4.2.4 Data forwarding
The data forwarding process is dependent on the underlying routing algorithm
used to transmit event data from the source nodes to the base station. The
CALP mechanism can be regarded as a plug-in component that modifies the
routing tables of sensor nodes in such a way that the selection of the forwarding
nodes is conditioned not only by their distance from the base station but also by
their distance from the adversary. Thus, upon receiving a data packet directed
to the base station, the recipient node decides in which direction to forward the
message based on the routing strategy and, additionally, the distance from its
neighbours to the attacker. These data are stored in the routing table of each
node.
There are at least two options when sending packets to nodes which are lo-
cated at a close distance to the adversary. One might choose to impede sensor
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nodes from forwarding packets to those neighbours located at a distance of less
than a minimum safety distance from the adversary, that is, data packets must
circumvent the region where the adversary is. On the other hand, instead of sim-
ply blocking the arrival of data packets to sensor nodes in the proximities of the
adversary, we might choose to penalise the selection of these nodes with respect
to other neighbours outside the established minimum safety distance. We refer
to these two strategies as strict and permissive data forwarding.
The use of a strict safety distance has the advantage of ensuring that the
attacker will not capture any packets unless he moves fast enough to cover areas at
a distance greater than the predefined minimum safety distance. We assume that
adversaries are incapable of moving that fast (see Section 4.1.2). Nonetheless, the
use of a strict security perimeter presents some drawbacks that might negatively
affect the operation of the network. Specifically, the greater the minimum safety
distance, the greater the number of hops a packet will traverse in the presence of
an adversary in the proximities of the communication path. Consequently, the
delivery delay and the overall energy consumption of the network will increase.
This might also result in the non-delivery of data packets at the base station if
the adversary is in its vicinity and the security perimeter is sufficiently large. In
that case, data packets travel back and forth originating network loops until the
adversary moves to another region. A possible countermeasure to this problem
is to make sensor nodes temporarily store any received data packet, but if the
adversary being countered is patient, i.e., he does not move until the reception of
a data packet, the delivery time significantly increases. Also, if the sensor nodes
continue to receive data packets they might run out of memory and therefore,
they should turn to dropping some packets.
On the other hand, a permissive security perimeter avoids the need of buffer-
ing data packets at intermediate sensor nodes in the vicinity of an adversary, thus
saving memory and reducing the delays in the delivery process. Thus, a permis-
sive minimum safety distance is more suitable for real-time applications while
the strict version is convenient in delay-tolerant application. Notwithstanding,
a permissive security perimeter provides a lower privacy protection level since
data packets may be forwarded to nodes placed within the hearing range of the
adversary. As a result, the adversary is more likely to reach the data source.
Clearly, there is a trade-off between overhead and privacy protection associated
with the data forwarding strategy. Further analysis and discussion is provided in
4.3. Shortest-path CALP Routing 117
Section 4.4.3.
4.3 Shortest-path CALP Routing
The CALP mechanism can be used in conjunction with different routing protocols
to enhance source-location privacy protection. Although this mechanism can be
applied to any routing protocol, here we focus on the application of CALP to
a shortest-path routing algorithm since they provide interesting features such as
minimal latency and reduced energy consumption.
4.3.1 Shortest-path routing
Several shortest- or single-path routing techniques can be found in the litera-
ture [62, 95]. These energy-efficient routing protocols allow sensor nodes to de-
liver data packets to the base station using the minimum number of neighbours
as data relays. Whenever a node has data to transmit, it picks the neighbour
node which is closest to the base station and sends the packet to it. The recipient
repeats the process until the packet is eventually received at the data sink. Since
each sensor node always picks the neighbour that is closest to the destination, the
path followed is the most energy-efficient and it also incurs the shortest delay.
Usually, these techniques require that either sensor nodes are equipped with
additional hardware or that an initialisation phase is performed. The simplest
way to enable this sort of routing protocol is by means of a topology discovery
protocol, where the base station floods the network with a distance value initially
set to 0 that is incremented at each hop; similar to the route updating process
described in Section 4.2.3.
The shortest-path routing technique considered in this section makes greedy
forwarding decisions since it selects locally optimal neighbours. A neighbour is
considered to be locally optimal when it minimally deviates from the straight
line connecting the data sender and the destination. An example is given in
Figure 4.3, where N represents the node sending data in the direction to the
data sink (S) and A,B,C,D,E are the neighbours of N (neighs(N)). Also,
α = ∠NAS, β = ∠NBS, and γ = ∠NCS are the angles formed between the line
NS, and NA, NB and NC, respectively. For the sake of simplicity only some of
the angles have been represented. Thus, X is the locally optimal neighbour of N
if ∀X, Y ∈ neighs(N) ∧X 6= Y,∠NXS ≤ ∠NY S.











Figure 4.3: Locally optimal neighbour selection
The main advantage of implementing a greedy shortest-path technique is that
only a small amount of internal storage is required in the nodes to operate.
In order to route data packets, a sensor node needs information about its own
neighbours and the location of the base station, but it does not have to be in
possession of information about other intermediate nodes. The main limitation
of a greedy approach is that the path followed by the packets might not be
globally optimal even though it is locally optimal, i.e. there might exist more
efficient paths.
4.3.2 Combination with CALP
When combined with the CALP mechanism, the greedy shortest-path routing
technique acquires the ability to anticipate the movements of the adversary in
such a way that the number of packets he might be able to capture is significantly
reduced. Additionally, the packets will minimally deviate from the shortest path
to the destination, thus the extra energy consumption incurred by the operation
of our privacy preservation mechanism is notably reduced compared to other solu-
tions. Moreover, note that the deviation from the most energy-efficient path only
takes place when the adversary is located close to that area. Figure 4.4 depicts
a scenario where the network adapts the routing path in order to circumvent an
adversary moving in the vicinity of the shortest path. The area controlled by
the adversary is represented as a dashed circle while dashed arrows represent a
temporary suppression of messages.
Two versions of the shortest-path CALP routing have been devised. In the
first version, a strict minimum safety distance is considered. Consequently, the
route update messages are used to create an impassable security perimeter, which
data packets never traverse. When the distance from the adversary to the shortest





Figure 4.4: Path adaptation depending on the presence of the adversary
Algorithm 1 Sending strategy: Strict CALP routing
Input: MIN SAFETY DIST
Input: data
1: neighs← get neighbours()
2: for all ni ∈ neighs do
3: if distance(ni) ≤MIN SAFETY DIST then
4: penalty[ni] =∞
5: else
6: penalty[ni] = angle(ni) + pi/distance(ni)
7: end if
8: end for
9: next hop← minimum(penalty, neighs)
10: send(data, next hop)
path is shorter than the minimum safety distance, i.e., the adversary is over the
shortest path, data packets will deviate from the original path to avoid crossing
the security perimeter. This behaviour is described in Algorithm 1. Basically,
whenever a sensor node has data to transmit or forward, the node obtains a list
of neighbours from its routing table and for each of them calculates a penalty
based on their distance to the adversary. This penalty is maximum when the
neighbour is in range of the adversary (lines 3-5) but it is a linear function of the
distance and the deviation from the shortest path otherwise (lines 5-7). Finally,
the data packet is sent to the neighbour with the lowest penalty.
In the permissive version of the protocol, data packets do not necessarily
change their route in the case of an adversary placed in the shortest path. Packets
are only deviated if the cost associated with performing such a choice is greater
than the cost of entering the adversary’s hearing range. A detailed description
of this behaviour is provided in Algorithm 2. Similar to the strict version, the
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Algorithm 2 Sending strategy: Permissive CALP routing
Input: MIN SAFETY DIST
Input: data
1: neighs← get neighbours()
2: for all ni ∈ neighs do
3: penalty[ni] = angle(ni) + pi/distance(ni)
4: if distance(ni) ≤MIN SAFETY DIST then
5: penalty[ni] = penalty[ni] + 1/distance(ni)
6: end if
7: end for
8: next hop← minimum(penalty, neighs)
9: send(data, next hop)
algorithm is activated when a node has data to transmit or forward. The node
obtains the list of neighbours and for each of them it calculates a base penalty
(line 3), which is incremented by a factor that is inversely proportional to the
distance of the neighbour to the adversary (lines 4-6) in the case the adversary is
in its vicinity. The neighbour with the lowest penalty is finally chosen to receive
the data.
As previously described, when the adversary is not present in the field, the
proposed algorithms must behave as the original shortest-path routing protocol.
Therefore, the locally optimal forwarding neighbour is chosen so that it minimally
deviates from the straight line connecting the data sender and the base station.
To that end, the distance to the adversary is used as a penalty value in such a way
that the closer the adversary, the greater the penalty. In particular, we penalise
the proximity of a neighbour to the adversary exactly pi/distance units. Depend-
ing on whether the version in use is strict or permissive, an additional penalty is
introduced when the distance to the adversary is less or equal than the predefined
minimum safety distance. The minimum safety distance is a parameter of the
solution (MIN SAFETY DIST ) that might be tuned by the administrator of
the network to carefully balance between privacy protection and usability.
Finally, note that both algorithms are based on straightforward operations
that can be performed even by extremely hardware-constrained devices. Addi-
tionally, the CALP requires some extra memory in order to store information
about the distance from the adversary to each of the neighbours. Table 5.1 shows
the routing table of a particular node, where the right-most column has been







Table 4.1: Routing table of node N
added to keep distance information. These values are updated upon the recep-
tion of the route update messages described in Section 4.2.3.
4.4 Protocol Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the performance and privacy protection level of the
proposed shortest-path CALP routing mechanism. First, we briefly describe the
simulation scenario.
4.4.1 Simulation Scenario
We developed a discrete-event simulation environment in Matlab and conducted
extensive experiments on it. The simulator enables multiple simultaneous trans-
missions from various data sources as well as the presence of various local adver-
saries moving in the field. The simulator obviates the low-level communication
problems (e.g., collisions) and focuses on the application and routing layers since
our goal is to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed solution.
The setup used for our simulations is similar to that commonly found in the
literature [60, 128]. We deployed a large wireless sensor network consisting of
n × n uniformly distributed nodes, where n = 100. Each simulation instance is
run 50 times and each of the instances consists of 500 simulation steps. A new
data message is generated and forwarded by the data source at each simulation
step. Also, a beaconing phase is scheduled so that the network is aware of the
whereabouts of the adversary and thus packets are routed accordingly. Source
nodes are placed at different distances from the base station but are static during
each simulation.
In the first simulation step the adversary is placed in the proximities of the
base station, which is located at the centre of the network by default. The
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adversary under consideration is either inquisitive or patient. The inquisitive
adversary moves randomly until he overhears a transmission in his vicinity, in
which case he moves in the direction of the received message. If he follows a trace
of packets and after a period of time no message arrives at his current position
he starts to move randomly in the search of new packets. On the other hand, the
patient adversary only moves in the presence of packets in his vicinity. Moreover,
adversaries might move at different paces with respect to the simulation steps,
however the speed is fixed and constant within a single simulation instance.
By default, the network safety distance is set to 5 meaning that communi-
cation paths are modified when the adversary is closer or equal to that distance
from the shortest path. Furthermore, the hearing range of the adversary has been
set to a monitoring radius equivalent to that of a sensor node. Although the sim-
ulation environment allows for several simultaneous adversaries in the field, we
study the effect of a single adversary. Note that the simulations were conducted
such that the adversary is considered to be in the field at all times. However, in
real scenarios this is not the case, the adversary enters and leaves the network at
will.
The simulation ends under two circumstances, either when the adversary
reaches the source or when the last simulation step is reached without the adver-
sary being able to find the data source.
4.4.2 Privacy Protection
This section evaluates the privacy protection level provided by both the permis-
sive and strict versions of the shortest-path CALP routing scheme. The level of
protection is measured as the number of source nodes the adversary is able to
capture in each simulation instance. The two versions of the proposed mechanism
are compared with each other and with respect to the traditional shortest-path
routing scheme for various source-sink distances. Moreover, the simulations are
conducted in the presence of both inquisitive and patient adversaries. The re-
sults are depicted in Figure 4.5 as a bars diagram where the x-axis represent the
distance to the base station and the y-axis show the number of total number of
captures after 50 simulations of each instance.
From the simulations we observe that the distance of the source node with
respect to the base station has no clear impact on the privacy protection level.
The adversary is able to reach the data source in roughly the same number of
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Figure 4.5: Number of captured sources
cases regardless of the distance. The patient adversary (see Figure 4.5b) always
reaches the source node because he waits next to the base station until he receives
a packet addressed to it. After that, since all packets follow the same path, he
reaches the data source in the minimum number of steps. On the other hand, the
inquisitive adversary (Figure 4.5a) is less likely to find the data source even for a
single-path routing algorithm. The main drawback for inquisitive adversaries is
that at the beginning of the simulation they might move away from the original
location thus missing some of the packets arriving at base the station several
simulation steps later. These adversaries are only successful if at some point
during the simulation they come across with the communication path.
When the shortest-path routing protocol is used in conjunction with the CALP
mechanism, the situation improves enormously. When the adversary is inquisitive
(see Figure 4.5a), he is only capable of compromising source-location privacy
when the distance between the data source and the base station is relatively
short. Surprisingly, the permissive version of the shortest-path CALP routing
provides better protection level than the strict version. The reason is that, in
the strict version, the movements of the adversary are never conditioned by the
packets traversing the network since he is not able to overhear them given a
sufficiently large safety distance, as the one being used. In the permissive version,
an inquisitive adversary is able to overhear some of the packets because under
certain circumstances the nodes might choose a node within the security perimeter
as the next hop. This causes the adversary to move in the direction of the received
packet but since the path changes dynamically based on his movements, he might
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overhear packets coming from different neighbouring nodes which misleads him
from the target.
When countering a patient adversary (see Figure 4.5b), neither version of our
protocol ever leaks location information about the source node. Apparently the
packets are able to circumvent the attacker without being detected. In the per-
missive version, the packets might reach the base station by traversing the safety
distance thereby causing the patient adversary to move towards those packets.
Being the adversary in a new location away from the base station, the new paths
are re-adapted thus being able to circumvent the adversary and reach the base
station. However, in the strict version, since the adversary is initially placed next
to the base station and the packets are not allowed to traverse the safety region,
the task of delivering the packets to the base station is not fulfilled. This issue is
reviewed in more detailed in the following sections.
4.4.3 Protocol Performance
We evaluate the performance of the protocol by means of the length of the result-
ing routing paths. The length of the path not only determines the delivery time of
the packets but also the overall energy consumption of the network. Larger paths
result in more transmissions and consequently have a negative impact on the life-
time of the batteries. In general, single-path routing algorithms are considered
energy-efficient algorithms since data packets are sent via the shortest path from
the source node to the base station. However, these algorithms provide the lowest
protection level as all the packets follow the same (shortest) path. Therefore, the
inclusion of the CALP mechanisms to a shortest-path routing scheme effectively
trades off between performance and privacy protection level.
The mean path length of the packets travelling from the source nodes to the
base station is represented in Figure 4.6. In general, the mean path length is
slightly higher than the minimum expected value, i.e. the length of the path
originated by the shortest-path routing algorithm. Clearly, in the presence of
an inquisitive adversary (see Figure 4.6a), the permissive version of our scheme
provides better results than the strict version. On the other hand, for a patient
adversary (see Figure 4.6b), the permissive approach originates paths that are
on average slightly longer than those generated in the presence of an inquisitive
adversary. The reason is that for a patient adversary the nodes need to deal
with an adversary waiting in the vicinity of the base station. More importantly,
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Figure 4.6: Mean path length
the strict version is unable to generate data paths that circumvent the patient
adversary and eventually deliver the packets to the data sink. Since the length
of the packets is stored when they arrive at the base station, no data is shown
for this scheme in Figure 4.6b. This problem is not due to the design of the
CALP mechanism but is caused by the particular strategy followed by this type
of adversary.
This problem can be lessened in several ways depending on the requirements of
the network. In a sensor network with no real-time requirements (i.e. it tolerates
moderate latencies), instead of sending messages back and forth at the border of
the security perimeter, intermediate nodes could temporarily store the packets
until the adversary decides to move away from the base station. However, if the
adversary is patient enough, the highly constrained memory of the sensor nodes
would require some of the packets to be dropped. Therefore, a more convenient
approach to deal with this issue is to implement a mixed version of the CALP
mechanism including the benefits of both the permissive and strict schemes. The
idea is to switch from a strict to a permissive approach as packets approach to the
base station. In this way, if a patient adversary is next to the base station using
a permissive strategy attracts the adversary away from it and allows the delivery
of packets. In addition, using a strict strategy is expedient when the adversary
is close to the data source because at that point capturing a few packets might
lead to the target. Also, it is possible to overcome the problem by dynamically
re-adapting the safety distance depending on the whereabouts of the adversary
or by switching from the CALP approach to one of the solutions based on the
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creation of random routes, such as the Phantom Routing.
Despite the mean path length being close to the minimum value, some isolated
packets might traverse a large number of intermediate nodes before being deliv-
ered. Therefore, studying mean values is not enough and next we look into the
path length distribution. In Figure 4.7 we present the path length distribution
in the presence of an inquisitive adversary with box plots1, which is a useful way
of describing the degree of dispersion and skewness in the data, and identifying
outliers. On the left-hand side of the figure, we can observe that when using
a permissive security perimeter, most of the packets travel a similar number of
hops before reaching the destination. The mean value is very close or equal to the
distance to the sink and there are only a few packets that travel long distances
(outliers). However, the landscape changes dramatically when using the strict
version of the scheme, as shown on the right-hand side figure of the figure. Some
isolated packets may travel up to 134 hops before reaching the base station. The
reason for such long paths is the creation of network loops due to the presence of
the adversary in regions close to the sink. Packets are sent in the direction of the
base station but nodes on the border of the security perimeter cannot send them
forward and choose to relay them to other nodes which are in the same situation.
Finally the packets are returned to any of the nodes which initially sent those
packets. Keeping a list of already seen packets could help avoid network loops,
however, since the adversary is able to move, the next time a node receives the
packet the situation might be different, i.e. the direction, which was previously
occupied by the adversary, might currently be safe.
In general, we can claim that the permissive version provides an adequate
protection level without incurring an excessive overhead to the network. It is
true that in a few special cases the protocol generates paths that are a slightly
longer than usual but this is not too problematic. However, we acknowledge that
the overhead incurred by the strict version of the protocol might be overly high.
Consequently, this strategy must be used only when the criticality of the scenario
demands an extraordinary privacy protection level. Notwithstanding, a mixed
strategy might be the best option to keep a reasonable path length.
1In each box, the central mark is the median, the edges of the box are the first and third
quartiles, and the whiskers extend to the minimum and maximum data points or to 1.5 times
the interquartile range. Outliers (‘+’) are values behind the whiskers.
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Figure 4.7: Path length distribution
4.4.4 Safety Distance Impact
In this section we study the impact of the security perimeter on the privacy
protection level and the mean path length. Security perimeters of size 2, 5, and
7 have been used for the evaluation. Again, we have considered an inquisitive
adversary and source nodes at various distances from the base station. The results
on how the security perimeter affects privacy protection and the length of data
paths are given in Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9, respectively.
As expected, the size of the security perimeter has a clear impact on the
number of captures. The larger the security perimeter, the better the privacy
protection. In general, both the permissive and strict versions of the CALP
mechanism behave well for a security perimeter size larger than 2. Also, the
distance of the data source to the base station affects both versions but to a lesser
extent. More precisely, the adversary is only able to capture a few packets in the
permissive approach when the distance to the base station is not sufficiently large
(see Figure 4.8a). This is also the case in the strict approach but the problem
is even more acute (see Figure 4.8b). In general, the problem is that by using a
small security perimeter the network is incapable of readjusting the routing paths
and thus the adversary is more likely to capture packets, which leads him to the
data source.
Additionally, we observe that the security perimeter size has an almost neg-
ligible impact on the mean path length. However, there might be some packets
traversing an undue number of nodes before reaching the base station destina-
tion, as already discussed in Section 4.4.3. The strict version is more sensitive to






















































































































Figure 4.9: Impact on mean path length
the size of the security perimeter. In particular, using a larger security perimeter
when the source node is close to the base station might result in some executions
with no packets reaching their destination. This particular case is depicted in
Figure 4.9b for a security perimeter size of 7 and a source node located 10 hops
away from the base station. Again, to counter the problem of having some pack-
ets not reach their target, a source-sink distance-dependent security perimeter
might be used. In other words, the security perimeter might be larger for nodes
that are located further away from the base station. Moreover, as the security
perimeter size increases, the mean path length increase is more abrupt in the
strict version than in the permissive version.
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4.5 Summary
This chapter has presented the CALP scheme, a novel approach to source-location
privacy that, unlike previous solutions, is triggered upon the detection of the
adversary only. This mechanism benefits from the ability of sensor nodes to detect
the presence of objects in their vicinity to prevent the transmission of messages in
the area controlled by the adversary. When a sensor node detects the adversary
it disseminates this information throughout the network thus enabling efficient
privacy-preserving routing protocols.
The idea of feeding routing protocols with the location of the adversary has
been successfully applied to a shortest-path routing technique. The combination
of a shortest-path routing with the CALP scheme has a very clear advantage.
Data packets only deviate from the most energy-efficient routing path when the
adversary is in the proximity to that path. In particular, two versions of the pro-
tocol have been developed based on the way data packets are forwarded when an
adversary is within a minimum safety distance from the sender. Moreover, two
different strategies have been considered for the adversarial model. The exten-
sive simulations that have been performed have demonstrated that the resulting
protocol is capable of providing a solid privacy protection level with an average
energy consumption very close to optimal.




Wireless sensor networks are continually exposed to different types of attacks
but the most devastating ones are those that target the base station since this
critical device is responsible for collecting and analysing all the traffic generated
in the network. Therefore, protecting the location of the base station is essential
for the integrity and survivability of the network. Besides its importance for the
physical protection of the network, the location of the base station is strategically
critical because it is usually related to a highly-relevant facility. As a result, a
number of authors have struggled to provide receiver-location privacy, primarily,
by randomising and normalising the traffic pattern of the network. However, this
might be insufficient when the adversary is also capable of retrieving the routing
tables of the sensor nodes. Normally, the routing tables contain information
regarding the distance to or the location of the base station, which may be used
by the attacker to effectively reach the base station thus rendering useless anti-
traffic analysis techniques. This serious threat to receiver-location privacy has
never been taken into consideration in the literature.
This chapter presents HISP-NC (Homogeneous Injection for Sink Privacy with
Node Compromise protection), a receiver-location privacy solution that consists of
two complementary schemes which protect the location of the base station in the
presence of traffic analysis and node compromise attacks. This solution addresses,
for the first time, both problems in a single solution. On the one hand, the HISP-
NC data transmission protocol hides the flow of real messages by introducing
controlled amounts of fake traffic to locally homogenise the number of packets
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being forwarded from a sensor node to its neighbours. On the other hand, the
HISP-NC perturbation scheme modifies the routing tables of the nodes to reduce
the risk of node capture attacks while ensuring that data packets eventually reach
the base station.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.1 describes the
network and threat models as well as the main assumptions applicable to the
rest of the chapter. A detailed description of the HISP-NC data transmission
and routing tables perturbation schemes are presented in Section 5.2 and 5.3,
respectively. Then, Section 5.4 evaluates and analyses the potential limitations of
our solution with respect to the traffic overhead and delivery time of data packets.
Finally, Section 5.5 presents a discussion and evaluates the privacy protection level
achieved by the HISP-NC scheme under different types of attacks.
5.1 Problem Statement
This section presents the network model as well as the capabilities of the ad-
versary. It also introduces the main assumptions applicable to the rest of this
paper.
5.1.1 Network Model
We consider WSNs used for monitoring purposes. Usually, these types of networks
follow an event-driven model, which means that the decision to transmit data
to the base station is made by individual sensor nodes immediately after the
occurrence of special events in their vicinity. Consequently, this implies a many-
to-one communication model where all the information flows from source nodes
to a single or just a few base stations.
In this paper we consider networks with a single base station although the
robustness of the solution is not affected by the number of base stations. As a
matter of fact, having a single base station is the worst case scenario since all the
traffic is addressed to a single device resulting in a more abrupt traffic pattern.
In a setting with multiple base stations, the amount of traffic is more balanced
between all potential recipients. Also, if the goal of the adversary is to bring down
the network, he has to destroy each base station and eventually the scenario will
be as the one considered here.
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Moreover, we assume that the network is comprised of numerous sensor nodes
which are deployed over a vast area. This prevents the adversary from both
controlling the communications in a large portion of the network and having
all sensors within easy reach. On top of that, sensor nodes could be hidden or
placed beyond the visual field of the adversary. Sometimes this is not a strong
assumption, for example if we consider application scenarios such as under-water
or under-ground sensor networks.
We focus on highly-connected sensor networks, where every node is aware
of its adjacent neighbouring nodes and the direction towards the sink. This
information is achieved by means of a topology discovery protocol, which allows
sensor nodes to build their routing tables. The data contained in the routing table
might vary depending on the implementation but it must contain information
about the distance (e.g., in number of hops) from each neighbour to the base
station. In this paper, the routing table is sorted incrementally. More precisely,
those neighbours which are closer than the original node to the base station are
placed at the top of the table, the neighbours at the same distance are located
in the middle, and the neighbours which are one hop further away are placed at
the bottom of the table. We denote these groups of nodes as LC, LE and LF ,
respectively.
Finally, we assume that each sensor node shares keys with its immediate neigh-
bours and makes use of secure encryption algorithms that prevent an adversary
from obtaining any identifiable information from packet payloads. In other words,
the encryption mechanism under consideration must be robust to cryptanalysis
and also provide indistinguishability between real and fake transmissions. In or-
der to achieve this feature, sensor nodes could add some noise to the payload of
their messages before these are encrypted. The noise can be in the form of a se-
cure random sequence [79] or a counter that is incremented for each transmitted
packet.
5.1.2 Adversarial Model
The adversary considered here might take advantage of both traffic analysis and
routing tables inspection in order to determine the location of the base station.
For the sake of clarity, we assume that the adversary either chooses to perform one
of these attacks at a time and thus we describe the capabilities of these attackers
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separately. Nonetheless, it would be possible for a single adversary to use both
sources of information in an attempt to improve his success rate.
Traffic Analysis Attacks
Traffic analysis attacks consists of extracting or inferring information based on the
mere observation of the traffic traversing the network. Consequently, adversaries
performing this type of attack can be categorised mainly based on their eaves-
dropping capabilities and the mechanisms they use to extract the information
from their observations.
First, we consider the eavesdropping capabilities of the adversary. In partic-
ular, we concentrate on both the hearing range and the ability to retrieve packet
header information. With respect to the hearing range, adversaries might range
from those capable of observing the transmissions of a single node to those pow-
erful enough to monitor all the communications in the network. On the other
hand, we distinguish between adversaries who, by observing a message, are capa-
ble of recognising the addressee of the next hop and those unable to retrieve this
information. This information is contained in the header of the packets but it
might be protected by means of some sort of pseudonyms mechanism [30]. Next,
we provide a formal definition of the adversarial model:
Definition 3 (ADV). Let X = {x1, x2, · · · , xm} be the set of sensor nodes com-
prising the network and let xi be an ordinary sensor node in the proximity of the
adversary. We define the following adversaries:
• ADVn chooses first a node xi, and then observes the transmissions of node
xi and all its neighbours within distance n. In the next round he may choose
a different node xi′. The choice of the next xi′ depends on the movement
strategy, see for instance time-correlation and rate monitoring, below.
• ADVan is similar to the previous one: he observes the transmissions of node
xi and all its neighbours within distance n, but this observation includes
also the addressees of all those transmissions.
We could define other types of attackers that are unable to monitor all the
neighbours within a certain distance but only a partial set of them. However,
these types of attackers and their analysis will be left for future work.
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(a) ADV0 (b) ADVa0 (c) ADV1 (d) ADVa1
Figure 5.1: Adversarial Model Examples
The attacker model considered here has a limited hearing range, similar to an
ordinary sensor node1 (i.e., ADV1), which is the typical hearing range considered
in the literature. These adversaries are capable of monitoring any packets trans-
mitted by nodes at distances no larger than 1, as those depicted in Figure 5.1. In
this figure, the central node, xi, broadcasts a message that is received by all its
immediate neighbours. Transmissions are depicted by means of lines and arrows.
An arrow represents that the packet is addressed to that particular node while
dashed lines represent that these nodes are passive observers. When the arrow
is dashed we mean that the node identifier cannot be retrieved by the attacker
while the ordinary arrow represents that the identifier is accessible. Finally, the
dotted circles represent the hearing range of the adversary.
Moreover, the adversary is mobile and decides in which direction to move based
on his observations and the particular features of the communication model. Also,
we assume that the attacker knows how the protection mechanism works or he
will eventually understand it (i.e., we adopt Shannon’s maxim [127]). When the
adversary reaches the next node he continues to analyse the traffic in his vicinity
in an attempt to reduce the distance to the base station. Deciding which node
to visit next is based on the information gathered from the two attack strategies
proposed in the literature: the time-correlation and the rate-monitoring attack.
In a time-correlation attack, the adversary observes the transmission times of
a node xi and its neighbours. Based on the assumption that a node forwards
a received packet shortly after receiving it, the adversary is able to deduce the
direction to the sink and move accordingly. In a rate-monitoring attack, the
adversary moves in the direction of the nodes transmitting a higher number of
1The hearing range of current sensor nodes operating outdoors is around 100 meters for low
power configurations [49]. However, these values might be altered by many factors such as the
signal frequency or the presence of obstacles.
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packets. This attack is based on the fact that nodes in the vicinity of the base
station must transmit not only their own data packets but also the traffic from
remote sources. This strategy is less efficient than the previous one because it
means the adversary has to capture a sufficient number of packets before moving.
Additionally, this attack is not effective when there are very few data sources or
the adversary is not close to the sink.
Routing Tables Inspection
Node capture is a form of physical attack which is favoured by the unattended
nature of sensor networks. Sensor nodes are usually deployed in open and hostile
environments and thus they are within reach of adversaries which might try to
tamper with them. Physical attacks may come in various guises [13] that range
from node destruction to node reprogramming as well as node replacement or the
extraction of data contents from the memories in the node.
Here, we concentrate on adversaries who capture sensor nodes with the sole
purpose of retrieving information that might be useful for reaching the base sta-
tion. The goal of the adversary is not to destroy the nodes or modify their
software to interfere with the communications or the normal operation of the
network. This allows the attacker to remain undetected to potential intrusion
detection systems and therefore continue tracking down its target for a longer
period of time. Note that this is also the case for adversaries performing traffic-
analysis attacks. In general, we say that the adversarial model considered in this
paper is passive.
After capturing a node, the adversary may have access to the data contained
in the node. In particular, the most valuable piece of information for an adver-
sary willing to reach the base station is the routing table. A node’s routing table
indicates the distance from each of its neighbours to the base station (see Fig-
ure 5.2), which is used to select the most suitable routing paths. Consequently,
an adversary retrieving the routing tables of several nodes may acquire a very
good clue as to the distance and direction towards the base station.
In this respect, the node capture strategy is not clearly defined in the literature
because, as far as we are concerned, this is the first receiver-location privacy
solution to consider this threat. Nonetheless, several papers have dealt with
the modelling and mitigation of node capture attacks in WSNs (e.g., [32, 138])
particularly in the protection of secure communication channels for random key
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distribution systems. Some authors consider that adversaries pick nodes in the
field at random while others assume that the adversary chooses to compromise
(all or some) nodes within a particular region. In this work we consider that
the adversary is more successful if he captures nodes from nearby, rather than
randomly. Also some features, such as the time it takes to compromise a single
node, are considered by other authors but we will not take them too much into
consideration here. Instead, we will assume that the adversary is not capable
of inspecting more than a given number of routing tables during a single data
transmission phase.
Once the adversary has captured a node and retrieved its routing table he can
make a decision on his next move. Provided that the routing tables are correct,
the adversary is certain that the first neighbour in the table is closer than the
current node to the base station. Thus, the adversary is more likely to reach the
base station if he moves towards the first neighbour in the routing table for each
compromised node. Moreover, after only a few captures the adversary obtains
a good idea of the direction towards the base station. More details about the
operation of the adversary are provided later in Section 5.5.
5.2 Data Transmission Scheme
This section provides a detailed description of the HISP-NC data transmission
protocol. We present an overview of its main features as well as some fundamental
properties that must hold so as to ensure a robust privacy-preserving transmission
protocol and the arrival of packets to the sink. Also, the neighbour discovery
process is described since it is crucial for the subsequent data transmission stage.
5.2.1 Overview
The transmission protocol used by HISP-NC is basically a biased random walk
scheme reinforced with the injection of controlled amounts of fake traffic. When-
ever a node has something to transmit, it sends two packets to different random
nodes. This probabilistic process is repeated for each transmission and it is de-
vised to ensure that messages flow in any direction; evenly distributing the traffic
among all neighbours. One of these packets is more likely sent to a node closer
to the base station while the other packet is addressed to a neighbour at the
same distance or further away with high probability. Consequently, one of the
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packets can carry real data and the other one can be used as a mechanism to hide
the data flow. In this way, the protocol prevents the adversary from successfully
determining the direction to the sink by observing the packets transmitted in his
vicinity while the delivery delay is not significant.
This process is guided by a computationally inexpensive approach that de-
termines the recipients of messages. A node selects two neighbours by picking
uniformly at random, a combination resulting from all the combinations of two
elements without repetitions from its routing table. Since the routing tables are
arranged in such a way that the nodes closer to the base station are at top of the
table, the resulting combinations are more likely to have one of these nodes in
the first position of the duple. Therefore, real packets are sent to the first node in
the combination and fake packets are sent to the second. As each node appears
in the same number of combinations, the traffic is evenly distributed. Moreover,
nodes receiving fake traffic must also send two messages, both of which are fake,
to prevent the protocol from leaking information. Also, a time-to-live parameter
is introduced to control the durability of fake traffic in the network.
5.2.2 Neighbour Discovery Process
Shortly after the deployment of the network, a network discovery protocol is
launched to allow sensor nodes to route data packets. This process is initiated
by the base station, which broadcasts a message containing a hop count initially
set to zero. On reception, each node stores the minimum hop count received
from its neighbours and forwards the message after increasing the hop count by
one. In this way, each node builds a routing table that contains its neighbours at
distance n− 1, n, and n+ 1, where n is the number of hops from the node to the
base station. The result of this process is depicted in Figure 5.2. In this figure
we represent a particular network configuration and the routing table2 of node x,
which is three hops away from the data sink. This node may use nodes A or B,
which are one hop closer to the base station, as data relays.
The neighbour discovery process is essential to the rest of our protocol. The
reason is that the number and distribution of neighbours affects to both the level
of protection and the delivery time as we will show in the following sections.
2It is not necessary to keep the distance or group values within the table. The arrangement
(ordering) is sufficient for our protocol to work.











































Figure 5.2: Routing table of shaded node x
5.2.3 Transmission Properties
The protocol we are aiming for uses both real and fake messages. The source
node, as well as any node that receives a real message, sends a real and a fake
message, which should be indistinguishable to an adversary but not to the ad-
dressees. Property 2 aims to balance the amount of traffic being delivered from a
node to its neighbours. By doing this, a local adversary cannot make a decision
on which direction to follow based on the number of packets forwarded to neigh-
bouring nodes. While the paths of fake messages are relatively short (this is a
parameter of the solution), the path of real messages is intended to converge on
the sink. This is established by Property 1: real messages must be transmitted
to nodes closer to the base station with a high probability. These two properties
together ensure that both real packets reach the base station and also that the
flow of real messages is hidden by fake messages since they are indistinguishable.
An additional technical property ensures that the transmission of each pair of
messages is sent to two different nodes.
Property 1 (Convergence). Let x be an arbitrary sensor node and BS be the base
station. Also, let neigh(n) be the set of immediate neighbours of a particular node
n. Then we say that a path is convergent if x chooses the next node x′ ∈ neigh(x)
such that:
E(dist(x′, BS)) < E(dist(x,BS))
where E is the mathematical expectation and dist is the distance between two
particular nodes.
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Property 2 (Homogeneity). Let x be an arbitrary sensor node and neigh(n) be
the set of immediate neighbours of a particular node n. We say that the trans-
missions of a node x hold the homogeneity property if:
∀y, z ∈ neigh(x) Frecm(x, y) ' Frecm(x, z)
where Frecm(x, y) represents the number of messages (real and fake) transmitted
by node x to node y.
Property 3 (Exclusion). Let m and m′ be a pair of messages and t be a particular
transmission time. Let send(m,x, y, t) denote that x sends to y the message m
at time t. The exclusion property states that:
∀m,m′, x, y, t send(m,x, y, t) ∧m 6= m′ ⇒ ¬send(m′, x, y, t)
The fulfilment of all these properties guarantee the usability of the system and
privacy of the base station. Next, a data transmission protocol that is consistent
with these properties is presented.
5.2.4 Transmission Protocol
The HISP-NC data transmission protocol introduces insignificant computational
and memory overhead because it is based on straightforward operations. More
precisely, it only requires a simple sorting operation and a pseudo-random number
generator [68].
Since we need to send two messages, the combinations of two elements without
repetition from all neighbours in the routing table is an elegant and lightweight
mechanism for the selection of neighbours, which is conforms to the provisions of
Property 3. Moreover, if the routing table is sorted incrementally in terms of the
distance of its neighbours to the base station (i.e., [LC, LE , LF ]) we can ensure
that most of the resulting combinations have a closer or equally distant neighbour
in the first position. Therefore, Property 1 is satisfied if the real packet is always
transmitted to the first neighbour. Also Property 2 holds provided that we pick
a combination uniformly at random from the set of all possible combinations.
In Algorithm 3 we describe the behaviour of a node upon the reception of
a packet. The algorithm uses as input the received packet, a data structure
that contains the combinations of two neighbours from the routing table, and a
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Algorithm 3 Transmission strategy
Input: packet← receive()
Input: combs← combinations({LC, LE , LF}, 2)
Input: FAKE TTL
1: {n1, n2} ← select random(combs)
2: if isreal(packet) then
3: send random(n1, packet, n2, fake(FAKE TTL))
4: else
5: TTL← get time to live(packet)− 1
6: if TTL > 0 then
7: send random(n1, fake(TTL), n2, fake(TTL))
8: end if
9: end if
network parameter that controls the durability of fake packets in the network.
Initially, the algorithm decides the random pair of neighbours to whom packets
will be addressed (line 1). Subsequently, if the received packet is real, then it
is be forwarded to n1 while n2 receives a fake packet whose time-to-live is set
to FAKE TTL (line 3). This parameter is dependent on the hearing range of
the adversary and provides a trade-off between energy consumption and privacy
protection. Also, note that the packets are sent in random order to prevent
the adversary from trivially learning which is the real message. The described
behaviour is identical in the case the node, rather than being an intermediary, is
a source node which signals the occurrence of a special event in the field.
To the contrary, if the received packet is fake, the node first obtains the time-
to-live (TTL) from the packet and decrements its value by one (line 5). In case
the new TTL is greater than zero, the node sends two fake messages with the
current TTL value (line 7). Since we consider adversaries with a hearing range
similar to an ordinary sensor node (i.e., the familyADV1), fake messages might be
forwarded only once but still exceed the reach of the adversary. This mechanism
prevents fake messages from flooding the network and at the same time impedes
adversaries from obtaining information from non-forwarded fake packets.
5.3 Routing Table Perturbation Scheme
This section describes the routing table perturbation scheme implemented by
HISP-NC. First, we overview the need for and main features of the proposed
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solution. Then we present some naive solutions to the routing inspection problem
and establish some perturbation requirements. Finally, we describe the devised
perturbation algorithm.
5.3.1 Overview
Routing tables are a fundamental component of almost any data transmission
protocol. They contain relevant information regarding the location or distance to
the data sink. The HISP-NC data transmission protocol relies on the order of the
table to determine suitable combinations of neighbours that satisfy the usability
and privacy of the system. However, the traffic normalisation efforts could be
rendered completely useless if an adversary can inspect the routing tables as he
would be able to determine which nodes are closer to the base station regardless
of the use of traffic analysis techniques.
The routing table perturbation scheme complements the data transmission
scheme by introducing some modifications to the routing tables of the sensor
nodes. The modifications consist of a re-arrangement of the table in such a way
that neighbours closer to the base station are not necessarily at the top of the
table, neighbours at the same distance are not compulsorily in the middle, and
likewise neighbours further away are not always at the bottom. In this way if
an adversary captures the routing table of a node he cannot be certain of which
neighbours in the table are closer to the base station.
The devised perturbation algorithm is modelled as an optimisation problem
and it is inspired on evolutionary strategies to find a solution. The algorithm is
guided by a simple parameter that controls the degree of perturbation applied
on the routing tables. This parameter balances between the efficiency of data
transmission protocol and the resilience to routing table inspection.
5.3.2 Basic Countermeasures
The original distribution of the routing tables used by the HISP-NC transmission
protocol is such that neighbours closer to the base station are placed before neigh-
bours at the same distance, and these in turn are placed before farther neighbours
(recall Figure 5.2). This particular arrangement of the table is important for the
generation of combinations of two neighbours where the first element is highly
likely to be in the set of closer nodes (i.e., LC), which allows the distance to the
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base station to be reduced. However, if an attacker retrieves the routing table of
a node he might use this information to determine which neighbours are closer,
move to any of these nodes, and repeat the process. After very few repetitions
the attacker has a very good estimation of the direction towards the base sta-
tion. To prevent node routing table inspection from being a substantial threat to
receiver-location privacy, it is necessary to introduce some uncertainty into the
routing tables
Since the routing tables of the nodes may change after each topology discovery
protocol, the perturbation must be performed on all sensor nodes. Otherwise,
if the decision of modifying the routing tables was determined by a particular
probability distribution, the adversary could compromise a node and wait until
the next discovery phase to check whether its routing table has changed. If so, the
adversary only needs to wait for a sufficient number of updates until he discovers
the pattern. In fact, the number of updates does not have to be necessarily high
since observing the same routing table after a few discovery phases, indicates
with a high probability that the original table is this one. To further increase the
chances of correctly learning the real routing table, the adversary only needs to
make more observations. In the long term, the original routing table stands out
from the modified versions.
Similarly, making the nodes store fake routing tables does not provide extra
protection to the real table. There are two main reasons why this is not an
effective protection mechanism. On the one hand, the sensor node must also
store a variable or pointer to the actual routing table and this information would
be available to an adversary as well. On the other hand, even if it is not easy to
determine which is the real routing table by analysing the memory of node (i.e.,
because it is obfuscated in someway), the attacker can eventually identify which
table is in use. For example, this information can be retrieved by comparing the
sets of routing tables generated by a node after different discovery phases. Those
elements not present in the intersection of the sets of tables from different phases
can be discarded if we consider sensor nodes to be honest in the sense that the
real routing table is always contained in the node.
5.3.3 Perturbation Requirements
The routing table of each node must be perturbed to prevent an attacker from
easily gaining information about the location of the base station after inspecting
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them. The routing table resulting from the perturbation algorithm must (i)
provide a sufficient level of uncertainty in the adversary and still (ii) be usable to
enable the arrival of data packets at the base station.
Next we provide a formal definition of a routing table that will be later used
to prove some desirable properties of the devised perturbation algorithm.
Definition 4 (Routing table). Let L∗ = LC ∪ LE ∪ LF be the list of all the
neighbours of a node n, where LC = {c1, c2, c3, . . .} are neighbours of level n− 1,
LE = {e1, e2, e3, . . .} are neighbours of level n, and LF = {f1, f2, f3, . . .} are
neighbours of level n+ 1.
A routing table is a bijection r : {N−1, . . . , 0} → L∗, being N the total number
of neighbours.
In other words, a routing table is simply an ordering of all the neighbours
of a specific node. Similarly, we can define pos : L∗ → {N − 1, . . . , 0} as the
inverse of r, such that, given a specific neighbour it returns the position of this
node in the table. An example is depicted in Table 5.1, where pos(c1) = N − 1,
pos(f3) = N − 2, and so forth.
Position Node
N − 1 → c1
N − 2 → f3
N − 3 → c2
. . . . . .
1 → e6
0 → f5
Table 5.1: A Specific Arrangement of a Routing Table
Having gained the previous definitions we are in a position to determine in
which circumstances a routing table enables the eventual delivery of data packets
to the base station. When these conditions are met we say that the routing table
is correctly biased.







More simply, a routing table is correctly biased if and only if the probability
of choosing an element from LC as the recipient of data packets is higher than
the probability of choosing an element from LF .
5.3. Routing Table Perturbation Scheme 145
Proof. Assume that we pick a random combination of neighbours (n1, n2), where
pos(n1) > pos(n2) as defined by our data transmission protocol. Given a subset
L ⊆ L∗ we want to know what the probability is that the first node, n1, is in L.
This probability is given by the following expression:





where C = N ∗ (N − 1)/2 is the total number of combinations of two elements
without repetition of L∗. Also note that C = 1 + 2 + . . .+ (N − 1) = ∑
n∈L∗
pos(n).
It is possible to write all possible combinations without repetitions of two
nodes as a list of pairs, lexicographically ordered, from the routing table:
(r(N − 1), r(N − 2)), (r(N − 1), r(N − 3)), (r(N − 1), r(N − 4)), . . . , (r(N − 1), r(0))
(r(N − 2), r(N − 3)), (r(N − 2), r(N − 4)), . . . , (r(N − 2), r(0))
(r(N − 3), r(N − 4)), . . . , (r(N − 3), r(0))
. . .
(r(1), r(0))
Since the node r(N − 1) appears in the first position of N − 1 pairs, the node
r(N−2) inN−2 pairs, and so on, they are exactly (N−1)+(N−2)+(N−3)+. . .+1
pairs in the list, which is N ∗ (N − 1)/2 = C.
Now, choosing a random pair (n1, n2) such that pos(n1) > pos(n2) is equiv-
alent to choosing any pair from the previous list. Thus, the probability that a
certain node n1 is chosen as the first entry is simply the number of elements in
the routing table r whose position is below n1, divided by the total number of
pairs. This is precisely pos(n1)/C and Equation 5.1 follows directly.
The perturbation degree or bias of a routing table, bias(r), is an important
parameter to quantify because it determines both the speed of convergence of
data packets to the base station and the uncertainty level of the attacker. We
define the bias of a routing table r, bias(r) ∈ [−1, 1], as the probability of sending
data packets in the direction of or in the opposite direction to the base station.
This parameter compares the level or distance of the current node, level(n0),
with the expected value of the level of the next node in the transmission path,
i.e., E(level(n1)). The closer the bias is to 1 the greater the probability is that
data packets are sent to nodes in LC (i.e., the distance decreases). Likewise, a
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bias value close to -1 implies that it is highly likely that the first element of the
resulting combination belongs to LF .
The bias of a routing table can be calculated as the weighted difference be-
tween number of combinations resulting from the neighbours in LC and the num-











Proof. By definition, we have that the bias of a routing table is:
bias(r) := level(n0)− E(level(n1))
The level of the next node n1 is the same level as n0, or this value decremented
or incremented by 1. This is determined by the list of neighbours to which the
node belongs, LE , LC, or LF , respectively. Thus,
E(level(n1)) = (level(n0)− 1) ∗ P(n1 ∈ LC) +
(level(n0) + 1) ∗ P(n1 ∈ LF) +
level(n0) ∗ P(n1 ∈ LE)
= level(n0)− [P(n1 ∈ LC)− P(n1 ∈ LF)]
and now the result follows directly from Equation 5.1.
As previously defined, the bias is a value in the [−1, 1] interval, but not all
values are eligible because the bias is dependent on the number of elements in LC
and LF . For example, bias(r) = −1 if and only if L∗ ≡ LF , since LC = ∅ and∑
n∈LF pos(n) = C.
Let us first calculate the upper bound of the bias. The maximum value,
biasM(r), is reached when the elements in L
C are placed at the top of the routing
table, the elements in LF are placed at the bottom, and the elements in LE are
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where c, f , and N are the number of elements in LC, LF , and L∗, respectively.
Similarly, the minimum value, biasm(r), is reached when L
C is at the bottom,










(N − i)) (5.4)
After mathematical transformations we have that the bias of a particular
routing table r is bounded by the following equation:
c(c− 1)− 2fN + f(f + 1)
N(N − 1) ≤ bias(r) ≤
2cN − c(c + 1)− f(f − 1)
N(N − 1) (5.5)
5.3.4 Perturbation Algorithm
The perturbation algorithm in HISP-NC receives a routing table and a desired
value and outputs an ordering of the table that satisfies, to some degree, the input
bias value. This algorithm must be implemented by all nodes in the network and
given the hardware limitations of the nodes, the complexity of the algorithm (i.e.,
completion time and memory requirements) must be minimised.
A deterministic perturbation algorithm that explores the entire search space
of solutions has a complexity of O(A):
O(A) = N !
c! e! f !
where N is the total number of elements in the routing table, and c, e, and f is
the cardinality of the groups LC, LE , and LF , respectively. This sort of algorithm
always finds the best solution but the cost is determined by the total number of
elements in LC, LE , and LF . Consequently, such a deterministic algorithm might
be viable for configurations where the total number of elements in the table is
low or when the neighbours in the lists are unevenly distributed, i.e., most of the
elements belong to a single list.
Alternatively, this problem can be modelled as an optimisation algorithm
where the objective function depends on the desired bias of the table and the
positions of the nodes comprising it. More precisely, our algorithm is inspired
by evolutionary strategies [44] where simple mutations are applied to the routing
table in order to minimise the distance to the desired bias. In Figure 5.3a we
compare the order of complexity of a deterministic version of the algorithm versus
















































(b) Random swap vs. Smart swap
Figure 5.3: Complexity of perturbation algorithms
its evolutionary counterpart. Clearly, the number of iterations required for the
deterministic algorithm (upper plane) to reach the solution is significantly larger
than for the evolutionary algorithm (lower plane). On the y-axis we depict the
maximum number of iterations that the evolutionary algorithm3 is allowed to run
since it might never find the best solution. Actually, the results presented for the
evolutionary algorithm do not represent the last iteration of the algorithm but
rather the last iteration when the value of the objective function was reduced,
i.e., the iteration when the algorithm obtained the pseudo-optimal solution.
The perturbation algorithm (see Algorithm 8) is triggered immediately after
the topology discovery phase. It receives as input the lists of neighbours from
levels n − 1, n, and n + 1 as well as the desired bias for the routing table and
the maximum number of iterations to run. Firstly, the algorithm calculates the
distance to the objective by means of the energy function (line 1). This function
is basically defined as the distance between the desired bias and the bias of the
current ordering of the table. The operations performed from line 3 to line 11
are intended to reduce the aforementioned distance. To that end, a mutation is
performed over the current routing table (line 4) and then its energy is calculated.
The mutation consists of swapping two elements of the table using a particular
strategy. In the case that the mutation reduces the value of the objective func-
tion, then the previous routing table is discarded. The process is repeated for
MAX ITER iterations or until the desired bias is reached. Finally, the algorithm
returns the perturbed routing table but before starting the data communication
phase, the node must securely erase any data used by the algorithm.
3The deterministic algorithm is not affected by this variable.
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Algorithm 4 Perturbation Algorithm
Input: br ← {LC, LE , LF}
Input: bias, MAX ITER
1: E ← energy(bias, br)
2: i← 0
3: while (i < MAX ITER) ∧ (E 6= 0) do
4: br′ ← swap(br)
5: E ′ ← energy(bias, br′)
6: if (E ′ < E) then
7: br ← br′
8: E ← E ′
9: end if
10: i← i+ 1
11: end while
12: return br
Figure 5.3b depicts the performance of our algorithm with two different swap
functions, which gives a good idea of the average number of iterations our algo-
rithm needs to find a pseudo-optimal solution. More precisely, the upper plane
represents the median number of iterations when using a function that swaps two
random elements of the table. In contrast, the lower plane represents the mean
number of iterations when the mutation is more intelligently done and consists
of swapping the two elements that achieve the largest decrease on the value of
energy function. Clearly, as shown in the figure, the smart swapping converges
faster on the solution than the random swapping, especially as the number of
neighbours increases, but it requires more processing power.
Finally, note that this algorithm might not reach the optimal solution but it
converges to it. Either it is infeasible to achieve the expected solution for the given
lists of neighbours (see Equation 5.5), or the number of iterations of the algorithm
was insufficient for the swapping function to allow the convergence. Also, given
the non-deterministic nature of the solution, it may be that the result differs for
two runs of the algorithm with the same input parameters. This provides an
extra means of protection from reversing attacks.
5.4 Protocol Analysis
This section presents a detailed analysis on the potential limitations that might
hinder the successful operation of the HISP-NC protocol. First, we explore the
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impact of the network topology and the expected number of hops for real messages
to reach the base station prior to and after the perturbation of the routing tables.
Finally, we analyse the overhead introduced by our solution in terms of fake packet
transmissions.
5.4.1 Network Topology
The distribution of real and fake messages is clearly impacted by the number of
the neighbours in each of the groups of the routing table of the nodes. As stated
in Section 5.3.3, the arrangement of the table and the size of each of the groups
of neighbours determine the bias of the table. In other words, Property 1 could
be unsatisfied if the number of neighbours in LC is significantly lower than the
number of neighbours in LF . This problem is dependent on the topology of the
network and the hearing range of the nodes.
To have a clearer picture as to what extent this poses a real limitation to our
data transmission protocol, we provide a numerical analysis on the number of
elements in LF that any sensor node can withstand without sacrificing the us-
ability and privacy of the system. The present analysis considers the unperturbed
version of the routing table, where the elements are arranged according to their
distances to the base station.
Let N be the total number of neighbours of an arbitrary node such that
N = c + e + f , where c, e, and f are the number of neighbours in LC, LE , and
LF , respectively. The theorem below gives a sufficient condition on c, f and N
to ensure the desired property of data convergence.
Theorem 2. Real messages follow a biased random walk converging to the base
station if f <
√
2c(N − c) for any sensor node in the route.
Proof. We want to show that if f <
√
2c(N − c) then P(n1 ∈ LC) > P(n1 ∈ LF),
which represent the probabilities of sending a data message to a node in LC and
LF , respectively.
The number of combinations of two neighbours where at least the first element







while the number of combinations of two neighbours where the first element of
the duple is a node in LC is:






Consequently, the probability of selecting a neighbour in LC is higher than
the probability of selecting a neighbour LF iff the number of combinations with
a closer neighbour in the first position of the duple is larger than those with the
first element being a further neighbour. Formally:
P(n1 ∈ LC) > P(n1 ∈ LF)⇔ c(c− 1) + 2c(e+ f) > f(f − 1)
In order to simplify the analysis we make some generalisations which are less
restrictive but still provide a sufficient condition for the proof.
2c(e+ f) > f 2 ⇒ c(c− 1) + 2c(e+ f) > f(f − 1)
Provided that c+ e+ f = N , the previous equation can be expressed as:
f <
√
2c(N − c) (5.6)




2c(N − c)⇒ P(n1 ∈ LC) > P(n1 ∈ LF)
Intuitively, the imposed restriction can be satisfied in manually deployed net-
works deployed following a particular topology (e.g., grid or mesh). Yet we deem
it necessary to validate the feasibility of our restriction in randomly deployed
networks by means of experimental simulations. In particular, Figure 5.4 depicts
the average results over 50 repetitions of our network discovery protocol for vari-
ous network sizes. We considered the following network parameters: (i) a square
field area of side 1, (ii) the transmission radius of the nodes is set to 0.1, and
(iii) networks ranging in size from 100 to 700 randomly deployed nodes. In Fig-
ure 5.4a we show that the probability of isolated nodes drops significantly when
the network size is over 200 nodes. Moreover, Figure 5.4b presents the average
number of neighbours closer, equal and farther for any node in the network. In
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(a) Probability of isolated nodes







































Figure 5.4: Node connectivity in randomly deployed networks
this figure we also show that the restriction imposed by Equation (5.6) on the
maximum number of further neighbours is satisfied at all times.
Note that the results shown in Figure 5.4b are average values and there might
be some nodes not satisfying the restriction. However, this would only pose some
additional delay unless there are network regions with a high concentration of
nodes unable to fulfil the imposed condition. This issue might cause network
packets to continuously move back and forth impeding their progress towards the
base station. This is not the case when the node density is sufficient. However,
this is a problem that does not only affect our solution.
In general, we can state that when the density of a randomly deployed net-
work is over 350 nodes per square kilometre there is a high probability of full
connectivity; considering transmission ranges of 100 meters. Also, the restriction
on the number of neighbours is satisfied for such density.
5.4.2 Message Delivery Time
The probabilistic nature of our protocol introduces some uncertainty on the de-
livery of messages to the sink. This issue has some implications both on the
reaction time of the network and the energy consumption of the nodes. There-
fore, we provide some insights into the expected number of hops to reach the base
station for a packet originated n hops away.
Let xn be the expected number of hops for a packet originated at distance n.
The proposed transmission protocol can be modelled by the following recurrence
equation:
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(b) Distribution of neighbours
Figure 5.5: Protocol performace for various network configurations
xn = 1 + pxn−1 + qxn + rxn+1 (5.7)
This equation represents a biased random walk where the packet will be for-
warded to a neighbour after increasing the number of hops by one. At each hop,
we have a probability p of delivering the packet to a node closer to the base
station, a probability q of staying at the same distance, and a probability r of
moving in the opposite direction. Therefore, the average speed towards the base
station is p− r.
In general, this result is true for constant values of p and r but this is not
always the case in sensor networks. The reason is that not all sensor nodes
present the same distribution of neighbours. This depends on the hearing range
of the nodes, the network topology and their location in the field. In Figure 5.5
we present the performance of our protocol for WSNs deployed in a grid with
equal transmission power for all nodes. We examine various configurations which
are obtained by increasing the transmission power of the nodes and this in turn
changes the connectivity of the network. Each of these configurations present,
on average, 4, 8, 12 or 20 neighbours per node. Also, for each configuration we
place the source at various distances from the base station: 5, 10, 15 and 20 hops.
Several source nodes are selected for each distance and every single source node
generates 500 data packets to be received by the base station.
The results show that the expected number of hops increases with the dis-
tance to the sink as well as with the connectivity of the nodes. As the number of
neighbours available to a node increases, the more difficult it is for the adversary
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to make a decision on which of the recipients is actually closer to the base station.
However, a significant increase in the number of neighbours also has implications
on the delivery time because as the transmission range grows, more nodes are
included in the group of equally distant neighbours (i.e., LE) of the node. This
issue is shown in Figure 5.5b, where we provide a box-plot representation of the
number of neighbours closer (C), equal (E), and further (F) for the simulated net-
work configurations. For example, C4 indicates the number of closer neighbours
in the 4neigh network configuration.
Additionally, note from Figure 5.5a that, for all the configurations, the average
speed of the packets decreases when they are close to the sink. Consider, for
example, the 4neigh configuration. When the distance to the sink is 5, the
expected delivery time is 11, while a packet at distance 20 will be delivered after
42 hops. This means that the time difference from distance 20 to 5 is 31 and
thus, the average speed is 15/31 = 0.484. However, in the proximities of the base
station (from distance 5 to 0) the speed drops to 5/11 = 0.454. The reason is
that the distribution of neighbours for nodes around the base station is different
from the distribution for distant nodes. More precisely, the nodes in close vicinity
of the base station have very few nodes in the closer list but the number of nodes
at the same distance or further away is high. The imbalance between the lists of
neighbours grows with the transmission range of the nodes, being more significant
for the 20neigh configuration. In this case, the speed drops from 0.358 to 0.179
in the vicinity of the data sink.
As previously stated, the perturbation of the routing tables negatively impacts
the efficiency of the data transmission protocol and thus affects the message
delivery time.
We conducted a number of experiments for the same network configurations
described before. We modified the routing tables of all the nodes using our per-
turbation algorithm, which is configured to perform at most 30 random swaps and
uses input bias values between 0 and 1. For each simulation we sent 500 messages
from 10 random source nodes located at the edge of the network, which is 20 hops
away from the base station. The results are presented in Figure 5.6a, where the
mean number of hops travelled by packets is depicted, and Figure 5.6b, which
shows the relationship between the bias value used as input to the perturbation
algorithm and the mean bias of the network after its application.
From Figure 5.6b we can observe that for those configurations with a larger
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(a) Mean number of hops




























(b) Mean network bias
Figure 5.6: Perturbation impact on message delivery
number of neighbours, the range of values defined for the bias is smaller. This
is the reason why the mean number of hops increases more abruptly as the bias
approaches zero in configurations with fewer neighbours. In particular, when the
desired bias is exactly zero, the mean number of hops for the 4neigh configuration
is significantly high (over 1800 hops) because the mean network bias is slightly
below zero (-0.0097). On the other hand, the mean hop count for the 20neigh
configuration is below 350 hops because the mean network bias is close to 0.1.
In general, setting the desired bias value over 0.2 ensures that the mean num-
ber of hops for any configuration is below 100 for a source node located at the
edge of the network.
5.4.3 Fake Traffic Overhead
The injection of fake traffic is a fundamental feature of the HISP-NC data trans-
mission protocol since it hides the flow of real messages. However, the amount
of fake traffic must be kept as low as possible in order to extend the lifetime of
the nodes. To control the propagation of fake messages, our protocol defines a
system parameter, FAKE TTL, that depends on the hearing range of the ad-
versary in such a way that he is unable to observe the whole fake path. The idea
is to prevent the adversary from controlling the transmissions of the node from
which the first fake packet originated and the node which dropped the last fake
packet, simultaneously. Otherwise, the attacker could learn information about
the direction towards the base station.
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Figure 5.7: Overhead of fake messages
Instead of injecting fake packets at regular intervals, which would provide the
best privacy protection but would also deplete the sensors’ batteries rapidly, the
transmission of fake traffic is triggered by the presence of real packets. When the
eavesdropping range of the adversary is large, the energy cost associated with
fake transmissions would be similar to making sensor nodes inject fake traffic at
regular intervals with the difference being that fake packets would be injected
only in the presence of events.
In Figure 5.7 we illustrate the overhead imposed by HISP-NC for different
time-to-live values. More precisely, we show the ratio of fake over real messages
that is introduced to balance the transmissions in a band around the real path.
When FAKE TTL is set to zero, the ratio is 1 because each real packet is trans-
mitted in conjunction with a single fake packet, which is no longer propagated.
Note that the ratio is not affected by different network topologies since the num-
ber of transmissions performed by the protocol is independent of the connectivity
of the sensor nodes. As the time-to-live grows, the ratio increase is in the order
of O(2n+1) where n is the hearing range of the adversary. In any case, given the
adversarial model considered in this paper the overhead imposed by this approach
is moderate.
Finally, note the overhead imposed by fake transmissions might be reduced
by half if we introduce a slight modification. Instead of sending two packets
upon the reception of traffic, we might send a single packet addressed to two
node identifiers. In this way, and assuming that the identifiers are hidden from
potential observers, the two recipients receive the packet and continue with the
forwarding process. The first identifier indicates the real recipient and the second
indicates the fake recipient. This improvement is possible due to the broadcast
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nature of wireless transmissions, which allows all the neighbours of a node to
overhear its messages.
5.5 Privacy Evaluation
The HISP-NC data transmission protocol aims to provide protection from local
adversaries capable of performing various types of traffic analysis attacks. The
strategy of the adversary is to repeatedly move to a node closer to the base station
by observing the transmissions along the communication path. Starting at any
point of the network he eventually finds a data sender. From this location, the
adversary attempts to determine the direction to the base station by observing
the communications of the data sender and its neighbours.
Firstly, the adversary might perform a time-correlation attack and move in the
direction of the neighbour forwarding the first message transmitted by the data
sender. Given the features of our solution, several cases may occur depending
on whether the packet is real or fake. If the packet is real, the adversary is
highly likely to reduce by one, his distance to the base station. However, this
is not necessarily the case because real traffic might also be forwarded in other
directions. Moreover, the probability of following a real packet is lower than
the probability of following a fake packet. The reason is that, as real messages
move, they generate pairs of messages, one real and one fake, while fake messages
trigger the transmission of pairs of fake messages. Also, note that the adversary
can only be certain of whether he made the right choice when he follows a fake
packet that is no longer propagated. This situation provides the adversary with
no information about the direction to the base station because fake messages are
forwarded in any direction. This is true unless the hearing range of the adversary
allows him to observe both ends of the branch of fake messages. In that case,
the adversary could determine that the root of the branch is closer to the base
station with a high probability.
Alternatively, the adversary might choose to perform a sufficient number of ob-
servations before making a decision on the next move. In that case, the adversary
will move towards the neighbour with the higher transmission rate. To reduce
the success of this strategy, the HISP-NC transmission protocol makes nodes to
evenly distribute messages among their neighbours, thus locally homogenising the
number of packets being observed by a potential adversary. Again, the adversary
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(b) Node Capture Attacks
Figure 5.8: Success rate of different adversaries
cannot distinguish real from fake packets unless he observes a node which, after
receiving a packet, does not forward it. This implies that he is at the edge of the
band of fake messages surrounding the path of real data. Being able to precisely
determine the limits of the band of fake messages could provide the adversary
with information on how to reach the base station. However, the number and be-
haviour of events being reported by the sensor nodes may be extremely dynamic,
which hinders the process of bounding the aforementioned band. Moreover, real
packets are sent following a random walk which causes the band to be rather ar-
bitrary. Consequently, even if the adversary was capable of delimiting the edges
of the band at some point, this information does not necessarily lead him to the
base station.
Notwithstanding, in an attempt to empirically demonstrate the validity of
our privacy-preserving data transmission protocol we have launched a number of
simulations with different types of adversaries starting next to the data sources,
located at various distances from the base station ranging from 5 to 20 hops. Each
experiment was executed for 500 simulation steps and we considered the same
network configurations as in Section 5.4. First we ran simulations under a random
adversarial model that, for each simulation step, moves to a random neighbour
regardless of the transmission of messages. Then, we run the experiments with
attackers performing rate-monitoring and time-correlation attacks. The results
are depicted in Figure 5.8a.
We observe that the success rate of a random adversary is significantly higher
than for the other two types of adversaries but still its success rate is close to
or below 0.35. The random adversary is more effective for configurations where
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the average number of neighbours is smaller. Also note that in a quarter of the
simulations, the adversary is placed only 5 hops away from the base station,
which is when the adversary is more successful. Finally, it is worth noting that
the success rate for the rate-monitoring adversary is zero at all times, however
the time-correlation adversary reaches the base station occasionally, although the
previous analysis suggests that this should not occur. The reason is that due to
the nature of our simulator4 we were unable to precisely represent the behaviour
of a time-correlation adversary. Instead, the devised time-correlation adversary
observes which messages are generated by the neighbours of the node and from
those neighbours it randomly selects one as the next hop. The few times the
adversary reaches the target is due to this random selection and because the
initial position was only 5 hops away from the base station.
Additionally, we studied the success rate of an adversary performing node
capture attacks. For each network configuration and bias value we ran 10 simu-
lations, where the adversary started at random positions from the border of the
network (i.e., 20 hops away). Again, each simulation consisted of 500 simulation
steps, and we assumed that the adversary was capable of capturing the routing
tables of a node at each step. Also, we assumed that the adversary could move
to the next node of interest to him by simply knowing its identifier but in a
real setting the adversary might need to repeatedly capture neighbours until he
eventually finds a particular node. Moreover, the adversary keeps track of the
number of times he has visited each of the nodes in order to perform a more
effective attack and prevent being trapped inside loops. Furthermore, the per-
turbation algorithm is configured to run during the deployment of the network
for at most 30 iterations. Another parameter of the algorithm is the desired bias.
However, if we used the same input bias for all nodes, provided that the distri-
bution of the tables of the nodes might differ significantly, this would cause some
nodes not to modify their routing tables at all and this issue could be exploited
by the adversary. To prevent this, we adjusted the desired bias to the range of
possible bias values of each particular node. In this way, the routing tables of all
the nodes were perturbed to the same extent.
As expected, the number of captures an adversary needs to perform before
reaching the base station increases as the bias of the network approaches zero
4It is not possible to obtain the exact time at which a message is transmitted and thus sort
messages based on their creation time.
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(see Figure 5.8b). Clearly, the protection is more effective for configurations with
a larger number of nodes5 since the adversary keeps a record of already visited
nodes and his strategy is to move to the first node in the routing table with
the least number of visits. Although setting a very low bias is beneficial for
protection against routing table inspection attacks it also negatively affects the
delivery time of packets to the base station. Additionally, the number of tables
an adversary might capture is rather limited due to the complexity of performing
node capture attacks and also because compromising many nodes might reveal
that the network is being attacked. In particular, if we consider that an adversary
could capture at most a tenth of the nodes in the field, it is safe to use a bias
value less than or equal to 0.5. Consequently, the bias is an important parameter
that should be carefully tuned in order to find the right balance between usability
and protection, based on the likelihood of node capture attacks.
However, it is worth noting that any attacker that is able to capture a node
can behave as the node. Such an adversary has access to the (perturbed) routing
tables and he can simulate the algorithm of the node, and by repeating this
process all along the path, he will eventually reach the base station. This is true
for any algorithm, not a problem solely of our solution, as long as the attacker
can capture the routing tables and knows how the node works (i.e., he has all the
secrets), he is able to simulate the nodes he is compromising. Still, implementing
a perturbation algorithm is much better than not modifying the routing tables. In
the latter case, the adversary simply needs to always move to the first neighbour
in the routing table and he will reach the base station with the minimum number
of steps.
5.6 Summary
This chapter has presented HISP-NC, a receiver-location privacy solution that
aims to prevent both traffic analysis and routing table inspection attacks. The
solution consists of a traffic normalisation scheme, which relies on the injection of
controlled amounts of fake traffic to hide the flow of real traffic, and a routing table
perturbation scheme, which reorders the elements of the routing table according
5The number of nodes are 400, 1600, 1600, and 3600 for the configurations of 4, 8, 12, and
20 neighbours, respectively. Still, the distance from the edge to the base station is 20 hops in
all cases.
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to a given bias in order to hinder inspection attacks while ensuring the delivery
of data packets to the base station.
The feasibility of the HISP-NC scheme has been validated both analytically
and experimentally through extensive simulations. In particular, we have anal-
ysed the impact of the connectivity of the network on the convergence of the data
packets and the privacy protection level. We have also investigated the expected
convergence time of packets in order to gain insights into the expected delivery
delay of our solution. Moreover, we have explored the overhead imposed in terms
of fake traffic injection for adversaries with different eavesdropping capabilities.
Finally, we have discussed and evaluated the privacy protection achieved against
adversaries performing different types of traffic analysis and node capture at-
tacks. The proposed solution has proven to be secure and efficient against local
eavesdroppers and attackers capable of inspecting the routing tables of a limited
number of nodes in the network.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This chapter recapitulates our efforts to accomplish the objective of protecting one
of the most critical pieces of contextual information in WSNs, namely, location
information. We start by briefly summarising the research scope and problems
that have been addressed in this thesis. We then present a short description of
each of our contributions to the field while expanding on some possible lines of
improvement. Finally, we introduce open problems that need further research to
facilitate the adoption of this technology in everyday scenarios.
6.1 Contributions
Wireless sensor networks provide a distributed and self-managed sensory system
for monitoring and interacting with the physical world from remote locations.
The information collected by these systems is very diverse in nature due to the
number of sensors that can be fitted into these wireless-enabled, matchbox-sized
computers. This versatility allows the seamless integration of sensor nodes in any
conceivable scenario, being especially useful in remote and hostile environments
but they are also suitable for industrial control, precision agriculture, habitat
monitoring, and so forth.
This technology brings tremendous benefits to both businesses and individuals
but it also poses serious privacy risks due to the myriad data they are capable of
collecting unnoticed. This data collection problem has long been acknowledged
by the research community, who have struggled to devise innovative solutions to
it. Besides this unsolicited surveillance, there are some additional privacy issues
that arise from the wireless nature of the communications in WSNs. These new
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privacy problems are due to the analysis of the metadata associated with the
measurement and transmission of the data collected by the sensor nodes and it
primarily affects the network infrastructure and the phenomena being monitored
by the network, which might be directly related to individuals, goods, or business
processes. Therefore, contextual information privacy becomes an essential service
for wireless sensor networks.
A noteworthy contextual privacy problem is location privacy. Attackers can
determine the location of both the nodes reporting data and the base station,
by observing the data flows in the network. Therefore, the general approach to
protecting location privacy in sensor networks is to obfuscate the traffic pattern
as done in traditional anonymous communication systems originally devised for
computer-based communications. Therefore, the first step towards achieving the
final goal of this thesis was to analyse and understand whether computer-based
anonymity systems could be adapted to solve the location privacy problem in
sensor networks. To that end, we studied which anonymity properties were most
suitable to keep the adversary away from the data sources and the base sta-
tion. We concluded that in order to be able to deal with external attackers it
is necessary to hide the presence of real packets and thus undetectability and
unobservability are desired properties. In contrast, other properties like anonym-
ity and unlinkability are counterproductive or unnecessary in event-driven sensor
networks. Additionally, we wished to study the features and techniques used
by computer-based anonymity systems to asses whether some of them could be
applied to sensor networks. Both centralised and decentralised anonymity solu-
tions were analysed and we concluded that decentralised solutions are generally
more suitable for sensor networks because all the nodes behave similarly, hinder-
ing traffic analysis. We also paid particular attention to the overhead imposed
by these solutions to determine whether some of them could fit the constrained
hardware of sensor nodes. Some of these solutions are lightweight enough but
were devised with a different goal and adversarial model in mind, while other
solutions fit the requirements of the sensor domain but are either overly costly
or they limit the functionality of the network. In essence, the main conclusion
of this research is that, despite their apparent similarity, computer-based anon-
ymous communication systems are not suitable for the particular requirements
and adversarial models being considered, therefore it became obvious the need to
devise new tailored solutions for WSNs.
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This led us to review and categorise the existing literature on privacy in WSN.
We surveyed more than 50 location privacy solutions and grouped them into three
main categories, namely, identity protection, source protection, and receiver pro-
tection. These groups present different sub-categories based on the main features
of the solution and the capabilities of the adversary to be countered by them (see
Figure 3.22). We also analysed their pros and cons, discovered open problems,
and identified research gaps to contribute to. One of the biggest problems that
was identified when reviewing the literature is that location privacy solutions
usually imply larger communication paths, which in turn results in increased en-
ergy consumption, a higher probability of packet loss, and larger delivery delays.
This raised the following research question: Is it possible to activate the privacy
protection mechanisms only when necessary? This is precisely the idea behind
the CALP scheme, our context-aware location privacy solution. It benefits from
the ability of sensor nodes to detect objects in their vicinity so as to determine
the location of an attacker in the field. Using this information, the network can
dynamically readapt the routing paths in order to circumvent the area where the
adversary is located. The scheme was successfully combined with a single-path
routing algorithm to provide source-location privacy with minimal overhead when
the adversary is not present in the field. Specifically, we have devised a strict and
a permissive CALP version of the scheme, both of which provide a solid privacy
protection. The main difference between them lies on the penalties imposed on
the routing through the area controlled by the adversary. In the strict version,
the penalties are so high that packets do not traverse this area while in the per-
missive version, this is possible. The former is more secure but it may impose
overly high transmission delays if the adversary remains static next to the base
station. Therefore, we concluded that switching from a strict to a permissive
approach as packets approach to the base station is the most suitable approach
to protect from both inquisitive and patient adversaries. Although the CALP
mechanism has proven to be efficient in the context of source-location privacy we
believe that it is also suitable for protecting the location of the base station since
it is based on the concept of unobservability.
In the area of receiver-location privacy, we observed that existing solutions
targeting local adversaries were either too costly or leaked location information
in certain circumstances. Moreover, we realised that, unlike solutions for source-
location privacy, no scheme considered the threat of internal adversaries and
166 Chapter 6. Conclusion
routing tables inspection. This is a serious threat to receiver-location privacy
affecting all of the solutions analysed in this thesis since the routing tables of the
nodes contain relevant information about the location or the direction to the base
station. This information is necessary for the routing protocols to deliver data
packets to the destination but it can be exploited by an attacker to effectively
reach the base station, thus rendering the efforts made by the network in deploy-
ing anti-traffic analysis mechanisms absolutely useless. Our solution, HISP-NC,
provides robust probabilistic protection against local adversaries capable of per-
forming typical traffic analysis attacks but also, and for the first time, routing
table inspection attacks. During data transmission, the devised solution sends
data packets on a biased random walk towards the base station and hides this
information flow with controlled amounts of fake traffic. In this way, the overall
number of packets a node distributes between its neighbours is homogeneous and
thus statistically safe while ensuring the convergence of real traffic to the base
station. Additionally, the HISP-NC scheme provides a routing table perturba-
tion scheme that rearranges the elements of the routing table in order to reduce
the risk of node compromise attacks. The perturbation scheme is based on the
concept of routing table bias, which defines the speed at which packets converge
on the base station and depends on the ordering of the table. The solution allows
the network operator to indicate a desired bias, which is useful to reach a balance
between privacy protection and data delivery time.
6.2 Challenges and Future Work
Privacy preservation in WSNs has proved to be an extremely challenging task and
regardless of the number of schemes that have been devised there are still chal-
lenges and open problems that remain unresolved and demand further research
and innovative solutions. This thesis has covered just a subset of privacy prob-
lems within the area of contextual information privacy and there is still room for
improvement. Probably, the most obvious lines of research in the short term are
the enhancement of the proposed source- and receiver-location privacy solutions.
First, we wish to develop and evaluate the apparent benefits of combining a
strict and permissive CALP approach. We are also willing to extend the CALP
scheme to provide a holistic location privacy solution that is able to preserve
the location of both data sources and the base station. A naive solution to
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these problems is to use baseline flooding together with fake data sources but
this approach is too energy consuming for battery-powered devices. Achieving
an effective and energy-efficient solution would be a significant breakthrough in
the area since there is yet to be a single scheme capable of providing an integral
solution to both problems simultaneously. The CALP scheme seems promising in
this respect because it offers unobservability at a very low cost by modifying the
data communication paths based on the location of the adversary. To that end,
we need to further investigate the way in which to provide sensor nodes with the
ability to precisely identify and trace adversaries. By monitoring the movements
of the adversary and not only the current position, the network may be able to
infer the strategy of the attacker as well as its target. Moreover, we are interested
in taking into account the threat of internal adversaries. The proposed solution
assumes that route update messages are secure and legitimate. But what if we
cannot presume that? what if messages are legitimate but they are being created
by compromised nodes? We will look into the notions of reputation and trust as
they seem suitable to identify and revoke nodes that misbehave during the route
updating process.
The receiver-location privacy solution that has been devised in this thesis
is robust against existing traffic analysis attacks but its overhead increases ex-
ponentially with the hearing range of the adversary since fake traffic needs to
extend beyond the area he controls. Therefore, we are currently concentrating
our research efforts on reducing the amount of fake traffic necessary to maintain
an adequate protection level for the base station against powerful adversaries.
The protection against external adversaries has focused on the data transmission
phase but the location of the base station can also be leaked during the network
topology phase. The network is regularly flooded with a hop count message that
allows each sensor node to determine the distance of its neighbours from the base
station. This process is initiated by the base station, thus revealing its location
to external observers. We are working to incorporate an anonymous topology dis-
covery protocol in the HISP-NC scheme in order to provide a complete solution
to receiver-location privacy in WSNs.
Besides the aforementioned improvements, we wish to look into other chal-
lenging open problems. The literature lacks an interoperability framework that
allows researchers to quantify and compare the location privacy protection level
of solutions. Currently, different authors resort to different approaches such as
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measuring entropy, game theory, evidence theory, numerical analysis, and sim-
ulations. However, it is not trivial to provide a formal model that accurately
represents the behaviour of the system, especially in the context of a local ad-
versary. Although it is possible to measure the privacy loss in one step, the
information leak accumulates in such a way that it remains intractable as the
adversary moves through the field. Probably, this is the reason why simulations
is the most common approach to proving the correctness of solutions. But sim-
ulation results are not easily reproducible because either the simulator is not
standardised or the code is not made publicly available, or both. Thus, defining
an interoperability framework is a challenging area of research that may help to
devise enhanced solutions.
In line with the previous issue, it is necessary to formally and faithfully de-
fine the capabilities and actions that may be performed by the adversary. The
traditional approach is to define an adversary with a predefined strategy that
remains unaltered. An appropriate model for representing the knowledge of the
adversary does not exist. At most, the adversary knows whether or not he has
already visited a specific node. The adversary does not use or infer new informa-
tion based on previously known data or additional sources of information. In this
regard, the adversarial model considered in the literature is mostly passive and
does not interfere with the normal operation of the network. Particular attention
must be paid to adversaries who can inject, modify, reply, or block messages from
a portion of the network given the hardware limitations of sensor nodes. Also,
more research must be conducted to devise solutions against internal adversaries,
which are not only capable of obtaining contextual information but also packet
contents.
This thesis has concentrated on a specific wireless sensor network scenario
where sensors nodes are static and they communicate solely with the base station.
However, one of the most promising areas for research and innovation, the Internet
of Things, opens the door to new scenarios where everyday objects are fitted with
sensors, actuators, and limited batteries, just like sensor nodes. In this setting,
mobility is of paramount importance as devices may be carried or moved to
different locations and they might also be directly associated with individuals.
Moreover, these computing devices will not only interact with a single base station
but also with other near or remote devices through the Internet. Consequently,
the solutions that have so far been devised are no longer useful. Similarly, new
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types of adversaries might appear. Therefore, we believe that the integration of
sensor networks with the Internet will result in a prolific area of study.






A.1 Redes de sensores y privacidad
Las redes inala´mbricas de sensores (Wireless Sensor Networks [49]) son sistemas
de monitorizacio´n altamente distribuidos compuestos por nodos sensores y una o
ma´s estaciones base. Los nodos sensores son dispositivos de capacidad computa-
cional y taman˜o reducido, capaces de sentir feno´menos f´ısicos en su entorno y de
comunicarse de manera inala´mbrica. La estacio´n base es un dispositivo de mayor
capacidad que se encarga de recopilar, procesar y ofrecer la informacio´n obtenida
por los nodos sensores a los usuarios de la red.
Gracias a su versatilidad y reducido taman˜o, estas redes han demostrado
ser una tecnolog´ıa ideal para la monitorizacio´n y control de infinidad de esce-
narios. Sin embargo, su reducido taman˜o y el hecho de que los nodos sensores
se encuentren alimentados por pilas o bater´ıas es tambie´n uno de sus mayores
inconvenientes, ya que limitan su capacidad de co´mputo, sus posibilidades de
almacenamiento y su tiempo de vida. Esto influye de manera trasversal en el de-
sarrollo de protocolos y aplicaciones, ya que se hace obligatorio el uso responsable
de los limitados recursos disponibles. Asimismo, esto afecta de manera notable a
la seguridad de estos sistemas, que se convierten en el blanco de diferentes tipos
de amenazas y ataques [139].
A pesar de la infinidad de trabajos dedicados a la proteccio´n de las redes
de sensores en todos sus niveles, tanto hardware como software, la proteccio´n
de la privacidad no ha recibido la suficiente atencio´n de la comunidad cient´ıfica.
En general, podemos distinguir dos tipos de problemas de privacidad derivados
del despliegue de este tipo de redes. El primero y ma´s natural se debe a la
173
174 Appendix A. Resumen en espan˜ol
capacidad que tienen las redes de sensores de pasar desapercibidas al tiempo que
recopilan y correlacionan informacio´n acerca de los individuos o entidades que se
encuentren dentro de su a´mbito de accio´n [145]. Este tipo de amenaza no puede
ser afrontada u´nicamente con medios tecnolo´gicos sino que adema´s requiere de
legislacio´n, auditor´ıas y sanciones severas para persuadir a posibles infractores.
El segundo tipo de problema, que es en el que se centra la presente tesis, afecta
a la privacidad de la propia red de sensores y, en consecuencia, tambie´n puede
afectar a las entidades y objetos que e´sta monitoriza. En este a´mbito encontramos
dos categor´ıas en funcio´n de si las soluciones se centran en proteger el contenido
de los paquetes o el contexto en el que se desarrolla la actividad de la red. As´ı
pues, tenemos content-oriented y context-oriented privacy [100].
Una primera l´ınea de defensa para proteger la privacidad de la red es aplicar
esquemas de cifrado seguros que permitan preservar la confidencialidad de los
datos transmitidos. Esta medida garantiza que entidades externas no tengan
acceso al contenido de los paquetes. Sin embargo, esto por si so´lo no es suficiente
para garantizar la privacidad ya que estos datos estar´ıan disponibles a posibles
atacantes internos (nodos leg´ıtimos controlados por un adversario). Asimismo, un
observador externo podr´ıa inferir informacio´n sensible a trave´s de los atributos
de la comunicacio´n. De hecho, la mera presencia de paquetes puede revelar
informacio´n a un atacante. Por ejemplo, en una red dedicada a monitorizar el
trasiego de individuos en un edificio, la presencia de paquetes significar´ıa que
se ha detectado una persona en un a´rea determinada, independientemente del
contenido del mensaje. Este es un claro problema de privacidad.
A.1.1 Privacidad de localizacio´n
La privacidad de localizacio´n puede definirse como el deseo de decidir en que´ casos
y con que´ precisio´n se expone informacio´n de localizacio´n a terceras partes [5].
En una red de sensores, dependiendo de la entidad cuya localizacio´n queramos
proteger podemos tener privacidad de origen y privacidad de destino. La privaci-
dad de fuente o source-location privacy pretende mantener oculta la localizacio´n
de los nodos que reportan eventos. El objetivo final no es la proteccio´n de los
dispositivos sino garantizar que un atacante no puede determinar el a´rea donde
tienen lugar determinados eventos, ya que los eventos pueden estar asociados a
individuos o recursos de gran valor econo´mico o estrate´gico, como ocurre en el
escenario descrito en la Figura A.1. Por otra parte, la privacidad de destino o
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receiver-location privacy tiene que ver con la proteccio´n de la estacio´n base. Este
dispositivo es de vital importancia para la integridad y supervivencia de la red
porque si se viera comprometido o fuera destruido, todo el sistema dejar´ıa de
ser de utilidad. Pero adema´s de para garantizar la proteccio´n f´ısica de la red, la
ubicacio´n de la estacio´n base es sensible porque suele alojarse en una instalacio´n
de gran relevancia. Por ejemplo, en el escenario de la figura, la estacio´n base
se encuentra en el campamento militar, por lo que al conocer su ubicacio´n el
atacante obtiene una gran ventaja sobre su enemigo.
BS
Figure A.1: Red de sensores desplagada con fines militares
Ambos problemas se deben al modelo de comunicacio´n particular de las redes
de sensores. Estas redes suelen desplegarse con el fin de ofrecer un sistema de
monitorizacio´n en tiempo real. Por ello, tras la deteccio´n de un evento de intere´s
(p. ej., la presencia de tropas) en las inmediaciones de un nodo sensor, e´ste reporta
inmediatamente a la estacio´n base utilizando un protocolo de comunicaciones
multi-salto. Por lo general, con el fin de ahorrar energ´ıa, se hace uso de protocolos
que buscan el camino o´ptimo. El uso de este tipo de protocolos da lugar a
marcados patrones de tra´fico, que facilitan a un atacante localizar el origen y
destino de las comunicaciones.
El atacante suele considerarse pasivo y externo. Un atacante externo es aquel
que no tiene control sobre la infraestructura y por tanto no tiene acceso a los
secretos compartidos por la red u otra informacio´n. Se dice que un atacante es
pasivo cuando no interfiere con el comportamiento normal de la red, es decir,
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se limita a observar el comportamiento. En funcio´n de su capacidad de obser-
vacio´n se distinguen dos modelos de atacante, los atacantes locales y los globales.
T´ıpicamente, los atacantes locales tienen un rango de escucha similar al de un
nodo sensor y, por tanto, suelen moverse por el a´rea de despliegue de la red sigu-
iendo paquetes con el fin de alcanzar su objetivo. La estrategia para determinar
su siguiente movimiento dependera´ de si su objetivo es alcanzar nodos fuente de
evento o la estacio´n base. En cambio, los atacantes globales tienen un rango
de escucha mucho ma´s amplio, equivalente a toda la red, que suele conseguirse
mediante el despliegue de una red de sensores propia que monitoriza la tasa y
tiempos de env´ıo de la red de sensores leg´ıtima.
Cuando el objetivo es localizar a los nodos origen, la estrategia seguida por un
atacante local es realizar un ataque conocido como traceback attack. Para ello, el
atacante cuenta con una antena direccional capaz de estimar el a´ngulo de llegada
de los paquetes que observa y, con esta informacio´n, puede moverse hacia el nodo
que realizo´ el env´ıo. De esta forma el atacante va reduciendo, salto a salto, su
distancia al nodo origen. En cambio, cuando el objetivo es encontrar la estacio´n
base, el atacante local opta por monitorizar los tiempos de env´ıo entre nodos
vecinos o por observar la tasa de env´ıo de los nodos a su alrededor. La primera
estrategia, conocida como time-correlation attack, permite al atacante determinar
la direccio´n hacia la estacio´n base gracias al hecho de que, cuando un nodo recibe
un mensaje, lo reenv´ıa inmediatamente hacia su destino. As´ı pues, el atacante
puede saber que´ vecino esta´ ma´s cerca de la estacio´n base al observar que e´ste
retransmitio´ el mensaje. La segunda estrategia, conocida como rate-monitoring
attack, se basa en el hecho de que los nodos ma´s pro´ximos a la estacio´n base
tienen una tasa de env´ıo mayor al tener que enviar no so´lo su propio tra´fico sino
tambie´n el de nodos remotos. Por ello, el atacante se mueve sucesivamente hacia
el nodo con la tasa de transferencia ma´s elevada de su entorno.
A.2 Adecuacio´n de los sistemas de comunicacio´n
ano´nima
Anteriormente hemos establecido que el problema de la privacidad de localizacio´n
se debe a los marcados patrones de tra´fico caracter´ısticos de las redes de sensores,
que permite a posibles observadores determinar el origen y destino de las comu-
nicaciones. Dado que los sistemas de comunicacio´n ano´nima (ACS) para redes
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de ordenadores fueron disen˜ados con el fin de dificultar el ana´lisis de tra´fico, es-
tos pueden ser una solucio´n plausible al problema. Sin embargo, la literatura
especializada [94, 140] se ha limitado a desechar el amplio espectro de soluciones
existentes con argumentos demasiado vagos, que se centran en la limitacio´n de
recursos de los sensores. Consideramos que este argumento no es suficiente y
cometer´ıamos un serio error al descartar estas soluciones sin un ana´lisis por-
menorizado, ya que en el futuro las capacidades de los sensores pueden mejorar
y equipararse a las ofrecidas por los equipos de sobremesa actuales.
A.2.1 Propiedades de anonimato en WSN
Si bien una de las caracter´ısticas fundamentales de los ACS es que proporcionan
mecanismos para dificultar el ana´lisis de tra´fico, no todos estos sistemas per-
siguen las mismas propiedades de anonimato. Del mismo modo, como veremos a
continuacio´n, no todas las propiedades son de utilidad en redes de sensores.
El anonimato es la capacidad que tiene un individuo de no ser suficientemente
identificable entre un grupo de sujetos con los mismos atributos. Por lo general, lo
que persigue un sistema de anonimato es preservar la identidad de las partes que
intervienen en una comunicacio´n, es decir, la identidad del emisor y la del recep-
tor. En el a´mbito de las WSN la utilidad de esta propiedad esta´ limitada a ciertas
situaciones, llegando a ser contraproducente en otras. Dado que la estacio´n base
necesita saber en todo momento la identidad del nodo que env´ıa la informacio´n
para una correcta gestio´n de los eventos, si se proporciona anonimato a los nodos
origen, la red dejar´ıa de ser de utilidad. Asimismo, los nodos deben conocer el
identificador de la estacio´n base para poder enviarle la informacio´n recopilada.
No obstante, esta propiedad es interesante para hacer frente a atacantes internos
y observadores externos que poseen un mapa de la red. Por tanto, el anonimato
so´lo es de intere´s en ciertas ocasiones y ante determinadas entidades.
De especial importancia para las comunicaciones tradicionales es la propiedad
de no enlazabilidad o unlinkability. Esta propiedad asegura que un atacante
no es capaz de distinguir fehacientemente si dos o ma´s objetos de intere´s esta´n
relacionados. Los ACS suelen esforzarse por proporcionar no enlazabilidad entre
fuente y destino, ya que sin esta propiedad, un atacante puede hacer perfiles
de usuarios en funcio´n de los sitios que visita. Esta idea no tiene demasiado
sentido en redes de sensores convencionales ya que el flujo de comunicacio´n apunta
siempre a la estacio´n base. En estas redes, la enlazabilidad es un problema si el
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atacante es capaz de determinar que un paquete pertenece a un nodo determinado
ya que esto le guiar´ıa directamente a la zona de la red donde se produce el evento.
En tal caso, estamos ante la misma situacio´n que presentamos anteriormente para
la propiedad de anonimato.
Por u´ltimo, hay dos propiedades que se centran en la proteccio´n de los ob-
jetos de intere´s por s´ı mismos. La indetectabilidad o undetectability evita que
un atacante pueda tener la certeza de que un objeto de intere´s existe. Por otra
parte, la inobservabilidad o unobservability proporciona adema´s anonimato a las
entidades relacionadas con el objeto de intere´s. Por tanto, la indetectabilidad
oculta la existencia de mensajes reales mientras que la inobservabilidad adema´s
implica que si los mensajes son descubiertos, sus emisores y receptores no pueden
ser identificados. Estas propiedades son las ma´s naturales para proteger la local-
izacio´n en redes de sensores. Si el atacante es incapaz de detectar la presencia de
mensajes de evento, tampoco podra´ determinar la localizacio´n de los nodos que
se comunican.
A.2.2 Ana´lisis de soluciones tradicionales
Las propiedades antes mencionadas han sido satisfechas por los sistemas ACS a
trave´s de diferentes te´cnicas, con mayor o menor impacto en las comunicaciones
y la carga computacional de los sistemas. Estas te´cnicas van desde un simple
cambio de identidad hasta operaciones ma´s complejas y costosas, tales como la
aplicacio´n de cifrados sucesivos, la inyeccio´n de tra´fico falso, y comunicaciones
sincronizadas. Por otra parte, los sistemas de comunicacio´n ano´nima se pueden
clasificar en centralizados o distribuidos, dependiendo de si los usuarios colaboran
en el proceso de anonimizacio´n. A continuacio´n analizaremos varios sistemas
ACS con el fin de determinar si tanto las te´cnicas utilizadas como el consumo de
recursos se adecuan a las caracter´ısticas y necesidades de las WSNs.
Sistemas centralizados
Las soluciones single-proxy [10] consisten en un u´nico dispositivo que hace de
intermediario en una comunicacio´n, de manera que cuando el emisor manda un
mensaje al destinatario, en lugar de hacerlo directamente, lo hace a trave´s del
proxy, que cambia el identificador del paquete por el suyo propio, ocultando as´ı la
identidad del emisor original. Desde un punto de vista computacional, este tipo de
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soluciones impone un coste computacional mı´nimo, siendo el proxy el que mayor
carga de trabajo realiza, ma´s au´n si tenemos en cuenta que el proxy suele dar
servicio a mu´ltiples clientes. Sin embargo, este tipo de soluciones por si solas so´lo
ocultan la identidad del emisor pero son incapaces de evitar los ataques de tra´fico
t´ıpicos en redes de sensores. Cuando el atacante es local, e´ste es capaz de alcanzar
su objetivo porque los paquetes siguen siempre la misma ruta. En el caso de que
el atacante global, es trivial determinar los extremos de la comunicacio´n, al igual
que pasa con todas las soluciones centralizadas. Sin embargo, el renombrado de
paquetes puede proporcionar cierto nivel de proteccio´n frente a atacantes internos,
al menos para aquellos que se encuentran detra´s del proxy.
Las redes de mixes o mix-nets [26] esta´n formadas por un conjunto de mixes
(i.e., proxies) que esta´n ideadas para comunicaciones tolerantes a retrasos. Cuando
un usuario desea comunicarse con otro, selecciona una serie de mixes y, por cada
uno de ellos, an˜ade a su mensaje una capa de cifrado asime´trico en orden inverso.
De esta forma, cada mix del camino so´lo tiene acceso a su capa de cifrado y no
puede obtener ni el contenido del mensaje ni el resto de nodos del camino, salvo
su antecesor y sucesor. Adema´s, como cada mix almacena todos los mensajes que
recibe durante un periodo de tiempo considerable, se hace extremadamente dif´ıcil
correlacionar los paquetes que env´ıa y recibe. Debido a este importante retraso,
su uso no es adecuado para la mayor´ıa de WSNs, que requieren de capacidad
de monitorizacio´n en tiempo real. Por otra parte, hay otras limitaciones con re-
specto a los requisitos computacionales y de memoria. En primer lugar, los nodos
fuente tienen que crear tantas capas de cifrado asime´trico como mixes atraviese
cada uno de sus mensajes. Esto supone, adema´s, que los nodos deben conocer la
topolog´ıa de la red para ser capaces de aplicar las capas de cifrado en el orden
correcto. Y debera´n almacenar un gran nu´mero de paquetes durante un largo
periodo de tiempo. Aunque este esquema es muy adecuado para hacer frente a
atacantes internos, es incapaz de hacer frente a atacantes globales o atacantes
locales que se muevan en el terreno. Estos u´ltimos podr´ıan llegar al extremo de
la mix-net y seguir los paquetes ya que seguir´ıan rutas fijas.
El esquema de onion routing [108] es muy similar al anterior ya que consta de
una serie de proxies, conocidos como onion routers, pero su principal mecanismo
de defensa no se basa en el retraso de paquetes sino en la ocultacio´n de los caminos
que estos atraviesan. Cuando un emisor necesita enviar informacio´n, primero es-
tablece una ruta o circuito dentro del sistema. El circuito se establece mediante
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una estructura de datos formada por varias capas de criptograf´ıa asime´trica que
contienen las claves que cada intermediario usara´ para descifrar el flujo de datos
posterior. Una vez establecido el circuito, el origen cifra repetidamente los datos
con las claves sime´tricas establecidas con los miembros del camino. Al tener un
funcionamiento similar a las mix-nets, su requisitos y limitaciones son parecidos.
La diferencia principal radica en que no imponen un gran retraso en las comuni-
caciones pero sigue siendo necesario el cifrado (sime´trico) por capas en origen y el
conocimiento de la topolog´ıa de la red para realizarlo en el orden correcto. Cada
nodo intermedio descifra una capa de cada paquete recibido y los multiplexa en
los enlaces cifrados que mantiene con otros miembros de la red. A pesar de que
reduce el coste impuesto por las redes de mixes, sigue siendo un esquema demasi-
ado pesado y adema´s presenta las mismas limitaciones frente los tres modelos de
atacante considerados.
Sistemas distribuidos
En el sistema Crowds [109], su propios miembros forman el sistema de anonimato,
colaborando para enviar peticiones entre todos, ocultando as´ı la identidad del
verdadero origen. Cuando un miembro del sistema quiere enviar un mensaje, se
elige otro miembro al azar para actuar como intermediario. El receptor decide si
repetir el proceso o si enviar finalmente el mensaje al destino. Adema´s, los nodos
del camino descifran el mensaje, reemplazan la identidad por la suya propia y lo
vuelven a cifrar para cambiar su apariencia. Los mensajes posteriores con mismo
origen y destino seguira´n el mismo camino. Aunque no se trate de un esquema
con un coste computacional elevado, los requisitos de memoria son importantes.
Cada nodo debe compartir una clave con cada miembro del Crowd y mantener
una tabla que le indique a que´ camino corresponde cada paquete recibido. Sin
embargo, su mayor limitacio´n es que al ser caminos esta´ticos pueden ser seguidos
fa´cilmente por atacantes locales. A pesar de ser una solucio´n descentralizada, los
atacantes globales siguen siendo capaces de detectar el origen y destino de datos
ya que no se ofrece ningu´n mecanismo para ocultar el env´ıo y todo el tra´fico
generado acaba en la estacio´n base. Sin embargo, los mecanismos utilizados
pueden hacer frente a atacantes internos ya que so´lo conocen el paso anterior y
el siguiente de cada camino.
El protocolo GAP [14] fue ideado para permitir la comparticio´n de archivos en
redes P2P. La idea de base es que cuanto ma´s tra´fico transmite un nodo menos
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probable es que un mensaje particular haya sido generado por e´l. Por ello, la
red mantiene una base de ruido, en forma de tra´fico falso, que permite a los
nodos empezar a transmitir sin exponerse a posibles atacantes. Cuando un nodo
recibe un mensaje, e´ste puede decidir reenviarlo a varios miembros, reenviarlo
tras reemplazar su identificador de origen o simplemente descartarlo. Adema´s,
los datos que atraviesan la red utilizan un esquema de codificacio´n similar a
un cifrado sime´trico que permite a los nodos verificar si los paquetes que reciben
concuerdan con alguna de sus peticiones sin necesidad de descifrar. Finalmente, se
an˜aden pequen˜os retrasos para dificultar la correlacio´n de tra´fico. Este esquema
impone un elevado coste, sobre todo a nivel de consumo energe´tico. Por otra
parte, el modelo de comunicacio´n P2P no concuerda con el de una red de sensores,
aunque la estacio´n base podr´ıa comportarse como un miembro ma´s. En cuanto
al nivel de proteccio´n frente atacantes, este esquema es bastante robusto frente
a observadores y atacantes internos. Tanto atacantes locales como globales son
distra´ıdos gracias al tra´fico falso que se usa de sustento. Los atacantes internos
son evitados en cierta medida gracias al renombrado de las cabeceras y el esquema
de codificacio´n de datos.
El modelo DC-nets [27] permite compartir informacio´n entre un grupo de
usuarios al tiempo que ocultan al emisor (y destino), incluso frente al resto de
participantes del protocolo. Cada ronda del protocolo permite la transmisio´n de
un bit de informacio´n, para lo cual es necesario que cada nodo comparta un bit
secreto con sus vecinos. Todos los miembros transmiten simulta´neamente el re-
sultado de sumar los bits secretos que conoce y si alguien tiene informacio´n que
compartir invierte el resultado de la operacio´n. Como cada secreto se utiliza dos
veces, el resultado de sumar todas las contribuciones debe ser cero, a menos que
alguien haya invertido su resultado. Dado que los bits compartidos son secretos,
no hay manera de determinar el emisor. Este esquema puede extenderse para per-
mitir la transmisio´n mensajes mediante la comparicio´n de nu´meros aleatorios en
lugar de bits. La aplicacio´n del modelo DC-nets en redes de sensores se encuentra
limitada por varios factores. En primer lugar, la necesidad de un canal de emisio´n
sincronizado y fiable que cubra a todos los nodos de la red, incluida la estacio´n
base. En segundo lugar, supone una alta sobrecarga de memoria para almacenar
los secretos para mu´ltiples rondas de protocolo. Adema´s, se desperdicia ancho
de banda y energ´ıa debido a la ejecucio´n continuada de rondas del protocolo
incluso cuando ningu´n participante tiene datos que transmitir. Otro problema
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Limitaciones Modelo de Atacante
CPU, RAM, Otros Global Local Interno
Single-proxy ↓↓ × × ×
Mix-nets ↑↑↑ × × X
Onion routing ↑↑ × × X
Crowds ↓ × × ≈
GAP ↑↑↑ X X X
DC-nets ↑↑↑ X X X
Table A.1: Adecuacio´n de soluciones tradicionales
importante es que este esquema no admite mu´ltiples emisores simulta´neos, lo que
restringe enormemente la aplicabilidad y la naturaleza de la red de sensores.
A.2.3 Resultados
En general, observamos que los mecanismos centralizados son menos apropiados
que los distribuidos. Esto se debe a que un adversario local puede determinar los
puntos de entrada al sistema de anonimato y desde all´ı seguir paquetes hasta el
origen o el destino. Para evitar este tipo de ataques al menos ser´ıa necesario que
los paquetes siguieran caminos distintos para alcanzar y salir de la red de anoni-
mato. Si consideramos atacantes con una visio´n global de la red, ni siquiera con
esta contramedida ser´ıa posible ocultar a los extremos de la comunicacio´n. Los
sistemas distribuidos ofrecen una mejor proteccio´n frente a este tipo de ataques
ya que todos los nodos de la red formaran parte del sistema de anonimato. No
obstante, no todas estas soluciones descentralizadas proporcionan un nivel de
proteccio´n adecuado.
El resultado del ana´lisis realizado se resume en la Tabla A.1, de donde se puede
concluir que si bien es cierto que existen soluciones que son extremadamente
costosas para las capacidades de los nodos sensores actuales, hay tambie´n otras
soluciones que imponen unos requisitos o limitaciones razonables, pero que no
se ajustan a las necesidades o a los modelos de atacante propios de este tipo de
redes.
A.3 Estudio del estado del arte
En la seccio´n anterior hemos concluido que las sistemas de anonimato tradi-
cionales no son aplicables a las redes de sensores. En esta seccio´n vamos a estu-
diar las caracter´ısticas, ventajas e inconvenientes de las soluciones desarrolladas
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espec´ıficamente para hacer frente al problema de la privacidad de localizacio´n en
redes de sensores. El objetivo final de este estudio es detectar puntos de mejora
donde realizar aportaciones.
Con el fin de no extendernos demasiado en la exposicio´n, en lugar de presentar
un ana´lisis pormenorizado de cada una de las soluciones que estudiamos en el
cap´ıtulo original, en este resumen vamos a dedicarnos a destacar las caracter´ısticas
principales de los grupos de soluciones ma´s relevantes que se establecen en nuestra



































Figure A.2: Clasificacio´n de soluciones de privacidad de localizacio´n en WSN
A.3.1 Proteccio´n de la identidad
La proteccio´n de la privacidad de localizacio´n pasa por ocultar cualquier dato
sensible que se env´ıe a trave´s de la red, ya sea en la carga u´til de los paquetes
o en sus cabeceras. Los mecanismos de confidencialidad permiten proteger los
datos, sin embargo, las cabeceras de los paquetes deben ir en claro para permitir
el encaminamiento de los paquetes. Por tanto, un atacante podr´ıa aprovechar
esta informacio´n para determinar que´ nodos intervienen en la comunicacio´n y,
con un mapa de la red, determinar su ubicacio´n. Para dificultar esta tarea se han
desarrollado esquemas de seudo´nimos que van cambiando la identidad del nodo
de manera dina´mica.
El primer grupo de soluciones se basa en un bloque de seudo´nimos limitado
que se distribuye entre los nodos de la red de manera que la estacio´n base tiene
constancia de cuales utiliza cada nodo. El principal inconveniente de este tipo
de esquemas es que se hace necesario almacenar en memoria un gran nu´mero
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de seudo´nimos. Para acabar con esta limitacio´n, se opta por la generacio´n
de seudo´nimos mediante mecanismos criptogra´ficos que permiten crear nuevos
seudo´nimos a medida que van siendo necesarios. Normalmente la generacio´n
se lleva a cabo mediante funciones hash no invertibles para evitar que un ata-
cante puede obtener identidades pasadas si compromete el secreto. Para evitar
este tipo de problemas, se busca una solucio´n de compromiso basada en cadenas
de hashes usadas en orden inverso, lo que implica almacenar los identificadores
temporalmente pero proporcionan mayor resistencia a posibles ataques. Para
mayor seguridad, algunos esquemas proponen aplicar tambie´n la funcio´n hash a
los secretos compartidos cada vez que se utilizan. Sin embargo, es pra´cticamente
imposible disen˜ar un sistema resistente a atacantes capaces de capturar un nodo
y acceder a su memoria interna, ya que tendr´ıan acceso a todos sus secretos y
comportarse como el propio nodo.
A.3.2 Proteccio´n del origen
Los mecanismos dedicados a proteger la localizacio´n de los nodos fuente de eventos
dependen en gran medida del modelo de atacante considerado. As´ı pues, si el
atacante tiene un rango de escucha local, la mayor´ıa de soluciones se han basado
en la generacio´n de caminos aleatorios que pretenden desviar al atacante de su
objetivo. Mientras que si el atacante tiene una visio´n global, se hace uso de tra´fico
falso para ocultar la presencia de eventos. Los mecanismos para hacer frente a
atacantes internos o nodos comprometidos son escasos y diversos.
Atacantes locales
La estrategia seguida por atacantes locales es observar el a´ngulo de llegada de
los mensajes para seguir el camino en sentido inverso hasta el origen. Esta es-
trategia tiene e´xito porque, por normal general, los paquetes siguen siempre el
mismo camino desde el origen hasta el destino. Por ello, la mayor´ıa de soluciones
desarrolladas hasta la fecha se basan en generar un camino diferente por cada
paquete enviado, aunque tambie´n hay algunos esquemas que utilizan tra´fico falso
para desviar al atacante del camino de datos el mayor tiempo posible.
Ba´sicamente encontramos dos grupos de soluciones que generan caminos aleato-
rios, ya sean puros o dirigidos. El primer grupo de soluciones surge a ra´ız del
trabajo iniciado por Ozturk et al. [100], en el que se define el protocolo Phantom
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Routing. E´ste consta de dos fases, una primera en la que se env´ıa el paquete de
forma totalmente aleatoria y se le deja avanzar h saltos. Tras esta primera fase,
se alcanza un nodo aleatorio, conocido como origen fantasma, que se encarga de
enviar el mensaje a la estacio´n base usando un algoritmo de camino o´ptimo. La
principal limitacio´n de este tipo de soluciones se encuentra en la primera fase y
se debe a que el uso de caminos totalmente aleatorios tienden a quedarse en las
proximidades del emisor. Por tanto, la longitud del camino, h, no es tan impor-
tante como su expansio´n. Wei-Ping et al. [144] observo´, adema´s, que es necesario
evitar que los nodos fantasma se encuentren pro´ximos entre s´ı o a la linea recta
que pasa por el origen y la estacio´n base, ya que esto da lugar a caminos muy
similares en la segunda fase, facilitando el ataque de traceback.
Las soluciones de caminos aleatorios dirigidos surgen con el objetivo de guiar
la primera fase del protocolo y acabar as´ı con alguna de las limitaciones anteriores.
Sin embargo, esto no es trivial ya que cada nodo individual suele conocer so´lo a
los nodos de su entorno. Dependiendo del tipo de informacio´n a la que tengan
acceso los nodos, realizara´n esta fase de una forma u otra. Existen soluciones,
como [60, 152], donde los nodos aprovechan que saben la distancia de sus vecinos a
la estacio´n base para guiar el camino. A cada salto se elige con mayor probabilidad
vecinos que este´n ma´s pro´ximos a la estacio´n base. De esta forma, se consiguen
caminos aleatorios que acaban expandie´ndose lejos del emisor. Sin embargo,
esto no evita el problema que observo´ Wei-Ping et al.. En cambio, si los nodos
tienen informacio´n sobre su ubicacio´n y la de sus vecinos, se pueden priorizar
la eleccio´n de nodos con un mayor a´ngulo de inclinacio´n [140, 144], solventando
as´ı el problema. El principal problema del segundo grupo de soluciones es que,
para conocer su ubicacio´n, los nodos necesitan hardware adicional o ser colocados
manualmente.
Finalmente, existen soluciones cuyo mecanismo de proteccio´n se basa en la
generacio´n de tra´fico falso para desviar al atacante del camino. Entre estas,
encontramos un grupo de soluciones que generan tra´fico falso en forma de lazo,
de manera que el tra´fico real y el falso se mezclan en el lazo para confundir al
atacante. En [98], los nodos que generan lazos se deciden de manera probabil´ıstica
y, por tanto, los emisores no tienen porque pertenecer a un lazo, lo que hace
posible llegar al emisor tras descartar lazos. Mientras que en [63], todos los
nodos de la red pertenecen a lazos, con lo que los emisores pertenecen siempre a
alguno de ellos. El principal problema de los lazos es que suponen un consumo
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energe´tico muy elevado. Otros esquemas, como [56, 100], generan emisores falsos
que env´ıan tra´fico para atraer al atacante y as´ı desviarlos del autentico emisor. La
eficacia de estas soluciones depende enormemente de conseguir una distribucio´n
balanceada de emisores falsos en la red.
Atacantes globales
Los atacantes globales tienen un rango de escucha que abarca toda la red de
sensores. Esto implica que las soluciones basadas en la diversificacio´n de caminos
resulten ineficaces ante este tipo de atacantes. Para engan˜ar a un atacante global
es fundamental hacer que la transmisio´n de mensajes sea independiente de la
deteccio´n de eventos. Por tanto, la inyeccio´n de tra´fico falso es un mecanismo
de defensa efectivo porque as´ı los nodos no transmiten so´lo cuando detectan un
evento.
La primera propuesta para hacer frente a este tipo de atacantes fue realizada
por Mehta et al. [89]. Los autores proponen que cada sensor transmita tra´fico
siguiendo un intervalo de tiempos fijo, de manera que, cuando se detecta un
evento, el mensaje correspondiente se retrasa hasta el siguiente tiempo de env´ıo
y si no hay nada que transmitir, se manda un mensaje falso. De esta forma se
consigue la no-observabilidad de los emisores. Sin embargo, esta solucio´n impone
un interesante compromiso entre el retraso en el env´ıo de mensajes de evento y el
gasto energe´tico de realizar demasiadas transmisiones. Este desaf´ıo ha generado
un importante cuerpo de investigacio´n que ha dado lugar a soluciones que afrontan
el problema desde diferentes a´ngulos.
Algunas soluciones se decidan a eliminar mensajes falsos con el objetivo de
reducir el consumo energe´tico [149]. Esto lo hacen mediante una serie de proxies
distribuidos por la red, que al recibir mensajes comprueban si son reales o falsos.
Si el mensaje es falso simplemente se desechan pero, si es real, lo almacenan
temporalmente y cambian su apariencia. Si el proxy no tiene mensajes reales
tendra´ que generar mensajes falsos para evitar cambiar su patro´n de env´ıo. De
esta forma se descarta gran cantidad de tra´fico falso, pero la localizacio´n de los
nodos proxy queda expuesta. Otros trabajos han tratado de reducir el consumo
energe´tico simulando la presencia de eventos en la red [89, 97]. En este caso, no
basta con definir un conjunto esta´tico de emisores falsos ya que el atacante global
podr´ıa detectarlos con facilidad. Se hace necesario que los emisores falsos se vayan
desplazando por la red de manera que su patro´n de movimiento se asemeje lo ma´s
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posible al tipo de eventos que se desea ocultar. Es precisamente esta, la mayor
limitacio´n de estas soluciones, que requieren un conocimiento muy profundo del
comportamiento de los eventos monitorizados.
Finalmente, una serie de trabajos se ha centrado en reducir la latencia en
el env´ıo de los eventos al tiempo que se mantiene un nivel de proteccio´n casi
perfecto [129]. La idea es que, en una ventana de tiempos inter-mensaje con una
determinada distribucio´n de probabilidad, es posible adelantar el env´ıo de un
mensaje de evento siempre y cuando los para´metros de la distribucio´n no se vean
alterados. A tal fin, cuando un nodo detecta un evento calcula cua´l es el mı´nimo
tiempo en el que puede enviar, de manera que la ventana de tiempos pasa un
test de bondad estad´ıstica. A la larga, esto puede alterar la media de tiempos
de la distribucio´n por lo que es necesario retrasar el env´ıo de mensajes falsos
posteriores. Sin embargo, gracias a este mecanismo de recuperacio´n de la media
un atacante podr´ıa detectar diferencias entre diferentes ventanas de tiempo. Por
lo que, en [8], se propone introducir cierta dependencia estad´ıstica tambie´n entre
mensajes falsos haciendo que se parezcan a ventanas con mensajes reales.
Atacantes internos
Los atacantes internos son aquellos nodos leg´ıtimos de la red que han sido com-
prometidos por el atacante y trabajan a sus o´rdenes. La ventaja principal de este
tipo de atacantes es que, al ser parte del sistema comparten secretos y tienen
acceso al contenido de los paquetes que atraviesan su entorno.
Las soluciones propuestas para hacer frente a este tipo de atacante son, hasta
la fecha, muy limitadas y de naturaleza diversa. En primer lugar, encontramos
una solucio´n que utiliza la nocio´n de confianza para evitar que los paquetes pasen
por nodos comprometidos [124]. Cada nodo agrupa sus vecinos en varios grupos
segu´n su distancia a la estacio´n base. Cuando tiene que enviar un paquete, elige
aleatoriamente entre los nodos ma´s cercanos que le resultan confiables. Si no
encuentra ninguno, busca en el resto de grupos por si hubiera alguno confiable.
Asimismo, proponen el remplazo de los identificadores de la cabecera antes de
reenviar el paquete. En [104] se propone un esquema de transformacio´n de las
cabeceras ma´s sofisticado, que consiste en la aplicacio´n de determinadas opera-
ciones criptogra´ficas en nodos de la ruta seleccionados dina´micamente.
Finalmente, existe una solucio´n que trata de evitar que un atacante pueda
obtener informacio´n de localizacio´n en el momento que compromete un nodo [130].
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Esto tiene sentido en un determinado tipo de redes de sensores en las que la
estacio´n base aparece espora´dicamente para recuperar los datos. En este tipo
de redes, hay determinados sensores encargados de almacenar temporalmente
los datos recogidos. La idea de la solucio´n es que cuando un nodo detecta un
evento, cifra los datos con una clave compartida con la estacio´n base y env´ıa el
resultado a uno de estos nodos de almacenamiento. De esta forma, si un atacante
compromete un nodo y recupera su contenido, no sera´ capaz de descifrar los datos
puesto que las claves de cifrado no se encuentran en el nodo.
A.3.3 Proteccio´n del Destino
Al igual que para la proteccio´n de los nodos origen, los mecanismos para proteger
la ubicacio´n de la estacio´n base dependen del modelo atacante. En general, la
idea es homogeneizar la tasa de transmisio´n de los nodos de la red con el fin de
evitar que la zona pro´xima a la estacio´n base tenga una tasa de transmisiones
muy superior al resto de la red.
Atacantes locales
Los atacantes locales utilizan dos tipos de estrategias que les permiten determinar
la direccio´n hacia la estacio´n base: la correlacio´n de tiempos y la monitorizacio´n
de la tasa de env´ıo. La primera se basa en que los nodos reenv´ıan el tra´fico que
reciben inmediatamente despue´s recibirlo. La segunda tiene como fundamento
que los nodos pro´ximos a la estacio´n base tienen una mayor tasa de env´ıo.
Existen una serie de medidas ba´sicas que permiten aliviar estos problemas [39].
En primer lugar, cambiar la apariencia de los mensajes a cada salto, para lo que se
descifran los paquetes recibidos y posteriormente se vuelven a cifrar con la clave
del siguiente salto. A pesar de esto, un atacante puede determinar la direccio´n del
flujo de datos observando los tiempos de env´ıo entre nodos vecinos. Para evitar
este tipo de ataques de correlacio´n de tiempos, se puede optar por almacenar
temporalmente los paquetes recibidos o an˜adir pequen˜os retrasos. Sin embargo,
el atacante puede conocer el siguiente salto observando que´ nodos reciben un
mayor nu´mero de paquetes. Estas medidas son insuficientes y se hace necesario
el empleo de te´cnicas ma´s sofisticadas para balancear la carga de tra´fico en la
red.
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En primer lugar, nos encontramos con soluciones que utilizan caminos aleato-
rios guiados hacia la estacio´n base. En [38], los mensajes se env´ıa siempre hacia
vecinos ma´s pro´ximos a la estacio´n base. El problema es que, tras varias obser-
vaciones, el atacante es capaz de determinar que´ nodos esta´n ma´s pro´ximos. Una
alternativa es enviar los paquetes utilizando caminos uniformemente aleatorios
pero la latencia de las comunicaciones se hace insoportable. Por ello, la mayor´ıa
de soluciones [38, 58] optan por introducir tra´fico falso en otras direcciones para
que la tendencia hacia la estacio´n base no sean tan clara. El problema es que la
cantidad de tra´fico falso o la forma de inyectarlo hace que el atacante siga siendo
capaz de determinar la direccio´n hacia su objetivo.
La inyeccio´n de tra´fico falso tambie´n se ha utilizado para simular la presencia
de la estacio´n base en diversas zonas de la red [25, 38]. En lugar de enviar el tra´fico
de forma aleatoria, se dirige so´lo a determinadas zonas, con lo que se consigue
que e´stas tengan una elevada concentracio´n de tra´fico. El principal inconveniente
de este tipo de soluciones es que requiere enviar tanto tra´fico falso a cada una
de esas zonas como recibe la estacio´n base, para as´ı atraer los atacantes. Esto
supone un coste energe´tico exageradamente elevado. Por otra parte, para que
este tipo de te´cnicas tenga e´xito es necesario que las zonas que reciben tra´fico
falso este´n uniformemente distribuidas en la red.
Atacantes globales
Los atacantes globales son capaces de localizar la estacio´n base porque la concen-
tracio´n de mensajes en su entorno es mayor que en cualquier otra zona de la red.
Por ello, el mecanismos fundamental para evitar este tipo de atacante es generar
tra´fico falso aunque tambie´n se han desarrollado otro tipo de te´cnicas relevantes.
En primer lugar, es interesante observar que un protocolo de inundacio´n tradi-
cional proporciona el mejor nivel de proteccio´n, ya que cada vez que un nodo
transmite un mensaje, todos los nodos de la red lo retransmiten, consiguiendo
as´ı una tasa de env´ıo uniforme en toda la red. Sin embargo este modo de fun-
cionamiento tambie´n supone un gasto energe´tico inmanejable. Por ello, algunas
soluciones han tratado de reducir el coste de esta solucio´n reduciendo el a´rea de
inundacio´n [90]. As´ı, si todos los paquetes se env´ıan a esta zona y obligamos a
la estacio´n base a estar en sus inmediaciones, se consigue que la estacio´n base
reciba los paquetes sin necesidad de inundar toda la red. Obviamente, al reducir
el a´rea de inundacio´n tambie´n disminuye la proteccio´n de la estacio´n base.
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La mayor´ıa de soluciones restantes se basan en el uso de tra´fico falso. Por ejem-
plo, hay soluciones que tratan de equilibrar la tasa de transferencia de todos los
nodos de la red independientemente de su distancia a la estacio´n base [155, 156].
Esto se consigue inyectando tra´fico falso en funcio´n de la tasa de transferencia
de los vecinos directos de la estacio´n base. Como estos nodos son los que ma´s
mensajes env´ıan, el resto de nodos trata de compensar su tasa de env´ıo para
transmitir tanto como estos. La principal limitacio´n de estos trabajos es que se
asume que todos los nodos tienen una tasa de env´ıo constante lo que permite es-
timar cuantos mensajes mandar´ıan los vecinos de la estacio´n base. Adema´s, cabe
la duda de si este mecanismo merece la pena frente a un protocolo de inundacio´n
tradicional.
Tambie´n cabe destacar las te´cnicas que ocultan la estacio´n base por similitud.
La idea es que la estacio´n base se comporte como un nodo cualquiera de la red,
de manera que cuando reciba un paquete lo reenv´ıe para que viaje varios saltos
alejado de su posicio´n [1]. El problema de esta solucio´n es que aunque los paquetes
no muera en la estacio´n base, igualmente la atravesara´n, con lo que esta zona
seguira´ teniendo el mayor volumen de tra´fico. Otra te´cnica interesante consiste
en reubicar a la estacio´n base en otra posicio´n considerada ma´s segura [1, 39].
El principal inconveniente de este tipo de soluciones es co´mo tener la certeza de
que una posicio´n es realmente segura. Si la estacio´n base calcula esta posicio´n
en funcio´n de la tasa de env´ıo en diferentes zonas, el atacante tambie´n podr´ıa
realizar un ca´lculo similar y estimar la siguiente posicio´n.
Finalmente, la creacio´n de zonas calientes con un alto volumen de tra´fico
tambie´n ha sido utilizada como mecanismo de defensa ante atacantes globales [24,
90]. En este caso, hay que prestar especial cuidado a la creacio´n de nuevas zonas
que reciben tra´fico falso ya que, en cualquier momento, la zona donde se encuentra
la estacio´n base sera´ una zona caliente. As´ı pues, el atacante podr´ıa fa´cilmente
realizar un ataque de interseccio´n entre los conjuntos de zonas observadas en
diferentes periodos de tiempo e ir reduciendo el nu´mero de zonas calientes falsas.
A.4 Mecanismo CALP para la proteccio´n del
origen
Nuestra aportacio´n a la proteccio´n de la localizacio´n de nodos fuente es el mecan-
ismo CALP (Context-Aware Source-Location Privacy). Tras el estudio del estado
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del arte observamos que uno de los principales problemas que adolece a la mayor´ıa
de soluciones es que su consumo energe´tico es elevado y esto se debe en gran parte
a que el mecanismo de proteccio´n esta´ activo durante todo el tiempo de vida de la
red. El objetivo que nos marcamos con CALP fue si era posible activar el mecan-
ismo de defensa so´lo cuando la privacidad de localizacio´n se viera amenazada, es
decir, cuando el atacante se encuentra en el a´rea de despliegue de la red.
CALP aprovecha la capacidad sensorial de la red para detectar posibles ata-
cantes y hacer que los mensajes se desv´ıen de su trayectoria para evitar el a´rea
donde se encuentran estos. De esta forma se limita el nu´mero de paquetes que son
capaces de capturar y, por tanto, se reduce su probabilidad de llegar al objetivo.
Al mismo tiempo, se reduce considerablemente la sobrecarga impuesta por las
soluciones actuales, que repercuten negativamente en el tiempo de entrega y el
consumo energe´tico.
A.4.1 Escenario y atacante
Consideramos redes de sensores tradicionales, utilizadas para la monitorizacio´n y
que siguen un modelo de transmisio´n basado en eventos. La red esta´ compuesta
por un nu´mero importante de nodos que se encuentran uniformemente distribui-
dos en una amplia extensio´n de terreno. Adema´s, los nodos son conscientes de
todos sus vecinos y comparten secretos con ellos para permitir un cifrado seguro
de las comunicaciones. La suposicio´n ma´s importante para el funcionamiento de
nuestro esquema es que cada nodo es capaz de detectar la presencia de objetos
en su entorno. Esto se puede conseguir por varios medios, ya sean sensores de
infrarrojos, acu´sticos, de presio´n, magne´ticos, etc.
Por otra parte, consideramos que el modelo de atacante es un observador
local, con un rango de escucha similar al de un nodo sensor tradicional, y que se
desplaza en el terreno realizando ataques de seguimiento de paquetes en sentido
inverso. Permitimos al atacante comenzar desde la posicio´n ma´s favorable para
e´l, que es junto a la estacio´n base. Consideramos que puede seguir dos tipos
de estrategias: ser paciente o curioso. El adversario paciente espera hasta que
escucha un paquete, en cuyo caso se mueve hacia el emisor del mismo. En caso de
estar mucho tiempo sin detectar un paquete vuelve a su posicio´n anterior para ver
si desde esa posicio´n vuelve a escuchar algo. Eventualmente, el atacante podr´ıa
volver a su posicio´n original, junto a la estacio´n base. El atacante curioso se
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comporta de manera parecida, pero en lugar de esperar a que lleguen paquetes
se empieza a mover de manera aleatoria hasta que detecta alguno.
A.4.2 Descripcio´n de la solucio´n
El mecanismo CALP puede verse como un complemento software que se integra
con el resto de componentes de un nodo sensor para permitir protocolos de en-
caminamiento respetuosos con la privacidad. Una de las ventajas principales de
utilizar CALP es que no requiere grandes modificaciones o reemplazar el proto-
colo de encaminamiento utilizado en la red, ya que la interaccio´n entre ambos se
realiza de manera pra´cticamente transparente a trave´s de las tablas de rutas de
los nodos.
En l´ıneas generales, el funcionamiento de CALP es como sigue. Ante la de-
teccio´n de un atacante en su entorno, los nodos reaccionan enviando un mensaje
de actualizacio´n de rutas a sus vecinos. Este mensaje es reenviado durante varios
saltos desde la posicio´n donde se detecto´ al atacante y se utiliza para modificar
las tablas de rutas de los nodos, de manera que cuando se tenga que enviar un
mensaje de evento se evite la regio´n controlada por el atacante.
Para la deteccio´n del atacante, la red puede basarse en la informacio´n ofrecida
por sus propios sensores o puede hacer uso de te´cnicas ma´s complejas basadas en la
interferencias que generan objetos en movimiento sobre las sen˜ales de radio [146].
Esto permite a la red determinar la presencia de objetos en su entorno pero no
es posible discriminar si se trata de un atacante u otra entidad. Cuando la red
se encarga, por ejemplo, de monitorizar tropas en un campo de batalla, e´stas
llevara´n consigo algu´n dispositivo que los identifique mediante un protocolo de
desaf´ıo-respuesta o similar [136]. En tal caso, y para evitar problemas, se puede
optar por activar el mecanismo de defensa ante cualquier otra presencia en el
terreno, aunque en ocasiones se trate de un falso positivo. Para reducir la tasa
de falsos positivos, la red puede observar el comportamiento de los objetos en
presencia de mensajes. Si una entidad no reconocida sigue paquetes en sentido
contrario, la probabilidad de que se trate de un atacante es elevada y por tanto
se comienza a enviar mensajes de actualizacio´n de rutas.
Dado que el objetivo es anticiparse a los movimientos del atacante, es necesario
que los mensajes de actualizacio´n de rutas se expandan varios saltos. De esta
forma, tanto los vecinos inmediatos como los cercanos tendra´n constancia de la
distancia a la que se encuentra el adversario. As´ı pues, cuando un nodo detecta
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una presencia, crea un paquete de actualizacio´n indicando a sus vecinos que el
atacante se encuentra a distancia 1 de ellos. Estos nodos almacenan el valor
recibido, incrementan el valor de distancia y repiten el proceso, difundiendo de
este modo la alerta. Cuanto mayor sea el rango de escucha del atacante ma´s
tendra´ que extenderse la alerta para permitir que los paquetes sean enviados
fuera de su alcance. Es importante notar que el env´ıo de este tipo de paquetes no
aporta ningu´n tipo de informacio´n al atacante acerca de la localizacio´n de nodos
fuente ya que su transmisio´n es independiente de la presencia de eventos en la
red. Y para evitar un consumo extra en la red, se puede optar por aprovechar el
env´ıo perio´dico de tramas baliza (i.e., beacon frames), cuyo cometido es informar
de para´metros de configuracio´n de la red.
Por u´ltimo, durante la fase de env´ıo de informacio´n, cada nodo decide el sigu-
iente salto en funcio´n del protocolo de encaminamiento utilizado y la distancia
de sus vecinos al atacante. Dependiendo de co´mo se utilice esta informacio´n de
distancia al atacante, tenemos al menos dos formas de enviar paquetes: impidi-
endo que los nodos env´ıen a vecinos que se encuentren a menos de una distancia
mı´nima de seguridad o penalizando la seleccio´n de nodos dentro de esta regio´n.
As´ı pues, tendremos una distancia de seguridad estricta y otra permisiva.
A.4.3 CALP con camino o´ptimo
El mecanismo CALP puede utilizarse con diferentes protocolos de encaminamiento
para mejorar la proteccio´n de la privacidad en WSNs. En esta seccio´n nos cen-
tramos en la aplicacio´n de nuestra solucio´n a protocolos de camino o´ptimo (i.e.,
shortest-path routing) ya que proporcionan caracter´ısticas interesantes como la-
tencia y consumo energe´tico mı´nimos.
El algoritmo de base elegido para este trabajo toma decisiones de encami-
namiento de forma voraz, ya que selecciona vecinos de manera localmente optima.
Un vecino es localmente o´ptimo si es el que menos se desv´ıa del segmento imag-
inario que conecta al emisor con la estacio´n base. De esta forma, al combinarlo
con CALP se consigue que los paquetes sigan el camino ma´s corto, desvia´ndose
lo menos posible del camino o´ptimo, incluso en presencia del atacante. En la
Figure A.3 se muestra el proceso de adaptacio´n del camino ante la presencia de
un atacante en el a´rea que atraviesa el camino ma´s corto a la estacio´n base.
Se han desarrollado dos versiones del protocolo. En la versio´n estricta, se
bloquea el env´ıo a nodos que se encuentran pro´ximos al atacante. Para ello,





Figure A.3: Adaptacio´n del camino en presencia del atacante
cuando un nodo tiene datos que enviar, obtiene los vecinos de la tabla de rutas y
para cada uno de ellos observa si su distancia respecto al atacante es adecuada.
Si es menor que la distancia mı´nima de seguridad, aplica la ma´xima penalizacio´n
para evitar que sea elegido, en caso contrario aplica una penalizacio´n lineal en
funcio´n de su a´ngulo y su distancia. Finalmente, el nodo elegido es el que tenga
la menor penalizacio´n. Este comportamiento se describe en el Algoritmo 5
Algorithm 5 Env´ıo en CALP estricto
Entrada: DIST MIN SEG
Entrada: datos
1: vecinos← obtener vecinos()
2: for all ni ∈ vecinos do
3: if distancia(ni) ≤ DIST MIN SEG then
4: penalizacio´n[ni] =∞
5: else
6: penalizacio´n[ni] = a´ngulo(ni) + pi/distancia(ni)
7: end if
8: end for
9: destino← minimo(penalizacio´n, vecinos)
10: enviar(datos, destino)
En la versio´n permisiva, los paquetes no son bloqueados pero los vecinos que se
encuentran en el interior del a´rea considerada peligrosa reciben una penalizacio´n
mayor. De esta forma, los paquetes so´lo son desviados de su camino si la penal-
izacio´n por desviar es menor que por entrar en el a´rea controlada por el atacante.
Una descripcio´n detallada del funcionamiento puede verse en el Algoritmo 6. Tras
obtener su lista de vecinos, el nodo calcula la penalizacio´n base en funcio´n de los
a´ngulos y distancia al atacante de sus vecinos. Esta penalizacio´n es incrementada
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en un factor que es inversamente proporcional a la distancia al atacante si e´ste
se encuentra a menos distancia que la distancia mı´nima de seguridad. El vecino
con menos penalizacio´n recibe los datos.
Algorithm 6 Env´ıo en CALP permisivo
Entrada: DIST MIN SEG
Entrada: datos
1: vecinos← obtener vecinos()
2: for all ni ∈ vecinos do
3: penalizacio´n[ni] = a´ngulo(ni) + pi/distancia(ni)
4: if distancia(ni) ≤ DIST MIN SEG then
5: penalizacio´n[ni] = penalizacio´n[ni] + 1/distancia(ni)
6: end if
7: end for
8: destino← minimo(penalizacio´n, vecinos)
9: enviar(datos, destino)
Para ambos algoritmos ocurre que, cuando el atacante no esta´ presente en
el terreno o en la zona pro´xima al camino, el algoritmo se comporta como el
protocolo original de camino o´ptimo. Finalmente, es interesante observar que
las operaciones realizadas son extremadamente livianas, incluso para dispositivos
muy restringidos. Asimismo, la memoria requerida por este esquema es insignif-
icante. Ba´sicamente, necesita so´lo de una nueva columna en la tabla de rutas
para mantener la distancia de cada vecino al atacante.
A.4.4 Evaluacio´n
La evaluacio´n de nuestra solucio´n se ha llevado a cabo en nuestro propio simu-
lador desarrollado en Matlab. Cada instancia de simulacio´n cuenta con una red
de sensores de 100× 100 sensores, en la que por cada uno de los 500 eventos pro-
gramados en el simulador se env´ıa un nuevo paquete. En cada evento, el atacante
es capaz de desplazarse un salto. Consideramos tanto atacantes pacientes como
curiosos, que originalmente se encuentran junto a la estacio´n base. Por defecto
la distancia mı´nima de seguridad esta´ fijada a una distancia de 5 saltos.
El nivel de proteccio´n de la solucio´n se mide en funcio´n del nu´mero de nodos
origen que el atacante es capaz de alcanzar tras 50 ejecuciones de la misma
instancia de simulacio´n y se compara con el resultado de utilizar el algoritmo de
encaminamiento por camino o´ptimo. Los resultados obtenidos se muestran en la
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Figure A.4: Nu´mero de emisores alcanzados
Figura A.4. A partir de esta figura, observamos que el algoritmo de camino o´ptimo
permite al atacante alcanzar la estacio´n base siempre que sea paciente y espere a
recibir el primer paquete, puesto que el resto seguira´ la misma ruta. Cuando se
utiliza un algoritmo de camino o´ptimo en combinacio´n con el mecanismo CALP,
la situacio´n mejora considerablemente. Ante un adversario curioso (Figura A.4a),
el atacante tiene una ligera ventaja si los emisores se encuentran pro´ximos a la
estacio´n base y sorprendentemente la versio´n permisiva ofrece mejor proteccio´n
que la estricta. Esto se debe a que, en la versio´n estricta, el atacante se mueve
libremente ya que no observa paquetes en su entorno. En cambio, con la versio´n
permisiva, el atacante sigue algunos paquetes que acaban por confundirlo. Ante
un atacante paciente (Figura A.4b), no se ofrece informacio´n de localizacio´n.
En la versio´n permisiva, los paquetes atraen al atacante a una zona lejos de la
estacio´n base y despue´s los caminos se readaptan para evitar al atacante y enviar
los datos a su destino. En cambio, con la versio´n estricta, al bloquearse el env´ıo
de paquetes en el entorno del atacante, e´ste no se ve atra´ıdo por los paquetes y
por tanto no abandona su posicio´n original.
Para evaluar el funcionamiento de nuestro protocolo nos fijamos en la longitud
de los caminos generados y, de nuevo, lo comparamos con el protocolo de camino
o´ptimo, que supone una cota ma´xima de eficiencia. En general, observamos que
la longitud promedio del camino (Figura A.5) es ligeramente superior a la del
camino o´ptimo, siendo esta diferencia mayor cuando el atacante es paciente. En
ese caso, cuando la estrategia es estricta observamos que no se representa la
longitud promedio puesto que la estacio´n base no llega a recibir paquetes. Una
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Figure A.5: Longitud media del camino
solucio´n a este problema pasa por desarrollar una versio´n mixta del protocolo,
que haga un uso permisivo de la distancia de seguridad cuando los nodos esta´n
pro´ximos a la estacio´n base, y estricto cuando el paquete atraviesa zonas remotas.
A pesar de obtener unos valores promedio bastante razonables para ambas
versiones del protocolo, ser´ıa interesante saber si hay ocasiones en las que estos
caminos pueden retrasarse demasiado con el fin de ver la idoneidad de nuestra
solucio´n a aplicaciones con requisitos de tiempo real. Para ello, hemos estudiado
la longitud de los caminos, en presencia de un atacante curioso, mediante diagra-
mas de cajas. Observamos que, cuando se utiliza la versio´n permisiva de CALP
(Figura A.6a), la mayor´ıa de paquetes viaja una nu´mero similar de saltos y so´lo en
raras ocasiones hay algu´n paquete cuya entrega se demora. Sin embargo, cuando
se utiliza la versio´n estricta del protocolo (Figura A.6a), hay paquetes que llegan
a triplicar la distancia media de la distribucio´n. Esto se debe irremediablemente
a la presencia del atacante en zonas pro´ximas a la estacio´n base, lo que provoca
que los paquetes no puedan ser entregados. Para evitar el coste energe´tico que
esto supone, los nodos podr´ıan mantener una lista de nodos visitados y en caso de
generar un bucle, almacenar temporalmente el paquete. Asimismo, prevemos que
la opcio´n de utilizar una estrategia mixta podr´ıa aliviar igualmente el problema.
Por u´ltimo, hemos estudiado co´mo afecta la distancia mı´nima de seguridad al
nivel de proteccio´n y a la longitud de los caminos. Para ello, hemos considerado
un atacante curioso y hemos definido tres distancias de seguridad, con valores 2,
5 y 7. Como era de esperar, cuanto mayor es la distancia de seguridad, menor
nu´mero de capturas y, por tanto, mejor es la proteccio´n (Figura A.7). Adema´s,
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Figure A.7: Impacto sobre el nu´mero de emisores alcanzados
observamos que, en ambos casos, un per´ımetro de seguridad mayor a 2 propor-
ciona un nivel adecuado de proteccio´n, siendo ma´s eficaz cuando la versio´n del
protocolo es permisiva (Figura A.7a). Por otra parte, como puede verse en la
Figura A.8, la distancia de seguridad tiene un impacto casi despreciable sobre
la longitud promedio de los caminos. Sin embargo, como vimos anteriormente,
pueden existir paquetes que atraviesen un nu´mero elevado de saltos antes de ser
entregados. Adema´s, se aprecia que la versio´n estricta es ma´s sensible a la distan-
cia de seguridad (Figura A.8b). Por u´ltimo, es interesante observar que cuando
la distancia de seguridad es 7 y el nodo se encuentra a 10 saltos del destino, no
se entregan los paquetes.
En general, podemos concluir que la versio´n estricta del protocolo tiene la
ventaja de asegurar que el atacante no es capaz de capturar paquetes pero, por































































Figure A.8: Impacto sobre la longitud media de caminos
contra, en ocasiones implica un retraso excesivo en la entrega de los paquetes.
Incluso puede que la entrega no llegue a producirse cuando el atacante no aban-
dona las proximidades de la estacio´n base. La versio´n permisiva tiene la ventaja
de que los paquetes siempre se entregan en un tiempo muy pro´ximo al o´ptimo
y, por tanto, es adecuada para aplicaciones con requisitos de tiempo real. Sin
embargo, tiene el inconveniente de que el atacante puede capturar paquetes en su
entorno aunque esto no llega a tener serias consecuencias en el nivel de proteccio´n
proporcionado a los emisores. Una estrategia mixta que combine las bondades de
ambas estrategias puede resultar bastante interesante.
A.5 Mecanismo HISP-NC para la proteccio´n del
destino
En esta seccio´n presentamos HISP-NC (Homogeneous Injection for Sink Pri-
vacy with Node Compromise protection), nuestro mecanismo para proteger a la
estacio´n base de posibles atacantes locales. Nuestro objetivo era mejorar el nivel
proteccio´n proporcionado por las soluciones basadas en caminos aleatorios, que
en ocasiones revelan la direccio´n hacia la estacio´n base. Asimismo, observamos
que ninguna de las soluciones existente ofrece proteccio´n frente a atacantes ca-
paces de obtener las tablas de rutas, a pesar de que e´stas contienen informacio´n
que permiten encontrar la estacio´n base.
El protocolo HISP-NC consta de dos esquemas complementarios. El primer
esquema, es utilizado durante la transmisio´n de datos y se basa en el env´ıo de
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mensajes siguiendo un camino aleatorio hacia la estacio´n base. Para ocultar el
flujo de datos, se utilizan cantidades controladas de tra´fico falso que permiten
homogeneizar el nu´mero de paquetes enviado a los vecinos de cada nodo. El
segundo esquema, se utiliza para reducir el riesgo que entran˜a la captura de las
tablas de rutas de los nodos. Se trata de un esquema de perturbacio´n que modifica
las tablas de rutas al tiempo que se asegura que los paquetes son entregados a
la estacio´n base. Aunque son esquemas complementarios, si el riesgo de recibir
ataques f´ısicos es reducido, el primero puede funcionar de manera auto´noma para
reducir la sobrecarga que supone la perturbacio´n.
A.5.1 Escenario y atacante
Consideramos una red de sensores dedicada a la monitorizacio´n de eventos, que
esta´ compuesta por un gran nu´mero de sensores y una u´nica estacio´n base. Asum-
imos que la conectividad de la red es elevada y que cada nodo conoce a sus vecinos
as´ı como su distancia a la estacio´n base. De esta forma, cada nodo puede con-
struir su tabla de rutas ordenada en funcio´n de la distancia: vecinos en ma´s
cercanos, a la misma distancia, o ma´s alejados. Nos referiremos a cada uno de
estos grupos como LC, LE y LF respectivamente. Adema´s, suponemos que los
nodos comparten secretos para establecer enlaces seguros.
El atacante es capaz de realizar tanto ataques pasivos (ana´lisis de tra´fico)
como activos (captura de nodos). El rango de escucha del atacante es similar al
de un nodo sensor cualquiera. Tras observar las comunicaciones en su entorno, el
atacante decide moverse con el fin de reducir su distancia hasta el destino. Esta
decisio´n depende de si el atacante opta por un ataque por correlacio´n de tiempos
(time-correlation) o un ataque por volumen de tra´fico (rate monitoring). Cuando
el atacante realiza ataques activos se limita a inspeccionar las tablas de rutas para
conocer los vecinos que esta´n ma´s cercanos a la estacio´n base. En la literatura
no existe una estrategia de captura claramente definida y mientras que algunos
autores consideran la captura aleatoria de nodos, otros optan por la captura de
nodos en una regio´n. En este trabajo consideramos que el atacante es ma´s exitoso
si centra su esfuerzo en una regio´n y avanza segu´n la informacio´n obtenida. Dado
el esfuerzo y el riesgo que supone un ataque de este tipo, el atacante so´lo podra´
comprometer un nu´mero reducido de nodos.
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A.5.2 Descripcio´n de la solucio´n
El protocolo de transmisio´n es ba´sicamente un camino aleatorio guiado cuya
direccio´n se oculta inyectando tra´fico falso de manera controlada. Cuando un
nodo tiene datos que enviar, e´ste transmite el paquete hacia la estacio´n base
con cierta probabilidad sesgada. El env´ıo va acompan˜ado de otro paquete falso
que homogeneiza la tasa de paquetes enviados a cada vecino. De esta forma se
oculta el flujo de datos real localmente sin introducir un retraso excesivo en las
comunicaciones.
El algoritmo de perturbacio´n consiste en reordenar la tabla de rutas de cada
nodo para que si un atacante tiene acceso a e´sta no sea capaz de alcanzar
fa´cilmente la estacio´n base al tener la certeza de que los nodos ma´s pro´ximos
se encuentran ma´s altos en la tabla. El nivel de perturbacio´n de la tabla intro-
duce incertidumbre en el atacante pero al mismo tiempo repercute negativamente
en el tiempo de llegada de los paquetes.
Protocolo de transmisio´n
Cada vez que un nodo transmite, env´ıa dos paquetes. El mecanismo ideado
se basa en la eleccio´n de parejas de vecinos a partir de las combinaciones sin
repeticio´n de parejas de vecinos de la tabla de rutas del nodo. Si la tabla de
rutas se encuentra ordenada en funcio´n de la distancia a la estacio´n base (i.e.,
{LC, LE , LF}), el primer elemento de cada una de las combinaciones resultantes
pertenece a LC con alta probabilidad. Por tanto, si los paquetes reales se env´ıan
a este nodo, conseguimos asegurar la convergencia de los datos a la estacio´n base.
Si adema´s las combinaciones se eligen de manera uniformemente aleatoria, todos
los vecinos reciben en promedio el mismo nu´mero de paquetes, ya que cada vecino
aparece exactamente en l− 1 combinaciones, siendo l el nu´mero de vecinos de la
tabla. Como los mensajes reales y falsos son indistinguibles, un observador local
es incapaz de distinguir el flujo real del falso.
En la Figura A.9a mostramos la tabla de rutas de un nodo arbitrario (la
columna grupo se an˜ade so´lo con fines aclaratorios) y, en la Figura A.9b, las
combinaciones que resultan de esta tabla. Se puede observar que se obtienen 9
combinaciones donde el primer elemento de la combinacio´n, n1, es un vecino ma´s
cercano a la estacio´n base, 5 donde n1 esta´ a la misma distancia que el nodo x, y
1 combinacio´n donde n1 se encuentra en la direccio´n opuesta a la estacio´n base.
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9 5 1
(b) Combinaciones resultantes
Figure A.9: Proceso de seleccio´n de vecinos en HISP-NC
De esta forma, al elegir una combinacio´n al azar, la probabilidad de enviar el
paquete real hacia un nodo ma´s pro´ximo a la estacio´n base es precisamente 9/15.
En el Algoritmo 7 se muestra el comportamiento de nuestro protocolo de
transmisio´n. Los argumentos de entrada son el paquete a reenviar, las combina-
ciones sin repeticio´n de la tabla de rutas ordenada y el para´metro TTL FALSO,
que controla el tiempo de vida de los mensajes falsos en la red y que depende del
rango de escucha del adversario. Cuando un nodo recibe un paquete real, se elige
una combinacio´n aleatoria de dos vecinos que recibira´n el mensaje real y uno falso
(l´ıneas 1 a 3). El mensaje falso se reenviara´ durante TTL FALSO saltos. Si el
paquete recibido es un paquete falso au´n vigente, se reduce su tiempo de vida
y se env´ıan dos mensajes falsos (l´ıneas 5 a 7). Adema´s, las parejas de paquetes
se env´ıan en un orden aleatorio para evitar que el atacante puede determinar de
forma trivial cua´l de los paquetes es el real.
Algorithm 7 Transmisio´n en HISP-NC
Entrada: paquete← recibir()
Entrada: combs← combinar({LC, LE , LF}, 2)
Entrada: TTL FALSO
1: {n1, n2} ← seleccio´n aleatoria(combs)
2: if es real(paquete) then
3: enviar aleatorio(n1, paquete, n2, paquete falso(TTL FALSO))
4: else
5: TTL← obtener tiempo vida(paquete)− 1
6: if TTL > 0 then
7: enviar aleatorio(n1, paquete falso(TTL), n2, paquete falso(TTL))
8: end if
9: end if
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Perturbacio´n de tablas
Mantener el orden de las tablas de rutas es fundamental para el correcto fun-
cionamiento de nuestro protocolo de transmisio´n. Sin embargo, esto puede per-
mitir a un atacante determinar que´ vecinos se encuentran ma´s pro´ximos a la
estacio´n base con so´lo capturar el nodo y obtener su tabla de rutas. Por ello,
ante situaciones de riesgo, es fundamental crear cierta incertidumbre aunque esto
conlleve un aumento en el tiempo de entrega de los paquetes.
Una tabla de rutas L∗ = LC∪LE∪LF es una ordenacio´n concreta de los vecinos
de un nodo. Para que nuestro protocolo de transmisio´n funcione, la ordenacio´n
de la tabla de rutas debe cumplir ciertas propiedades y en tal caso diremos que
tiene un sesgo correcto. Una tabla esta´ correctamente sesgada si cumple que
P(n1 ∈ LC) > P(n1 ∈ LF), es decir, la probabilidad de elegir una combinacio´n en
la que el primer elemento, n1 esta´ ma´s pro´ximo a la estacio´n base, es mayor que
la probabilidad de mandarlo a un nodo ma´s alejado.
Podemos cuantificar el sesgo de una tabla de rutas, bias(r) ∈ [−1, 1], en
funcio´n de la posicio´n que cada vecino tiene en la tabla. Esto es as´ı porque el
nu´mero de combinaciones en las que un vecino aparece en primera posicio´n coin-
cide exactamente con el nu´mero de vecinos que esta´n debajo suya en la tabla. Por
ejemplo, en la Figura A.9, el vecino A aparece en 5 combinaciones como primer
elemento, mientras que el vecino F no aparece en ninguna de las combinaciones
como primer elemento. El sesgo nos permite estimar la velocidad a la que avan-
zan los paquetes reales a la estacio´n base. Cuanto ma´s pro´ximo a 1 es el sesgo,
ma´s probable es que el siguiente nodo de la ruta se encuentre ma´s pro´ximo a la
estacio´n base, mientras que valores pro´ximos a −1 indican que el siguiente nodo












donde C = 1 + 2 + . . .+ (N − 1) es el total de combinaciones que resultan de la
tabla. Es sencillo comprobar que si L∗ ≡ LF , es decir, el nodo so´lo tiene vecinos
ma´s alejados, entonces bias(r) = −1 ya que ∑
n∈LF
pos(n) = C. Del mismo modo,
si L∗ ≡ LC, entonces bias(r) = 1.
Nuestro algoritmo de perturbacio´n recibira´ como para´metros un valor de sesgo
deseado y una tabla de rutas, y devolvera´ la tabla reordenada conforme al sesgo
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dado. En el Algoritmo 8 puede observarse que hemos modelado este algoritmo
como un problema de optimizacio´n, donde la funcio´n objetivo (l´ınea 1) depende
del valor de sesgo deseado y la ordenacio´n actual de la tabla. En concreto, el
algoritmo se inspira en estrategias evolutivas donde intercambiamos dos elementos
de la tabla de rutas (l´ınea 4) y comprobamos si as´ı se reduce la distancia al sesgo
deseado (l´ınea 6). El proceso se repite por un nu´mero ma´ximo de iteraciones o
bien hasta que se genere una ordenacio´n acorde al sesgo.
Algorithm 8 Algoritmo de perturbacio´n
Input: br ← {LC , LE , LF}
Input: sesgo, MAX ITER
1: E ← energia(sesgo, br)
2: i← 0
3: while (i < MAX ITER) ∧ (E 6= 0) do
4: br′ ← intercambiar(br)
5: E′ ← energia(sesgo, br′)
6: if (E′ < E) then
7: br ← br′
8: E ← E′
9: end if
10: i← i + 1
11: end while
12: return br
La principal ventaja de utilizar este tipo de estrategia frente a un algoritmo
de bu´squeda determinista se encuentra en el tiempo necesario para encontrar una
solucio´n (seudo-)o´ptima al problema, que dependiendo del taman˜o del espacio de
bu´squeda puede diferir varios o´rdenes de magnitud. Sin embargo, su principal
desventaja es que, al contrario que bu´squedas deterministas, este tipo de algorit-
mos puede no encontrar la solucio´n o´ptima al problema, aunque converge a ella.
No´tese, que la perturbacio´n introducida es dif´ıcilmente reversible si el valor de
sesgo no es conocido, ma´s au´n cuando el algoritmo es no determinista.
A.5.3 Evaluacio´n
La evaluacio´n se ha realizado en nuestro propio simulador desarrollado en Mat-
lab. Se han definido cuatro configuraciones de red en la que variamos el radio
de transmisio´n para conseguir un nu´mero promedio de vecinos por nodo (4, 8, 12
y 20) diferente por cada configuracio´n. Para ello, tambie´n debemos tener ma´s o
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(a) Numero esperado de saltos



































(b) Impacto del sesgo
Figure A.10: Tiempo de entrega de paquetes
menos nodos, conformando redes de 400, 1600, 1600 y 3600 para las configura-
ciones respectivas. Cada simulacio´n cuenta con 500 pasos de simulacio´n en los
que se env´ıan paquetes hacia la estacio´n base. La evaluacio´n se ha centrado en
estudiar el nivel de proteccio´n de la solucio´n frente a diferentes modelos de ata-
cantes y la sobrecarga impuesta por la solucio´n en funcio´n del tiempo promedio
de entrega y las necesidades de tra´fico falso.
En primer lugar hemos estudiado la sobrecarga que introduce nuestro proto-
colo de transmisio´n. Dada la naturaleza probabil´ıstica del protocolo de trans-
misio´n, los paquetes no siguen el camino o´ptimo a la estacio´n base. En la
Figura A.10, mostramos el nu´mero esperado de saltos para las cuatro config-
uraciones planteadas. En concreto, se presentan los resultados para nodos origen
situados a diferentes distancias (5, 10, 15 y 20 saltos) de la estacio´n base. Como
era de esperar, a mayor distancia y mayor conectividad de los nodos, mayor es el
nu´mero esperado de saltos. Sin embargo, es interesante observar que la velocidad
de avance de los paquetes disminuye cuando los paquetes se acercan a su destino.
Esto se debe a que en las proximidades de la estacio´n base los nodos tienen un
mayor nu´mero de vecinos LF .
En la Figura A.10b se muestra el impacto que tiene el algoritmo de pertur-
bacio´n sobre el tiempo de entrega. En este experimento todos los nodos esta´n
situados a distancia 20. Observamos que a medida que el sesgo se aproxima a cero
el tiempo de entrega aumenta, siendo considerablemente mayor para configura-
ciones con un menor nu´mero de vecinos. Esto se debe a que las configuraciones
con menos vecinos tienen menos formas de modificar las tablas de rutas. En
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rango de escucha del atacante
Figure A.11: Ratio de tra´fico falso
concreto, cuando el sesgo deseado es cero, el sesgo promedio de la red para la
configuracio´n de cuatro vecinos es ligeramente inferior a cero, mientras que para
la configuracio´n de veinte vecinos el sesgo promedio esta´ pro´ximo a 0.1. En gen-
eral, para un sesgo superior a 0.2 la longitud media de los caminos es inferior a
100 saltos.
En cuanto al tra´fico falso, la tasa de inyeccio´n depende directamente del
para´metro TTL FALSO, cuyo valor depende del rango de escucha del atacante y
que limita el nu´mero de paquetes falsos generados. En la Figure A.11 mostramos
el ratio de mensaje falsos frente al tra´fico real dependiendo del rango de escucha
del atacante. Cuando el adversario so´lo escucha los paquetes en su entorno in-
mediato, el ratio es 1 porque cada mensaje real va acompan˜ado de un mensaje
falso, que no vuelve a propagarse. A medida que el rango de escucha del adver-
sario aumenta, el ratio lo hace en el orden de O(2n+1). A pesar de que se trata
de una tasa exponencial, el modelo de atacante que consideramos es el t´ıpico
de la literatura que tiene un rango de escucha local, similar al de un nodo ordi-
nario. Basta con reenviar el tra´fico falso una vez para evitar para evitar que el
atacante observara todo el camino, lo cual es suficiente para evitar que obtenga
informacio´n sensible.
Finalmente, estudiamos la robustez de nuestra solucio´n frente a atacantes que
realizan ana´lisis de tra´fico o captura de nodos. En la Figure A.12a se muestra
como un modelo de atacante que se mueve de manera aleatoria, sin tener en
cuenta las comunicaciones, tiene mayor probabilidad de llegar a la estacio´n base
que aquellos que recurren a te´cnicas de monitorizacio´n del tiempo y tasa de
env´ıo de paquetes. Adema´s, como era de esperar, su tasa de e´xito es mayor
en configuraciones con un promedio de vecinos ma´s bajo. Obse´rvese que, del
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(b) Ataques de captura de nodos
Figure A.12: Tasa de e´xito de diferentes adversarios
total de simulaciones lanzadas, el atacante que realiza monitorizacio´n de la tasa
de env´ıo nunca llega a la estacio´n base mientras que el que realiza correlacio´n
de tiempos lo consigue en limitadas ocasiones. Esto se debe a que el atacante
se encuentra inicialmente a distancia 5 y a la naturaleza de nuestro simulador,
que es incapaz de determinar exactamente que´ paquete es enviado antes. Por
tanto, este atacante elige el siguiente salto de forma aleatoria entre los vecinos
que env´ıan mensajes.
En la Figure A.12b, el adversario comienza en un punto del extremo de la red y
puede capturar hasta 500 nodos para llegar a la estacio´n base. Adema´s, asumimos
que el atacante puede moverse al siguiente vecino tras obtener su identificador
de la tabla de rutas aunque en un escenario real puede necesitar capturar a
todos los vecinos del nodo para saber a cua´l de ellos corresponde el identificador
encontrado. La estrategia del atacante es moverse al primer nodo de la tabla de
rutas que ha visitado un menor nu´mero de veces para evitar quedar atrapado en
bucles. Los resultados muestran que, a medida que el sesgo de la red se acerca
a cero, el adversario necesita capturar un mayor nu´mero de nodos para llegar a
su destino. Sin embargo, un sesgo bajo influye negativamente en el tiempo de
llegada de los paquetes a la estacio´n base. En general, si consideramos que un
atacante podr´ıa capturar hasta una de´cima parte de los nodos de la red, ser´ıa
seguro utilizar un valor de sesgo menor o igual a 0.5. Por tanto, para garantizar
un nivel de seguridad adecuado al tiempo que protegemos a la red de ataques de
inspeccio´n de tablas de rutas el sesgo de la red deber´ıa encontrarse entre 0.2 y
0.5.
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A.6 Conclusio´n
Esta tesis se ha concentrado en el problema de la privacidad de localizacio´n en
WSNs. Este problema surge por la naturaleza inala´mbrica de las comunicaciones,
que permite a un observador analizar los patrones de tra´fico y determinar la
ubicacio´n tanto de los nodos que generan eventos como de la estacio´n base.
Dado que se trata de un problema de ana´lisis de tra´fico, el primer paso que con-
sideramos fue estudiar si las soluciones de anonimato para redes de ordenadores
eran aplicables a este entorno. Para ello, en lugar de limitarnos a estudiar los
requisitos computacionales de estas soluciones, tambie´n prestamos atencio´n a las
caracter´ısticas del modelo de comunicacio´n, a los modelos de atacantes t´ıpicos y a
las propiedades de anonimato que mejor se ajustaban al problema. Con todo esto
concluimos que, a pesar de que puede parecer que los sistemas de comunicacio´n
ano´nima tradicionales son aplicables, estos no se ajustan a las necesidades del
nuevo entorno. Por tanto, se hace necesario idear nuevas soluciones disen˜adas
espec´ıficamente para este redes de sensores.
Tras realizar un ana´lisis exhaustivo del estado del arte y agrupar las diferentes
soluciones en funcio´n del tipo de informacio´n que protegen y el modelo de atacante
que consideraban, detectamos una serie de puntos de mejora que hemos plasmado
en dos soluciones para hacer frente a atacantes con un rango de accio´n local. En
primer lugar observamos que los mecanismos de proteccio´n disen˜ados hasta la
fecha estaban activos en todo momento, independientemente de si el atacante
se encuentra en el terreno analizando el tra´fico. Esto nos llevo´ a plantearnos la
pregunta de si era posible activar el mecanismo de proteccio´n so´lo cuando fuera
necesario, reduciendo as´ı el retraso en las comunicaciones y el consumo energe´tico.
El mecanismo CALP da respuesta a esta pregunta, proporcionando un mecanismo
de privacidad capaz de enviar los paquetes evitando la zona controlada por el
atacante. Para ello, se aprovecha la capacidad sensorial de la red para detectar
objetos en su entorno. A pesar de que la robustez de este esquema so´lo fue
estudiada para proteger la localizacio´n de nodos origen, creemos que adema´s
puede ser de gran utilidad para la proteccio´n de la estacio´n base. La validez de
esta afirmacio´n la planteamos como trabajo futuro.
Por otra parte, observamos que las soluciones dedicadas a la proteccio´n de la
estacio´n base o bien eran muy costosas o bien no eran suficientemente robustas.
Adema´s, notamos que un atacante podr´ıa aprovechar las tablas de ruta de los no-
dos sensores para obtener informacio´n sobre la localizacio´n de la estacio´n base. A
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pesar de esto, ningu´n trabajo hasta la fecha ha considerado este tipo de amenaza.
Nuestra solucio´n, HISP-NC, cuenta con dos mecanismos capaces de hacer frente
a atacantes que realizan tanto ataques de ana´lisis de tra´fico como inspeccio´n de
tablas de rutas. Durante la transmisio´n de datos, los paquetes de datos siguen un
camino aleatorio guiado hacia la estacio´n base, que se oculta enviando mensajes
falsos. La idea es que cada vecino reciba en promedio la misma tasa de mensajes.
Adema´s, se ofrece un mecanismo que perturba las tablas de rutas de los nodos
de manera que el atacante no pueda identificar con facilidad que´ vecinos esta´n
ma´s pro´ximos a su objetivo. Uno de los principales puntos en contra de nuestra
solucio´n es que si el atacante tiene un rango de escucha amplio, se requiere una
tasa de mensajes falsos que crece de manera exponencial. Encontrar la forma de
reducir esta tasa se encuentra entre nuestras l´ıneas de trabajo futuro.
A pesar del trabajo desarrollado durante esta tesis quedan muchos frentes de
actuacio´n por explorar. En primer lugar, creemos necesaria la bu´squeda de nuevas
soluciones que introduzcan me´todos novedosos, como el propuesto por CALP, que
permitan reducir el elevado coste de aplicar mecanismos de defensa. Otro aspecto
de intere´s es el desarrollo de soluciones globales, capaces de proteger a los nodos
origen y destino de manera simulta´nea. Asimismo, es fundamental el desarrollo
de un marco unificado que permita cuantificar y comparar soluciones entre s´ı. En
linea con esto u´ltimo, es necesario definir modelos de atacante ma´s inteligentes,
capaces de adaptarse a la situacio´n y utilizar informacio´n externa para alcanzar su
objetivo. Por u´ltimo, nos gustar´ıa investigar y desarrollar soluciones de privacidad
para entornos dina´micos, como la Internet de los Objetos, donde la movilidad
es de vital importancia y los nodos no se comunican u´nicamente con la estacio´n
base sino con otros dispositivos. En este tipo de entornos no so´lo aparecen nuevas
formas de comunicacio´n sino tambie´n nuevos modelos de atacante y, por tanto,
sera´ necesario desarrollar nuevas soluciones.
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